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Abstract
There exist numerous documented behavioral deviations from standard discounted utility maximizing
behavior. These include time inconsistency, violations of the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives,
preferences for commitment, and preferences over the timing of information. I develop two novel models
which provide new insights into, and plausible explanations for, several of these deviations. In the first model,
Multiself Bargaining, I propose a dual-self model in which two selves have conflicting preferences over the
action to be taken by an agent. The selves have identical payoff utility, and only differ in their time preference
factor. The default action of the agent is modeled as the outcome of a Tullock contest among the selves, where
the self who wins chooses their preferred action. Viewing the outcome of this contest as the point of
disagreement, the selves are allowed to negotiate to a mutually preferred outcome, and this negotiation is
modeled as a Nash bargaining problem. I show that many of the deviations of interest are generated by this
model, including time inconsistent behavior, such as diminishing impatience, as well as violations of
independence of irrelevant alternatives in choice problems. Notably the preference reversals from time
inconsistency are “smooth”, as opposed to the singular reversal in quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the standard
model used in the literature. In the second model, Temporal Reference Points, I develop an alternate form of
prospect evaluation in which agents form a set of subjectively important points in time in the life of a prospect,
termed “temporal reference points.” When determining the present value of a prospect, agents discount based
on the time between each of these temporal reference points, as opposed to based on the entire time between
the present and the payout of the prospect. Under restrictions on the formation of temporal reference points,
diminishing impatience in an agent is shown to be equivalent to a preference for informational updates
occurring at the same time. Finally, the model is shown to allow the novel resolution of an apparent conflict in
the experimental evidence on diminishing impatience.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MULTIPLE SELVES AND TEMPORAL FRAMING
Rudy Henkel
David Dillenberger
Mallesh Pai
There exist numerous documented behavioral deviations from standard discounted utility maximiz-
ing behavior. These include time inconsistency, violations of the axiom of independence of irrelevant
alternatives, preferences for commitment, and preferences over the timing of information. I develop
two novel models which provide new insights into, and plausible explanations for, several of these
deviations. In the ﬁrst model, Multiself Bargaining, I propose a dual-self model in which two selves
have conﬂicting preferences over the action to be taken by an agent. The selves have identical payoﬀ
utility, and only diﬀer in their time preference factor. The default action of the agent is modeled as
the outcome of a Tullock contest among the selves, where the self who wins chooses their preferred
action. Viewing the outcome of this contest as the point of disagreement, the selves are allowed to
negotiate to a mutually preferred outcome, and this negotiation is modeled as a Nash bargaining
problem. I show that many of the deviations of interest are generated by this model, including time
inconsistent behavior, such as diminishing impatience, as well as violations of independence of irrel-
evant alternatives in choice problems. Notably the preference reversals from time inconsistency are
smooth, as opposed to the singular reversal in quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the standard model
used in the literature. In the second model, Temporal Reference Points, I develop an alternate form
of prospect evaluation in which agents form a set of subjectively important points in time in the
life of a prospect, termed temporal reference points. When determining the present value of a
prospect, agents discount based on the time between each of these temporal reference points, as
opposed to based on the entire time between the present and the payout of the prospect. Under
restrictions on the formation of temporal reference points, diminishing impatience in an agent is
shown to be equivalent to a preference for informational updates occurring at the same time. Fi-
nally, the model is shown to allow the novel resolution of an apparent conﬂict in the experimental
evidence on diminishing impatience.
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Part I
Multiself Bargaining
The idea of self-control is paradoxical unless it is assumed that the psyche contains more
than one energy system, and that these energy systems have some degree of independence
from each other. (Donald McIntosh, The Foundations of Human Society, 1969)
1 Introduction
The observable behavior of decision making agents includes a number of ubiquitous eﬀects not
consistent with the predictions of standard utility maximization with geometric time discounting.
Among these, agents exhibit time inconsistency; speciﬁcally, they have reversals of preference when
outcomes are mutually delayed. Agents exhibit violations of independence of irrelevant alternatives
in choice problems; in general, their decision may depend on the entire choice set, and they may be
tempted toward an option that they yet do not choose. Related to both of these, agents seek out
commitment devices, whether to prevent preference reversals, or to remove temptations, even when
such devices are costly.
That an individual might contain conﬂicting internal preferences is certainly one potential cause
of these phenomena. One strand of work in neurology views the brain as operating with a team
of rivals architecture, wherein diﬀerent sections of the brain compete with each other directly for
control over the actions of the individual, e.g. Eagleman (2011). Some MRI evidence is consistent
with the notion that decisions made with diﬀerent time horizons engage very diﬀerent areas of the
brain, e.g. McClure et al. (2004). Threads of research in psychology also address the idea of conﬂict
between multiple selves, e.g. Ainslie (1986).
Without laying claim to being a model of the brain, which it is not, this work has the goal of
formalizing this neurological inspiration in order to account for the described empirical regularities
in behavior. I do this through the use of a novel dual-self model. The model gives rise to a
smooth form of time inconsistency, which has the same qualitative implications as hyperbolic time
discounting. It further generates a two-sided temptation eﬀect, in which unchosen alternatives alter
the decisions of the agent. The model additionally predicts the use of costly commitment devices by
the agent, provides strong intuition about the nature of these phenomena, and provides some novel
insight into welfare evaluation.
I model an individual decision maker, or agent, as consisting of two selves: one patient and
one impatient. The selves are taken to share the same payoﬀ utility, and each discounts time
1
geometrically, but they diﬀer in their time discount factor. Thus, while they agree on the immediate
utility granted by a decision, such as which ﬂavor of ice cream is the most delicious, they will in
general disagree with regard to decisions which have consequences over time, such as whether it is a
good idea to eat the ice cream. If the selves cannot agree on what action to take, it is assumed that
they engage in a costly conﬂict over control of the action, modeled as a variant on a Tullock (1980)
rent-seeking game.1 The self that wins the conﬂict then chooses their most preferred action.
I allow the selves to negotiate in order to select an action mutually preferred to this costly
conﬂict; this negotiation is modeled as a Nash bargaining problem. The bargaining set is the set
of possible utility vectors created by available actions, or lotteries over actions, and the outcome
of the costly conﬂict is treated as the disagreement point for the bargaining. Thus, in equilibrium,
the costly conﬂict will not occur, as the selves will negotiate to a better outcome. This bargaining
can result in either a deterministic choice in some applications, such as consumption-savings, or
an agreed upon mixing between discrete choices in some discrete menu choice applications; both of
these are addressed. Section 2 details the model in full.
The ﬁrst empirical regularity, addressed in Section 3, is diminishing impatience. This is a par-
ticular form of time inconsistent preference reversal, where as the consequences of a decision are
pushed into the future, an individual's choices exhibit less impatience regarding the outcome. As a
simple example, an individual given the choice between $100 today and $120 tomorrow may choose
the $100 today, but when presented with the choice between $100 in seven days and $120 in eight
days may switch, and now desire to wait the extra day for the greater reward. As another example,
an individual may desire to save a large portion of his next paycheck for retirement; however, when
payday arrives, he may change his mind when faced with the immediate reality of reducing his con-
sumption. Proposition 1 establishes that the multiself bargaining model reﬂects a smooth form of
diminishing impatience. In discrete decisions, as payoﬀs at diﬀerent times are both pushed into the
future, the observed patience of the agent increases continuously, in that they choose latter rewards
with continuously increasing probability. For continuous decisions, such as consumption-savings,
the model predicts that their decision reﬂects greater patience as the decision is made farther in
advance, such as through a higher savings rate.
The empirical evidence for diminishing impatience is broad, and spans disciplines, seeing par-
ticular interest in psychology and economics; e.g. Thaler (1981), Loewenstein and Prelec (1992),
Kirby and Herrenstein (1995), Frederick et al. (2002), Fang and Silverman (2009). Many models
attempt to incorporate the phenomenon by utilizing forms of time discounting other than geomet-
ric. Evidence, e.g. Ainslie (1992) and Myerson and Green (1995), suggests that the form of time
discounting reﬂected in the decisions of agents is well ﬁt by hyperbolic discounting, in which the
1Also used by Benabou and Pycia (2002).
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discount factor falls steeply at ﬁrst, but then less rapidly.2 Consumption data is shown by some
work, e.g. Angeletos et al. (2001), to be much better ﬁt by hyperbolic models than exponential.
The most commonly used model of diminishing impatience, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, also re-
ferred to as beta-delta, was introduced by Laibson (1997). Quasi-hyperbolic discounting amounts
to having one time discount factor between the current period and the next period, and a second,
higher, time discount factor for evaluating between all periods thereafter. The diﬃculty with such
an approach is that it allows only a discontinuous form of diminishing impatience: a stark division
between now and later extremely sensitive to the precise deﬁnition of the length of a period. One
advantage of the multiself bargaining model is that the form of diminishing impatience it creates
more closely reﬂects hyperbolic than quasi-hyperbolic discounting, avoiding this discontinuity and
period sensitivity.
The tendency of agents to utilize costly commitment actions is addressed in Section 4. Evi-
dence for the use of commitment options includes voluntary intermediate deadlines, e.g. Ariely and
Wertenbroch (2002), Kaur et al. (2009), and savings pre-commitment, e.g. Thaler and Benartzi
(2004). In many cases these options are a priori ineﬃcient, as the same choices can be made with-
out the costly commitment device. Individuals now make use of smart phone apps which impose
ﬁnancial penalties for not going to the gym, for example. As we are dealing with preference aggre-
gation, and not a single set of preferences, the model cannot easily address a true preference for
commitment, and commitment options cannot beneﬁt both selves in this model. However, we can
speak of what the model implies about the behavior of the agent. Proposition 2 establishes that
for suﬃciently low, but positive, commitment cost, agents will make use of commitment devices to
commit to speciﬁc actions in advance with strictly positive probability. Further, under a broad set
of conditions, this probability will be 1. Intuitively, this arises from the fact that the patient self
has greater foresight when making decisions further in advance, and this foresight places that self in
a better position for bargaining; the commitment device then allows the patient self the ability to
lock in that superior position. Proposition 3 establishes conditions under which the same result will
hold when commitment devices for minimal (or maximal) actions are available, such as a minimum
amount of savings.
The eﬀects of tempting options on choices is addressed in Section 5. Temptation here is used
to refer to cases where the addition of an option to a choice set alters the decision made by the
individual, even when the new option is not chosen; in other words, a violation of independence of
irrelevant alternatives. This is documented in choices from discrete sets, as well as in consumption-
savings decisions, e.g. Hanks et al. (2012), Ashraf et al. (2006), Huang et al. (2013). Existing
literature on temptation primarily relies on choices being assigned some explicit temptation, or self-
2Speciﬁcally, under generalized hyperbolic discounting, a reward in t time is discounted by (1 + αt)−(γ/α).
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control value, e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). The agent is taken to have a limited, or costly,
capacity to resist such temptations. In contrast with this literature, in this model temptation eﬀects
will arise endogenously from the diﬀering utility evaluations of the selves, which in turn result from
their diﬀering time preference. Proposition 4 establishes that when the utility granted to a self by
their most preferred action increases, the agent will choose an action, or lottery, that grants that
self a higher expected utility, even if this most preferred action is an irrelevant alternative.
However, the overall temptation eﬀect of an action will be shown to depend on how much the
option is valued by both selves. If the preferred action of the short-term self is regarded as particularly
awful by the long-term self, such as a very unhealthy dessert choice, then the anticipated eﬀort the
long-term self exerts in conﬂict increases. Proposition 5 examines how the utility granted to the
long-term self by the short-term self's preferred action inﬂuences the outcome, establishing a cutoﬀ
which determines the way in which changes to this utility move the action chosen by the agent. The
implications of Propositions 4 and 5 are then combined to characterize the net eﬀect of the addition
of a new option to an existing choice set.
Section 6 investigates the implications of the model for welfare evaluation, with the primary
insight being that while the model is more limiting than the classic model for welfare evaluation,
we can recapture much that is lost by models that use non-geometric time discounting. This is
accomplished by viewing the selves as individuals for the purposes of examining welfare, so that
we can evaluate policies from the standpoint of how they aﬀect the welfare of both selves. Utility
aggregation methods are considered, and several results are established for a weighted utility welfare
function. Notably, commitment devices are argued to be welfare improving for suﬃciently long time
horizons.
Section 7 discusses extensions and alterations to the model, and concludes. Extensions discussed
include variations on the conﬂict game, the robustness of the model to other methods of bargaining
between selves, and varying the preferences of the selves along dimensions other than time preference.
4
2 The Model
2.1 Decision Problem and Notation
Time is continuous, but there are a ﬁnite number of discrete times t1 = 0, t2, t3... tN , where
decisions are made and payoﬀs received, with ∆n = tn+1 − tn ≥ 0. The decision made at time tn is
referred to as decision n. An agent is assumed to consist of two selves. Both selves share an identical
utility function over payoﬀs, u(·); they diﬀer only in their time discount rate, ρ. One self is referred
to as long-term with ρl, and one is referred to as short-term with ρs. It is assumed that these
time discount rates satisfy ρs > ρl > 0; note that this means the discount factor of the long-term
self is larger.3
The choice of continuous time here allows for ease in comparative statics exercises to follow, but
as utility is not evaluated continuously, the model should conceptually be thought of as consisting
of discrete periods with varying period lengths. In particular, for ﬁxed intervals, ∆1 = ∆2 = ... =
∆N−1 = ∆, the model becomes analogous to a standard discrete model, with time discount factors
given by
βl = e
−∆ρl > βs = e−∆ρs .
The actions available to the agent at decision n are given by action set An; An is assumed to
either be a discrete choice set, or a compact Euclidean space. The set of lotteries over actions is
given by An. At each decision point the agent must select one lottery over actions αn ∈ An. Let the
history of realized actions up to decision n be given by hn = {a1, a2, ... an−1}. In general, An, and
therefore An, may depend on this history. In addition to its eﬀect on future action sets, each realized
action grants some payoﬀ vector, and the corresponding payoﬀ utility is denoted u(at).
4 Each self
evaluates their own welfare using standard expected utility with geometric time discounting, so that
the time 0 discounted utility of a realized action stream a1, a2, ... an to self i is given by
n∑
j=1
e−ρitju(aj).
Every lottery αn at decision n creates an expectation over realized actions, and thus an expected
payoﬀ utility, given by
Eαn [u(an)].
3For ρs = ρl the model coincides with standard expected utility with geometric discounting.
4A payoﬀ occurring at a time where there is no decision to be made can be modeled as resulting from a trivial
decision from a singleton action set. In this way, the model can accommodate streams of payoﬀs resulting from single
actions, either by modeling the future payoﬀs as resulting from degenerate decisions, or by altering future action sets
to accomodate the changed payoﬀs. Implicitly, the history of actions acts as a state variable.
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The decision procedure employed by the agent will be described recursively. Consider the decision
made at time tN . As there are no future decisions, the concern of the selves is focused entirely on
the payoﬀ utility derived from the possible actions. As the selves agree on payoﬀ utility, they agree
on rankings of lotteries for this ﬁnal decision. Thus, the lottery chosen is simply
D(AN (hN )) = arg max
αN∈AN (hN )
EαN [u(aN )],
where D(AN (hN )) indicates the decision made from lottery set AN (hN ).5 The expected utility
self i derives from this decision at time tN will be denoted Ui,N (D(AN (hN )), hN ).
Now consider decision N -1, at time tN−1, where the lottery is being selected from AN−1(hN−1).
Each possible lottery αN−1 creates not only an expected payoﬀ utility but also an expectation over
the future history, hN . This future history in turn inﬂuences the future action set, which inﬂuences
the future decision made, and therefore the future utility. Speciﬁcally, the discounted utility to self
i at time N -1 from lottery αN−1 is given by
Ui,N−1(αN−1, hN−1) =
EαN−1
[
u(aN−1) + e−ρi∆N−1 (Ui,N (D(AN ({hN−1, aN−1})), {hN−1, aN−1}))
]
.
This utility will also be denoted as Ui(αN−1) to conserve notation; it consists of the expectation
of payoﬀ utility, u(aN−1), as well as the expected discounted future utility. Note that {hN−1, aN−1}
is the future history, and the expectation is over what value aN−1 will take. Essentially, the selves
are (correctly) projecting the action that will be taken at the ﬁnal decision point based on the action
taken today, and discounting the utility they will receive from that action based on the time diﬀerence
between the current decision and the latter one, ∆N−1. Note that this implies the assumption of
sophistication of the selves. Now, in contrast to the ﬁnal decision, due to the diﬀering discount rates,
the selves do not agree on the ranking for this decision, and generally may prefer diﬀerent lotteries.
Each lottery αN−1 creates a utility vector (Us(αN−1), Ul(αN−1)), as determined by the above
valuation. Denote by UN−1(AN−1, hN−1) the set of all such utility vectors for decision N -1, which
will be abbreviated UN−1. Since the choices are lotteries over actions, UN−1 will be a convex set.
A conﬂict/bargaining procedure, described in the next two subsections, is used to select a single
utility vector from UN−1, and the lottery chosen by the agent is the one corresponding to that
utility vector. These steps can then be applied recursively backward, as the selves can now project
the lottery chosen at decision N -1, and so on. The utility of lottery αn to self i at time tn is
Ui,n(αn, hn) = Eαn
(
u(an) + e
−ρi∆n [Ui,n+1(D(An+1(hn+1)), hn+1)]
)
.
5In the non-generic case where arg is multi-valued here, the agent is indiﬀerent between its elements, and the
model is agnostic about the lottery chosen from among them. However, as will be seen this indiﬀerence does not
impact the recursive decision procedure for earlier decisions, which is only dependent on the utility to each self.
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This is not a Bellman equation. D is a decision process depending on the utility values of both
selves, not just self i, thus it cannot be expressed as an optimization decision made by self i.
2.2 Conﬂict
Now we turn to describing the procedure by which the agent selects an action when the selves do not
agree.6 Consider decision n made at time tn, and corresponding set of utility vectors, Un, created
by the lotteries in An. First, note that each self will have a bliss action in An: the action which
grants them the highest discounted utility.7 This bliss action is given by
bin = arg max
an∈An
Ui(an).
These bliss actions induce a pair of bliss points in Un, given by:
(Us(b
s
n), Ul(b
s
n)) ≡ (Xsn, Y sn ), (Us(bln), Ul(bln)) ≡ (X ln, Y ln).
Thus, X ln represents the discounted expected utility granted to the short-term self by the bliss
action of the long-term self. Finally, we deﬁne
Sn ≡ Xsn −X ln; Ln ≡ Y ln − Y sn .
Sn, for example, is the non-negative diﬀerence in utilities that the short-term self will receive from
the two bliss points. Figure 1 illustrates these terms.
Us
Ul U(bl)
U(bs)
L
S
Figure 1: Utility vector set U with bliss points, bl and bs.
6If they do agree, the result of the procedure coincides with the mutually preferred lottery, and so need not be
viewed as a special case.
7Usually, there will only be one such action. It is possible, however, that a self may have multiple best actions,
granting the same maximum discounted expected utility; in most applications this will be a non-generic occurrence.
In this case, the model requires a single bliss action to be selected from among these actions, but is agnostic about
which; while the speciﬁc outcome that will result in this special case will depend on which bliss point is selected, the
general results of the model do not depend on the selection method.
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If the selves cannot agree on what action or lottery to take, it is assumed that the selves will
engage in a conﬂict modeled as a slight variant of the Tullock (1980) rent-seeking game.8 First, the
selves simultaneously commit to an eﬀort choice ei. Second, the winner is determined based on the
eﬀort choices. The probability that the short-term self is the winner is given by
p ≡

1
2 , if es = el = 0
eγs
eγs+e
γ
l
, otherwise,
with 0 ≤ γ. Third, the winner selects the action taken by the agent. Naturally, the self that wins
will select their own bliss action. Considering potential equilibria of this conﬂict game, note that
es = el = 0 is not one, as both selves would have incentive to exert marginal eﬀort. Thus, the
short-term self selects es to maximize:
eγs
eγs + e
γ
l
Xsn +
eγl
eγs + e
γ
l
X ln − es.
Lemma 1. Given Sn > 0, Ln > 0, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, the conﬂict game at decision n has a unique Nash
equilibrium given by:
e∗s,n =
γLγnS
γ+1
n
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
, e∗l,n =
γLγ+1n S
γ
n
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
, p∗n =
Sγn
Sγn + L
γ
n
.
This creates an expected utility vector for the selves given by
(
X ln +
Sγ+1n (S
γ
n + (1− γ)Lγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
, Y sn +
Lγ+1n (L
γ
n + (1− γ)Sγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
)
.
Proof: Proofs of all results not given in text are in Appendix A.
To ensure uniqueness, we will restrict attention to 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 in the conﬂict game.9
2.3 Bargaining
The model allows the selves to negotiate to an option mutually preferred by the selves to the outcome
of the conﬂict. This is modeled as a Nash bargaining problem, using the set of utility vectors, Un,
as the bargaining set, and the equilibrium of the conﬂict game as the disagreement point.
8The variance is that in the classic Tullock game the players are competing for an equal prize; in this application
the prize - control over the action of the agent - has diﬀerent values for the two players.
9This is diﬀerent from the standard Tullock requirement of 0 ≤ γ ≤ 2 precisely because of the homogeneous prize
value
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For the remainder of the paper, I will add the cost of eﬀort from the conﬂict game back into the
disagreement point, leaving the disagreement point as a simple mixing between the utility vectors
induced by the two bliss actions. This step will allow for cleaner intuition and understanding: the
actual payment of the cost of eﬀort in the conﬂict game is not the source of any interesting behavior
in the model. The qualitative nature of the results are not changed by this step, and where relevant
both disagreement points are shown to yield the same result in the proofs.10 This gives a simpler
form to the disagreement point derived from the conﬂict game, now given by
dn = (ds,n, dl,n) =
(
p∗nX
s
n + (1− p∗n)X ln, p∗nY sn + (1− p∗n)Y ln
)
=
(
X ln +
Sγ+1n
Sγn + L
γ
n
, Y sn +
Lγ+1n
Sγn + L
γ
n
)
.
The standard Nash bargaining solution maximizes the product of the gains of the two selves
relative to a disagreement point; this product is denoted the Nash product. Thus, the action taken
by the agent is given by
D(An(hn)) = arg max
αn∈An
(
Us(αn)−X ln −
Sγ+1n
Sγn + L
γ
n
)(
Ul(αn)− Y sn −
Lγ+1n
Sγn + L
γ
n
)
.
The chosen utility vector is illustrated as α in ﬁgure 2.11 Note that this procedure implies that
conﬂict does not occur in equilibrium. Rather, anticipation of conﬂict drives the bargaining between
selves. Both selves are able to project the outcome of conﬂict, and it is this commonly anticipated
outcome that drives the bargaining.
Us
Ul
b
l
b
s
d
α
Figure 2: Utility vector set U with disagreement point d and outcome vector α.
10Proposition 5 has a variant equational form depending on which disagreement point is used, both with the same
qualitative implications. The variant form is included in Appendix A.
11The Nash bargaining solution will give a unique utility vector, but it may be that multiple lotteries create the
same utility vector, thus leading the arg function to be multi-valued. In this case, both selves are indiﬀerent between
the possible arguments, and I interpret this as the agent being indiﬀerent between the options. In most applications
this is a non-generic occurrence, and for the remainder of the paper I will assume that D(·) is single valued.
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Lemma 2. The decision process employed at a given decision n is Pareto eﬃcient with respect to
the utilities of the selves. It is invariant to aﬃne transformations of the shared payoﬀ utility function
u(·). If Un is such that (x, y) ∈ Un if and only if (y, x) ∈ Un, then Us(D(An(hn))) = Ul(D(An(hn))).
An aﬃne transformation could also be applied to both eﬀort costs in the conﬂict game without
changing the outcome, but the costs have been normalized so that the marginal cost of eﬀort is
1. The last part of Lemma 2 is essentially the Symmetry axiom of Nash bargaining: the decision
process does not favor one self over the other; the classic axiom is based on an exogenous, symmetric
disagreement point, however.
Observe that if the Pareto frontier consists only of mixtures between the two bliss points, then the
disagreement point (itself being a mixture between the bliss points) will lie on the Pareto frontier, and
thus coincide with the outcome vector. So, for example, if there are only two actions, the outcome
can be interpreted as the selves agreeing on the same mixing that would result from conﬂict, and by
doing so bypassing the actual costs of conﬂict.12
2.4 Illustrative Example
To illuminate the workings of the model, we look at a simple example of savings-consumption.
Consider an agent endowed with $1 at time t1, and nothing at time t2, with ∆1 = t2 − t1 = 1. He
must decide how much to consume at time t1 and how much to save; assume there is no interest on
savings. We take his consumption utility function to be u(c) =
√
c, and ρl = 0, γ = 1, ρs = ln(2).
Denote the amount saved at time t1 as a. Modeling the action as being the choice of a, we have
A1 = [0, 1], with each action granting a payoﬀ utility as well as constraining the action set at time
t2. At t2, both selves will agree to consume the full amount remaining, so decision 2 is trivial. Thus,
each self in the ﬁrst decision has a discounted utility given by
√
1− a+ e−ρi√a. To determine their
bliss actions, we have:
bi1 = arg max
a∈[0,1]
√
1− a+ e−ρi√a,
which gives
bi1 = e
−2ρi/(1 + e−2ρi); bs1 = 0.2; b
l
1 = 0.5.
This creates bliss points
12If we use the disagreement point without the eﬀort costs added back in, then this is still the case, but it is not
obvious; see Lemma A.3 in Appendix A for a proof.
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(Xs1 , Y
s
1 ) = (Us(0.2), Ul(0.2)) =
(√
5
2
,
3
√
5
5
)
;
(
X l1, Y
l
1
)
= (Us(0.5), Ul(0.5)) =
(
3
√
2
4
,
√
2
)
.
Thus,
S1 =
2
√
5− 3√2
4
; L1 =
5
√
2− 3√5
5
;
d1 =
(
X l1 +
S21
S1 + L1
, Y s1 +
L21
S1 + L1
)
≈ (1.086, 1.382).
Finally, the amount of savings undertaken by the agent is found by solving
max
a
(√
1− a+ 0.5√a− ds,1
) (√
1− a+√a− dl,1
)
,
which gives a ≈ 0.354. This outcome is illustrated in ﬁgure 3.
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1.32
1.34
1.36
1.38
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1.40
a=0.2
a=0.5
a=0.354
d
Figure 3: Savings decision of a = 0.354.
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3 Diminishing Impatience
The source of diminishing impatience in the model is best introduced through a simple example.
Consider an individual with payoﬀ utility function given by u(w) = w who, at time t1 is given the
choice between receiving $100 at time t2, or receiving $120 at time t3. The utility vectors created
by the two options are, respectively,
(
100e−ρs∆1 , 100e−ρl∆1
)
;
(
120e−ρs(∆1+∆2), 120e−ρl(∆1+∆2)
)
.
As this is a binary decision, the resulting At consists of all mixing lotteries between the two
options, and Ut is as a result a line segment. Consider the interesting case where 120e−ρl∆2 >
100 > 120e−ρs∆2 , so that the long-term self strictly prefers to wait for the second option, and the
short-term self strictly prefers the sooner option. The time t1 bliss points given by these options,
then, are given by:
(Xs1 , Y
s
1 ) =
(
100e−ρs∆1 , 100e−ρl∆1
)
;(
X l1, Y
l
1
)
=
(
120e−ρs(∆1+∆2), 120e−ρl(∆1+∆2)
)
,
so that,
S1 = 100e
−ρs∆1 − 120e−ρs(∆1+∆2) = e−ρs∆1 (100− 120e−ρs∆2) ;
L1 = 120e
−ρl(∆1+∆2) − 100e−ρl∆1 = e−ρl∆1(120e−ρl∆2 − 100).
We will use γ = 1, so we have
p =
S
S + L
=
100− 120e−ρs∆2
(100− 120e−ρs∆2) + e(ρs−ρl)∆1 (120e−ρl∆2 − 100) .
As ρs − ρl > 0, it is straightforward to see that ∂p∂41 < 0. That is, as the payoﬀs are pushed into
the future, the probability of the short-term self gaining control in the case of conﬂict shrinks: the
disagreement point moves toward the bliss point of the long-term self. Thus, the model predicts that
as rewards are delayed, the individual has a higher probability of waiting for the greater reward. The
resulting Un and outcomes are shown for multiple values of ∆1 in ﬁgure 4, which uses ρs = ln(2),
ρl = ln(
20
19 ), γ = 1, ∆2 = 1. For each Un line segment, the higher point is the utility vector that
results from waiting for the latter, larger reward, and the point in between the two endpoints is the
outcome vector. One can see that as the delay (∆1) grows, the outcome moves to place more weight
on waiting for the latter, greater reward.
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Figure 4: Utility vector set U1 for diﬀering delays until payoﬀs.
The result on binary choices is generalized in the following.
Lemma 3. Given a choice at time t1 between a payout vector MLow at time t2 and a payout vector
MHigh at time t3, with u(MHigh) > u(MLow), denote by pL the probability an individual will choose
ML. Then,
∂
∂∆1
pL ≤ 0,
with the derivative strict wherever 0 < pL < 1.
Intuitively, as rewards are pushed into the future, both selves care less about the diﬀerence
between the two rewards; that is, the discounted value of the utility diﬀerence shrinks. However,
the diﬀerence shrinks at a faster rate for the short-term self. Essentially, the long-term self sees a
much bigger diﬀerence between far future rewards than the short-term self does, relatively. As a
result, the short-term self has little incentive to exert eﬀort in the conﬂict game, and is projected
to win such a conﬂict with low probability, shifting the disagreement point in bargaining to favor
the long-term self. Observationally, as ∆1 increases, the behavior of the individual becomes closer
to that predicted by standard geometric discounting, as though the long-term self was the entire
individual. I will now present the general result for diminishing impatience.
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Proposition 1 (Diminishing Impatience). Consider an agent selecting an action from A1, and
suppose that all actions a1 ∈ A1 grant the same payoﬀ utility at time t1. Then,
∂
∂∆1
Y l1 − Ul(D(A1))
e−ρl41
≤ 0 and lim
∆1→∞
Y l1 − Ul(D(A1))
e−ρl41
= 0,
with the inequality strict if the Pareto frontier of U1 is smooth.
The term Y l1 −Ul(D(A1)) is the diﬀerence in time t1 utilities the long-term self receives from his
bliss point, Y l1 , and from the decision made by the agent. Proposition 1 states that this diﬀerence in
utilities is shrinking to 0 as ∆1 grows. Note that, since all actions in A1 grant the same payoﬀ utility,
∆1 is the amount of time between the decision at time t1 and any possible payoﬀ utility variation
resulting from that decision; this is capturing the eﬀect of shifting all payoﬀs into the future. Taking
the future value of the utility diﬀerence, by dividing by e−ρl∆1 , shows that Proposition 1 is not
merely the result of both utilities shrinking to zero. Rather, the future payoﬀ utility received draws
close to the optimal future payoﬀ utility of the long-term self.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is that as the consequences of a decision are pushed into the
future, the outcome asymptotically approaches the bliss action of the long-term self. In the case of a
discrete decision, this takes the form that the probability with which the agent will choose the bliss
action of the long-term self approaches 1. For a continuous decision, the action chosen by the agent
approaches the bliss action of the long-term self asymptotically. Putting Proposition 1 in terms of
utilities allows the capture of both of these cases.
I'll now illustrate Proposition 1 for a continuous decision. Consider again a consumption-savings
example, with no interest and u(c) =
√
c, γ = 1, ρl = 0, ρs = ln(2). At time t1, a consumer knows
that they will receive endowment w at time t2, and must now decide how much to consume at time
t2 and how much to save for time t3, with ∆2 = t3 − t2 = 1. Denoting by a the savings decision
made at time t1.
The short-term self would like to choose a to maximize e−ln(2)∆1
√
w − a + e−ln(2)(∆1+1)√a,
which gives a = 0.2w as their their bliss action. Similarly, the bliss action of the long-term self is
a = 0.5w. Note that the bliss actions of the selves are not individually aﬀected by the delay between
the decision and the ﬁrst consumption, ∆1, as both selves are individually geometric discounters.
The bliss utility vectors at time t1 are respectively given by:(
e−ln(2)∆1(
√
0.8w + 0.5
√
0.2w),
√
0.8w +
√
0.2w
)
=(
2−∆1
√
w(
√
0.8 + 0.5
√
0.2),
√
w(
√
0.8 +
√
0.2)
)
;
(
e−ln(2)∆1(
√
0.5w + 0.5
√
0.5w),
√
0.5w +
√
0.5w
)
=
(
2−∆11.5
√
0.5w, 2
√
0.5w
)
.
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Determining S and L, we ﬁnd that
S1 = 2
−∆1√w
(√
0.8 + 0.5
√
0.2− 1.5
√
0.5
)
= 2−∆1
√
w
(
2
√
5− 3√2
4
)
≡ 2−∆1√wKs;
L1 =
√
w
(
2
√
0.5−
√
0.8−
√
0.2
)
=
√
w
(
5
√
2− 3√5
5
)
≡ √wKl.
The intuition becomes clear here again: S1 is being discounted, which represents the short term
seeing a smaller diﬀerence between the bliss points as ∆1 increases. L1 is discounted to a lesser
degree (in the chosen example, it is not discounted at all), representing that the long-term self
continues to see a diﬀerence between options for long delays. We can now calculate the probability
of the short-term self winning the conﬂict game:
p1 =
2−41
√
wKs
2−41
√
wKs +
√
wKl
=
Ks
Ks + 2∆1Kl
⇒ ∂
∂∆1
p1 < 0.
So, we see for the continuous case that the short-term self again has a lower probability of winning
the conﬂict game as the payoﬀs are pushed into the future. Since this lower probability is anticipated
by both selves, this will translate into a bargaining outcome more favorable to the long-term self:
in this case, a higher savings rate. Figure 5 shows the result for ∆1 = 1; that is, the result when
the agent is deciding on the amount of saving 1 unit of time in advance. The utility values for the
short-term self contract and, as a result, the disagreement point moves closer to the bliss point of
the long-term self; the savings rate increases from the previous 0.354 to 0.388.
0.5 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58
1.32
1.34
1.36
1.38
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1.40
a=0.2
a=0.5
a=0.388
d
Figure 5: Savings decision of a = 0.388 made in advance.
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The model thus predicts that when an individual is making a savings decision, the amount that
they will choose to save increases the farther their decision is from the date of consumption. It is
again this ability to account for smooth preference reversals that prevents the model from being
reliant on period length speciﬁcation, and aligns it more closely with hyperbolic discounting models,
as opposed to the more popular β-δ speciﬁcation.
4 Preferences for Commitment
To state the predictions of the model with regard to an agent's use of commitment devices, I will ﬁrst
introduce commitment sets, which are action sets that model committing to decisions in advance. It
is then shown, in Lemma 4, that if the agent commits to a single action suﬃciently far in advance,
the action (or lottery) chosen will be diﬀerent than the action chosen if he does not commit in
advance. Building on this, Proposition 2 shows that, under the same time condition as Lemma 4,
the agent will utilize costly, voluntary commitment devices to commit to single actions in advance,
for suﬃciently low commitment cost. Lemma 5 establishes that, intuitively, commitment devices are
used to commit to actions favorable to the long-term self, as opposed to those favorable to the short-
term self; one observes commitments to go to the gym, but not commitments to not go to the gym.
Finally, Proposition 3 establishes conditions under which commitment devices for minimal actions,
such as minimum amounts of savings, are equivalent to commitment devices for speciﬁc actions,
such as exact amounts of savings. This result, in turn, implies that minimal action commitment
devices have the same implications for behavior as single action commitment devices.
For this section, I exclusively consider two decision points, 1 and n, with 1 < n; I do not exclude
the possibility that there are decisions made in between the two. Deﬁne ∆t = tn− t1; note that this
is potentially distinct from ∆1 = t2 − t1. Denote Ancn some ﬁxed potential set of actions at decision
n, with corresponding lottery set Ancn , and utility vector set Uncn . I will assume throughout that Ancn
has at least two elements, and that the selves prefer diﬀerent lotteries in Ancn ; this is equivalent to
the assumption that the Pareto frontier of Uncn is not single valued.13
Deﬁnition 1. Ar1 is a required commitment set for A
nc
n if the following conditions hold.
1. ∀ an ∈ Ancn ∃ a unique ar1 ∈ Ar1 such that ar1 ∈ hn ⇒ An(hn) = {an}. ar1 is said to be a
commitment action, and to induce action an.
2. u(ai) = u(aj) ∀ ai, aj ∈ Ar1.
3. An′(hn′) is invariant to which action a1 ∈ A1 belongs to hn′ if n′ 6= n.
13If this assumption does not hold, then the selves agree on what action to take, the resulting behavior is trivial,
and nothing interesting results.
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4. Ar1 and A
nc
n have a one-to-one correspondence.
A required commitment set Ar1 captures the concept of an agent having to decide now what action
to take at a future date. The ﬁrst condition speciﬁes that any action in Ancn may be committed to
by choosing a corresponding action in Ar1. The second condition speciﬁes that the immediate payoﬀ
utilities between the diﬀerent commitment actions are the same, and the third condition speciﬁes
that the commitment actions do not aﬀect action sets at any other decision points; these two together
imply that the only diﬀerence between the commitment actions is through their eﬀect on decision n
actions. Finally, the fourth condition limits Ar1 to the commitment actions deﬁned by condition 1;
every action in Ancn has a unique corresponding commitment action in A
r
1, and every action in A
r
1 is
a commitment action for some unique action in Ancn .
Ar1 has an associated set of lotteries, Ar1, and utility vector set Ur1 . Denote the lottery that the
agent chooses from Ar1 as αr1 = D(Ar1); this is a lottery over commitment actions, which induces a
realized lottery over actions at decision n. I refer to this resulting lottery over actions as αrn; thus, α
r
n
is the realized lottery over actions at time tn that results from the agent choosing from the required
commitment set Ar1 at time t1.
For expositional purposes, it is useful to note here that Ur1 is a time discounted version of Uncn ;
the agent is essentially deciding from the actions of Ancn , he is just doing so earlier. Thus, the utility
vectors in Ur1 are the same as those in Uncn , discounted by the additional time between decisions 1
and n.14 As the short-term self discounts more heavily than the long-term self, Ur1 is contracted
more severely along the horizontal axis than the vertical. A contraction of this kind was illustrated
previously in Figure 5.
Now, deﬁne αncn to be the realized lottery over actions at time tn that results if the agent does
not previously commit to any action from Ancn . That is, α
nc
n = D(Ancn ). So, αrn is the realized lottery
over actions at time tn that results from commitment in advance, and α
nc
n is the realized lottery that
results from no commitment in advance. The following lemma deﬁnes the condition under which
these realized lotteries are diﬀerent.
Lemma 4. Let Ar1 be a required commitment set for A
nc
n , with n > 1. Then, ∃∆ such that if
tn − t1 = ∆t > ∆, αncn 6= αrn, and Ul,n(αncn ) < Ul,n(αrn). If the Pareto frontier of Uncn is smooth at
(Us(α
nc
n ), Ul(α
nc
n )), then ∆ = 0.
Proof: Application of Proposition 1. Details in Appendix A.
Lemma 4, intuitively, says that decisions change when they are made earlier. Further, it says
that if the earlier decision diﬀers, it will diﬀer in favor of the long-term self; these eﬀects follow
14The payoﬀ utility u(·) is not relevant at decision m; as it is the same for all actions, it can be normalized to zero.
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from the diminishing impatience discussed in the previous section. Concerning the latter part of
Lemma 4, the conditions under which the Pareto frontier is smooth at the point of decision are quite
broad. If the action set is continuous and the utilities are continuously diﬀerentiable functions of
the action set (such as in consumption-savings applications) it will generally be so. In speciﬁc, for
consumption-savings decisions with strictly concave payoﬀ utility, the Pareto frontier of U will be
a strictly convex, and thus the second condition of Lemma 4 will always hold. It will also always
hold for a binary action decision, as the outcome will be a strict mixing on the line between the two
bliss points. If the Pareto frontier is not smooth at the outcome, which can occur generically for a
discrete action set with more than two actions, then Lemma 4 says that a decision made suﬃciently
far in advance will still diﬀer from one made at the time of the action.
This result only applies in situations where advanced commitment is required. In many applica-
tions it is more reasonable to think of commitments as something optional; the agent may commit,
but they may choose not to as well.
Deﬁnition 2. Ao1 is an optional commitment set for A
nc
n if A
o
1 = A
r
1∪{anc1 } where Ar1 is a required
commitment set for Ancn , and a
nc
1 is such that a
nc
1 ∈ hn ⇒ An(hn) = Ancn . anc1 is termed the no
commitment action.
An optional commitment set takes a required commitment set, and gives the agent the additional
option to choose not to commit to any decision n action. Note that this deﬁnition does not require
that u(anc1 ) be equal to the payoﬀ utility of the commitment actions; this will allow us to examine
situations in which commitment carries with it some cost. If the realized action at decision 1 is anc1 ,
then this means that the agent will choose his period n lottery of actions from the full lottery set
Ancn , and the resulting lottery over actions will be αncn , as previously deﬁned.
Ao1 has an associated set of lotteries, Ao1, and utility vector set Uo1 . Denote the lottery that the
agent chooses from Ao1 as αo1 = D(Ao1). All actions in Ao1 induce a lottery over decision n actions,
either αncn for the no commitment action, or a degenerate lottery for the commitment actions. Thus,
αo1 induces a realized lottery over actions at time tn, and I refer to this resulting lottery over actions as
αon. Denote as p
nc
1 the probability that α
o
1 places on the no commitment action, a
nc
1 . For expositional
purposes, note that Ur1 ⊆ Uo1 : Uo1 can be thought of as starting with Ur1 , then adding the utility
vector induced by the no commitment action, along with any mixings involving it that are Pareto
improvements over existing vectors in Ur1 .
Proposition 2 builds on Lemma 4 to examine the more interesting case of a decision made from
the optional commitment lottery set Ao1.
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Proposition 2 (Preference for Commitment). Let Ar1 and A
o
1 be a required commitment set and
an optional commitment set for Ancn , respectively, with n > 1. Suppose that u(a
nc
1 )− u(a1) = c ≥ 0
∀ a1 ∈ Ao1/{anc1 }, and that ∆t > ∆, where ∆ satisﬁes the condition of Lemma 4. Then, ∃ c¯ > 0 such
that if c < c¯, pnc1 < 1. Further, if Uncn contains Pareto improvements on all strict mixings between
αncn and α
r
n, then ∃ ĉ > 0 such that if c < cˆ, pnc1 = 0, and αo1 = αr1.
Suppose that the agent can choose not to commit, and bears some utility cost c related to
commitment actions. Proposition 2 says that as long as the agent would have chosen a diﬀerent
lottery if required to make the decision in advance (the broad condition for which was deﬁned by
Lemma 4), and the costs are suﬃciently low, they will voluntarily use commitment options with a
strictly positive probability.
To interpret the second part of the result, note that requiring Uncn to contain Pareto improvements
on all strict mixings between αncn and α
r
n is equivalent to the requirement that the line segment con-
necting the utility vectors created by αncn and α
r
n lay on the interior of Uncn , excepting the endpoints.
Strict convexity of the Pareto frontier of Uncn is a suﬃcient condition for this, so the condition will
always hold in savings-consumptions problems with concave utility, such as our illustrative example.
It also holds generically in the case of discrete action sets when αncn and α
r
n have diﬀerent supports,
since their induced utility vectors would then lie on diﬀerent line segments of the Pareto frontier.15
In the event that this condition holds, Proposition 2 says that for suﬃciently low costs, the lottery
over commitment actions chosen will be the same as the lottery they would have chosen if they were
required to commit; the option not to commit will not be used. Two examples will greatly aid in
the understanding of this result.
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Figure 6: Utility vector sets at tn and t1 for optional commitment decision at t1.
15Non-generically, one element of the discrete action set may induce the same utility vector as a mixing between
two other elements of the action set, meaning that they would all lie on a line segment in U .
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Consider Ancn ={(H)ouse Salad, (G)rilled Steak}, ∆ = 1, γ = 1, ρl = 0, ρs = ln(2). In this
example, time tn is the point at which the food is consumed. The time tn discounted utilities of the
two options are shown in the leftmost graph of Figure 6; the diﬀerence in payoﬀs shown can arise
if the grilled steak gives higher payoﬀ utility at decision n, but changes future action sets (perhaps
through lower health) in a way that results in lower payoﬀ utility at future decisions. The point
which is labeled d, α indicates the utility vector induced by αncn , the lottery that the agent would
choose if making the decision at the time the food is consumed. In this case, it is a 50/50 mixture
between the two options. The Pareto frontier is smooth at that point, so Lemma 4 implies that the
mixing that the agent would choose in advance is diﬀerent than 50/50.
The second graph illustrates the decision made from an optional commitment set at decision 1,
where the payoﬀ utility cost of commitment is 0.3. The three actions show are to commit to a house
salad (cH), commit to a grilled steak (cG), and not to commit (nc). Ao1 ={cH, cG, nc} whereas
Ar1 ={cH, cG}. The utility granted by cH, for example, is time discounted from the utility granted
by H in the ﬁrst graph, and further reduced by the cost of commitment.
If the agent were selecting from Ar1, meaning if he had to select his food in advance, then the
Pareto frontier would be the mixing between cH and cG on the graph, and the resulting mixing over
actions is illustrated by point d; this is the utility vector induced by αr1. In this case, the probability
that the agent will end up eating the house salad is higher than the 50/50 chance he had when
selecting at the time of eating. The mixture over ultimate actions is αrn, so α
r
n 6= αncn , in accordance
with Lemma 4.
In the event that the agent is selecting from Ao1, meaning he can commit to his food in advance,
but does not have to, the Pareto frontier is given by the line segments connecting cH to nc, and nc
to cG. The ultimate lottery selected is a mixing between cH and nc, illustrated by α on the graph.
This is the utility vector induced by αo1. α
r
n and α
nc
n have the same support (and lie on the same
segment of the Pareto frontier), so that the second part of Proposition 2 does not apply here. Thus,
there is a positive probability of commitment, but not certain commitment. Finally, the third graph
simply shows the resulting outcome for a higher cost of commitment; the probability of choosing
not to commit becomes higher (the agent chooses a lottery with higher weight on the nc action).
An important intuition to take away from this graph is that the agent does not mix with com-
mitting to the option favored by the short-term self, the grilled steak. The agent either commits to
the action preferred by the long-term self, or they do not commit at all. This is a desirable property
of the model, because we do not observe individuals committing to unhealthy actions. They either
commit to going to the gym, or they do not commit either way; they never commit to not go to the
gym. The following lemma captures this intuition.
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Lemma 5. Let Ar1 and A
o
1 be a required commitment set and optional commitment set for A
nc
n ,
respectively, with n > 1. Suppose that u(anc1 )− u(a1) = c ≥ 0 ∀ a1 ∈ Ao1/{anc1 }. Then, ∃∆ such that
if ∆t > ∆, the lottery α
o
1 places zero weight on commitment actions that are strictly worse for the
long-term self than the no commitment action.
Let's consider commitment as applied to the illustrative consumption-savings example. From
Section 3, if the agent has to select the savings amount 1 time in advance, he selects a = 0.388; this
is shown in the left side of Figure 7; this graph corresponds to Ur1 , and the induced action lottery αrn
is degenerate on a = 0.388. Consider now giving the agent the option not to commit to a savings rate
in advance, and suppose that the commitment options carry with them some cost of commitment.
Recall that the agent chooses a = 0.354 if the decision is made without prior commitment. That is,
αncn is a degenerate lottery with a probability of 1 on a = 0.354. This is illustrated in the right side
of Figure 7; the no commitment point extends the Pareto frontier outward, since it carries no payoﬀ
utility cost in contrast to the commitment options; this graph corresponds to Uo1 . The α shown on
the graph is the utility vector induced by αo1, the decision made from Ao1.
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α
Figure 7: Required commitment versus optional commitment.
Note that since the Pareto frontier of Uncn is strictly convex, the second part of Proposition 2
applies, so that for suﬃciently small costs of commitment, commitment should be guaranteed. This
is illustrated in Figure 8, which shows what happens as the costs of commitment are reduced. The
no commitment option draws closer to the curve created by the commitment options; as it does
so, the portion of the Pareto frontier of Uo1 that includes mixings with the no commitment option
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shrinks and, if the cost is small enough, the option chosen when commitment was required, in this
case a = 0.388, becomes part of the Pareto frontier, and the agent will choose that option.
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Figure 8: Optional commitment for diﬀering commitment costs.
A reasonable objection to the applicability of this set of results is that savings commitments are
more naturally thought of, and observed as, minimal savings commitments, as opposed to binding
savings levels, so I now consider commitments to minimal actions.
Lemma 6. D(A) = D(D(A)).
Proof: D(A) is the decision made from a given set of lotteries, A. D(D(A)) is the decision made
when we limit the set of lotteries to the one lottery we would have picked from the full set. As there
is only one lottery to pick from, the choice is the same.
Lemma 6, while simple, is important to understand the application of Proposition 2 to savings
problems, or other commitment decisions where we restrict options without committing to a single
action. If an agent makes a commitment to a minimal amount of savings, then Lemma 6 implies
that this is equivalent to committing to the exact amount of savings that the minimal amount of
savings will induce. For example, if without any commitment an agent chooses savings a = 0.35, and
committing to a minimal savings of 0.2 in advance induces him to ultimately choose savings of 0.4,
then the commitment to a minimum of 0.2 is equivalent to committing to saving exactly 0.4 in the
ﬁrst place, both in terms of realized action of the amount saved, and in terms of utilities received by
the selves.16 Thus, a commitment decision to limit an action set can be reframed as a commitment
decision to a speciﬁc action or lottery.
16Assuming that the costs of the commitment options are the same.
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However, this does not mean that any set of commitment actions is equivalent to a required
commitment set, or optional commitment set, that includes all possible actions. To see why this is,
consider again our savings-consumption example. Suppose an agent has the ability to commit to
a minimum savings rate in advance, but not a maximum one. Then, there is no minimum savings
commitment which would be the equivalent of committing to saving 0, since no minimal commitment
in advance would induce the agent to choose 0 as the ultimate savings decision. If a decision maker
commits to a minimum savings rate of 0, this is equivalent to making no commitment at all.
Deﬁnition 3. Am1 is a minimal action commitment set for A
nc
n if the following conditions hold.
1. Ancn is an interval in R.
2. ∀ an ∈ Ancn ∃ a unique am1 ∈ Am1 such that am1 ∈ hn ⇒ An(hn) = {a : a ≥ an}. am1 is said to
be a minimal commitment action.
3. u(ai) = u(aj) ∀ ai, aj ∈ Am1 .
4. An′(hn′) is invariant to which action a1 ∈ Am1 belongs to hn′ if n′ 6= n.
5. Am1 contains no actions other than those deﬁned by 1.
Proposition 3 (Minimal Commitment Equivalence). Suppose that An is represented as an
interval in R, an ∈ [a, b], and that Ui(an) is continuous over An. Suppose further that for any
interval I ⊆ An, the utility vector set, Un(I) has a Pareto frontier that consists of utility vectors
from only pure actions (degenerate lotteries). Then, there exists an interval Arn = [a
′, b] ⊆ [a, b]
such that if Am1 is a minimal action commitment set for An, and A
r
1 and a required commitment
set for Arn, both with the same commitment cost c, then the same discounted utility vectors for the
selves and decision n realized actions will result from the agent choosing from Ar1 or from Am1 .
Proposition 3 says that allowing the agent to commit to a minimum action from within an interval
has the same outcome as allowing them to commit to a single action from a (weakly) smaller interval;
note that both intervals have the same maximum; this is because committing to a minimum of b
is the same as committing to b. Crucially, this allows the application of Proposition 2 to minimal
commitment actions.17 Notably, consumption-savings decisions, with strictly concave consumption
utility, will satisfy the suppositions of Proposition 3.
It follows that, under the suppositions of Proposition 3, the use of a minimal action commitment
device has the same eﬀect on agent decisions as exogenously forbidding low values in a single action
commitment device. The intuition here is fairly straightforward: minimal action commitment sets
17As well as maximal commitment actions, as any maximum commitment set can be reframed as a minimal
commitment set; e.g. amount consumed versus amount saved.
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eliminate low options, but still allow the agent to revise upward when the period to make the
decision arrives. Single action commitment sets prevent any revision upward. Thus, for example,
the model predicts that higher savings rates will result from having the option of choosing minimal
savings amount, followed by a later decision on additional saving, than from having the agent decide
their full amount of savings in advance. The long-term self essentially uses the early commitment
possibility to eliminate some particularly bad options (low savings rates), and then re-negotiates
from a stronger position when the time for the ultimate decision on savings comes around.
5 Temptation
I now turn to temptation eﬀects: the observation that agents' decisions do not always satisfy in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives. To be clear, by independence of irrelevant alternatives, I am
referring to Sen's (1971) condition α, which states that if x ∈ B ⊂ A, and x ∈ C(A), then x ∈ C(B),
where C(A) is the set of elements chosen from set A. If C(·) is a singleton, then this property says
that the removal of unchosen options should not alter the chosen option. I interpret violations of
this property in choice behavior as arising out of temptation. The presence of an option that one
self ﬁnds very desirable (tempting) increases the anticipated eﬀort that self would exert in conﬂict.
This manifests as the option exerting a pull on the outcome decided upon by the agent, even when
the option is not chosen.
In the multiself bargaining model, the action decided upon by the agent will depend on the
bliss actions of both selves, even if these actions are irrelevant options. This is due to the fact
that it is the bliss points determine the resolution of the projected conﬂict game, and therefore the
disagreement point that the selves anticipate in their bargaining. Irrelevant alternatives that are
not the bliss point of either self will not inﬂuence the outcome; in this sense the model is in accord
with existing literature on temptation, which primarily takes the view that it is only the most
tempting point that is relevant. For expositional purposes, this section focuses exclusively on the
temptation created by the bliss point of the short-term self, but the results apply similarly for the
bliss point of the long-term self.
Consider an agent at a restaurant choosing between a (H)ouse salad, (G)rilled steak, and a
(B)acon cheeseburger. The individual believes that B is the most delicious and H the least, but
that the opposite is the case regarding the health eﬀects of the choices. Suppose further that, as
a result of health eﬀects being something in the future, the preferences of the selves are such that
H l G l B and H ≺s G ≺s B, where i indicates the preference ordering of the self i. One
possible set of utility pairs granted by the three choices, then, is illustrated by Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Menu choice with and without tempting option B.
The left graph of Figure 9 illustrates the decision made when the individual is choosing between
only H and G. In the right graph we see how the outcome changes when we add in the third option,
B. The point α shows the lottery chosen by the agent in the ﬁrst case, while the addition of B moves
the lottery to α', shown to the right. With the addition of B, though the individual still chooses B
with zero probability (the outcome shown is a mixing between H and G), the weight placed on G
grows. Intuitively, in the presence of an option more desirable to a self, that self is more willing to
exert eﬀort in the projected conﬂict game; this pulls the disagreement point, and thus the ultimate
decision of the agent, closer to the bliss point of that self. It is important to note, though, that the
long-term self is also more willing to exert eﬀort with the addition of point B, since that self is much
more opposed to B than they were to G. Temptation is always bi-directional in the model, and it is
the diﬀerences in bliss utilities for both selves that determines the overall eﬀect. It is therefore not
always the case that adding an action to At which has a greater utility for the short-term self than
their current bliss point moves the outcome in their favor.
To nail down the net temptation eﬀect of a given option, I will break down the eﬀect into
component parts. First, Proposition 4 considers the eﬀect of making the bliss point of the short-
term self better or worse for the short-term self; in graphical terms this is moving B to the right or
left in Figure 9.
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Proposition 4 (Pure Temptation). Consider a decision maker choosing αn from An, corre-
sponding Un, and consider the eﬀects of altering the utility granted to the short-term self by the
short-term bliss point: Xsn. As long as an open connected subset of the Pareto frontier of Un con-
taining Un = (Us(αn), Ul(αn)) remains a subset of the Pareto frontier of Un, then,
∂Us(D(An))
∂Xsn
≥ 0, ∂Ul(D(An))
∂Xsn
≤ 0,
with the inequalities strict if the Pareto frontier is smooth at (Us(αn), Ul(αn)).
The interpretation of Proposition 4 is straightforward: if we increase the utility granted to the
short-term self by their bliss point, then the action chosen by the agent changes to one that grants
a higher utility to the short-term self. This is the temptation eﬀect in its purest and most intuitive
form: as the desserts on the menu become more delicious, the agent is pulled more toward them.
If the Pareto frontier is smooth, then the strictness of this change implies a continuous temptation
eﬀect, one which applies even if the bliss point is chosen with zero probability. However, if the slope
is not deﬁned at the outcome, then the temptation eﬀect ceases to be strictly increasing.
For example, in Figure 9, if we move point B to the right, the decision will shift smoothly to
the right as well; move B far enough, and the individual will eventually choose G for certain, and
remain there for an interval as B is moved farther to the right. Once B is moved far enough,
the individual would begin mixing between G and B, and the temptation eﬀect would again be
continuously increasing.18
To see why the result is true, note that in moving B in this way, the utility granted to the
long-term self by B remains the same, and thus the diﬀerence to the long-term self between the
bliss points remains the same (Ln constant). This means that the long-term self's incentive to exert
eﬀort in a potential conﬂict is unchanged, but the short-term self's incentive is increased. Thus,
the projected probability of the short-term self winning a conﬂict is conclusively increasing, moving
the disagreement point closer to B along the mixing line between H and B; this is compounded by
the fact that the mixing line itself is shifting in favor of the short-term self (since the B endpoint is
moving in favor of the short-term self). Finally, the fact that the disagreement point has shifted in
favor of the short-term self means that the bargaining outcome will as well.
The relevance of requiring that a section of the Pareto frontier surrounding the decision be
unchanged is to ensure that the changing point is an irrelevant alternative. Doing away with that
condition, we obtain a more limited result:
18Though, once the agent was mixing with G and B, the Pareto frontier around the decision would also be changing,
and it would no longer be a pure temptation eﬀect; B would no longer be an irrelevant alternative.
26
Lemma 7. Consider a decision maker choosing αn from An, with corresponding Un, and consider
the eﬀects of altering the utility granted to the short-term self by the short-term bliss point: Xsn.
Then,
∂Us(D(An))
∂Xsn
≥ 0.
Without the limitation on the Pareto frontier, an improvement in the bliss utility of the short-
term self still moves the outcome in a direction favorable to the short-term self. However, it may
also add Pareto improvements on the previous outcome, and so the net eﬀect on the utility granted
to the long-term self is ambiguous. This would occur if, in Figure 10, B was shifted far enough to
the right that the Pareto frontier became the line segment between H and B (so that G was no
longer on the frontier).
I now turn to the second component of temptation, which is the eﬀect of making the short-term
bliss point more or less desirable to the long-term self. In Figure 9, this would correspond to moving
B up or down. If the bliss point of the short-term self becomes worse for the long-term self, then
essentially the long-term self's (unchanged) bliss point becomes relatively better for the long-term
self than it was before; intuitively, if the long-term self knows that losing a conﬂict would result in
a very bad option, he will exert more eﬀort in such a conﬂict. As it is the worsening of one bliss
point that makes the other bliss point more appealing, I refer to this as indirect temptation. So,
the projected probability that the short-term self wins a conﬂict conclusively decreases as a result
of such a change.
However, if the short-term self wins, the outcome is worse for the long-term self than it was
previous to the change. These two eﬀects create an ambiguous net eﬀect on the expected utility
outcome of the projected conﬂict game, and thus on the disagreement point. Proposition 5 details
the condition under which the the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates.19 That is, the condition under which a
worsening of the short-term self's bliss point for the long-term self leads to a better disagreement
point, and thus a better outcome, for the long-term self.
19This is the only proposition in which the equational form is dependent on whether one uses the disagreement
point with or without the eﬀort costs added in, as discussed in section 2.3. Proposition 5 uses the disagreement point
with eﬀort costs added back in. Proposition 5', included in Appendix A, uses the disagreement point without eﬀort
costs added in; it has the same qualitative implications, and yields no additional intuition.
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Proposition 5 (Indirect Temptation). Consider a decision maker choosing αn from An, corre-
sponding Un. Consider altering the utility granted to the long-term self by the short-term self bliss
point: Y sn . As long as an open connected subset of the Pareto frontier of Un containing the Nash
bargaining outcome (Us(αn), Ul(αn)) remains a subset of the Pareto frontier of Un, then
Sγn + (1− γ)Lγn
γSnL
γ−1
n
<
Ul(αn)− dl
Us(αn)− ds ⇒
∂Us(D(An))
∂Y sn
≥ 0, ∂Ul(D(An))
∂Y sn
≤ 0,
with the reverse strict inequality implying the reverse weak inequalities.
To interpret this proposition, I start by noting that the ﬁrst term is a ratio of the changes in the
coordinates of the disagreement point that result from an increase in Y sn : it is the slope along which
the disagreement point moves as a result of such a change. The second term is the slope of the line
connecting the disagreement point to the utility vector created by the current lottery choice, αn.
Note that if the Pareto frontier of Un is smooth at (Us(αn), Ul(αn)), then this slope is the negative
of the slope of the Pareto frontier at that point; this follows from the nature of the Nash bargaining
solution.
Thus, Proposition 5 says that if an increase in Y sn moves the disagreement point below the line
connecting the original disagreement point to the original decision, then the lottery chosen by the
agent changes to a lottery granting higher utility to the short-term self, and lower utility to the
long-term self. Now, to get at some intuition for this, consider γ = 1; in which case
Sγn + (1− γ)Lγn
γSnL
γ−1
n
= 1.
If additionally the Pareto frontier is smooth, then Proposition 5 can be more simply stated as:
If the slope of the Pareto frontier at the current decision is greater in magnitude than 1, then an
increase in Y sn changes the outcome in favor of the short-term self (and similarly a decrease in Y
s
n
changes the outcome in favor of the long-term self). Tying this back into the menu-choice example,
this condition would imply that shifting the B option downward would make the outcome worse for
the short-term self; the additional incentive of the long-term self to exert eﬀort in projected conﬂict
would be the dominant eﬀect of the shift. Intuitively, the relatively high slope of the Pareto frontier
indicates that the long-term self has more to lose from shifts along the frontier; thus, said self will
react more strongly to changes in options which have the potential to move the outcome along the
frontier.
Now, putting together the implications of Propositions 4 and 5, consider the addition of a new
option (such as menu choice B in the example) to an existing set of actions (such as {H, G}).
Suppose that the new option is better for the short-term self than their existing bliss point, but
28
worse for the long-term self. If the condition of Proposition 5 holds, then the net eﬀect of such a
new option is ambiguous: it increases Xsn, which improves the outcome for the short-term self by
Proposition 4, but decreases Y sn , which improves the outcome for the long-term self by Proposition
5. If the decrease in Y sn is suﬃciently large relative to the increase in X
s
n, the outcome may actually
improve in favor of the long-term self, in spite of the new point being a favorable option for the
short-term self. I refer to this as a backﬁre eﬀect, and such a situation is illustrated in Figure 10
below.
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Figure 10: Regions dividing eﬀect of adding a new bliss point; γ = 1
The Pareto frontier is Figure 10 is the line segment between B and C, with the outcome vector
marked in between them as α. Consider adding another vector to the set of utility vectors. Region
1 in the graph is the backﬁre region; in this region the increase in bliss utility for the short-term
self is relatively small, compared to the large potential decrease in utility for the long-term self.
As a result, additions in this region cause the outcome to move to favor the long-term self; the
indirect temptation eﬀect dominates. Additions in region 2 cause the outcome to shift in favor
of the short-term self while hurting the long-term self; the pure temptation eﬀect dominates. For
additions in region 3, the pure temptation eﬀect still dominates, but the new option creates large
enough Pareto improvements over the original outcome, due to shifting the Pareto frontier outward,
that both selves beneﬁt.
If the condition of Proposition 5 does not hold, however, there is no backﬁre eﬀect, and region 1 is
empty; is this case any new action which increases the bliss utility for the short-term self necessarily
improves the outcome for the short-term self. Note now the distorted scale of Figure 10: the slope
of this frontier is −4. The magnitude must be greater than 1 for region 1 to be non-empty, and a
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relatively high slope magnitude is required for region 1 to be signiﬁcant. Connecting to the previous
intuition, the steeper the slope, the more the long-term self has to lose from movement along the
frontier, and thus the larger the potential backﬁre region will be. If the Pareto frontier is smooth,
the curve separating regions 1 and 2 is deﬁned by
(d
′
s − ds)(Ul(α)− dl) = (d
′
l − dl)(Us(α)− ds),
where (ds, dl) is the original disagreement point (deﬁned by Lemma 1), (d
′
s, d
′
l) is the disagree-
ment point created by the original bliss point of the long-term self and the new option (a point
on the curve), and α is the original outcome.20 If the Pareto frontier is not smooth at the current
outcome, then the boundary between regions 1 and 2 is itself a region as opposed to a curve; the
addition of a new point anywhere inside this boundary region does not change the outcome.
I close this section by illustrating the temptation eﬀect in a continuous action set. Consider
again our illustrative savings example, and suppose that the agent has committed to saving at least
0.3. Then, when it is time to make the ﬁnal savings decision, the bliss action of the short-term self
is to save exactly 0.3, as 0.2 (their former bliss action) is no longer in A. As a result, the agent is
less tempted toward low saving rates, and the action chosen by the agent moves from a = 0.354 to
a = 0.367. This is shown in ﬁgure 11.
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Figure 11: Savings decision with commitment to minimum of 0.3.
20This minor result is a direct implication of Lemma A.2, given in Appendix A.
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6 Welfare Implications
While it presents more challenges to interpretation than the standard geometric discounting utility
model, the dual-self bargaining model presented here need not be silent on questions of welfare. By
choosing to view an agent as actually consisting of two individuals, there are several results that
grant leverage for welfare evaluation. This gives an advantage over models in which there is a single
individual whose preferences change in each period due to non-geometric time discounting. Rather
than have one set of preferences for each period, here there are only two in total. There is also
the observation that utilities are intrapersonal here, rather than interpersonal. Selves share a payoﬀ
utility from actions, and so utility comparisons arguably carry more weight here than they would
when comparing across individuals. I ﬁrst address the notion of Pareto improvements: actions that
improved the utility for both selves over another action.
Lemma 8. Given two actions a and b, a is never chosen from any action set A containing both a
and b if and only if the utility vector created by b is a Pareto improvement over that created by a.
Proof: If b is a Pareto improvement, then a will not be on the Pareto frontier, and so will never be
chosen. If a is never chosen from A = {b, a}, then it must be that b is a Pareto improvement, as the
agent would otherwise choose a strict mixing of the two actions.
This has a close relation with the notion of the unambiguous choice relation developed by Bern-
heim and Rangel (2009). Essentially, if a is never chosen when b is available, then we say that b is
unambiguously preferred to a, written as bP ∗a, in the terminology deﬁned by their work. Thus, in
this model, b is unambiguously preferred to a if it represents a Pareto improvement over a in regard
to the two selves. An immediate extension is that for a given action, a, if there exists another action,
b, which is unambiguously preferred, a can deﬁnitively said to be Pareto ineﬃcient from a welfare
perspective. It also has the important implication that if an agent always makes the same decision
from a binary choice (probability 1), then the choice made is a Pareto improvement over the other,
and thus can be deﬁnitively said to be welfare improving.
I now turn to the more diﬃcult question of welfare evaluation of options when neither is a Pareto
improvement over the other. If we wish to make meaningful statements about welfare on such
questions, it is necessary to consider some aggregation of the utilities received by the two selves.
One method by which to do so is a weighted utility welfare function, W (a) = wUl(a)+(1−w)Us(a),
famously advanced by Harsanyi (1955, 1977) as a method of aggregating interpersonal social welfare.
For what follows, I will conﬁne attention to this form of welfare function.21
21A criticism of such a weighted utility function as a measurement of social welfare involves the diﬃculty in
interpersonal utility comparisons, e.g. Sen (1977). In my model the utility comparisons are intrapersonal: the selves
in fact share a payoﬀ utility function, and I argue that this lessens the strength of the critique. Second, more
practically, as the selves share their payoﬀ utility function, it is desirable that any measure of welfare be invariant to
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Lemma 9. Consider a choice set given by A = {a, b}, suppose that b is the action preferred by the
short-term self, and that the agent is observed to choose b with probability p. Then,
p <
1(
1−w
w
)γ
+ 1
⇐⇒ wUl(a) + (1− w)Us(a) > wUl(b) + (1− w)Us(b).
Lemma 9 implies that, if welfare of an individual is evaluated by a weighting between options,
observation of choice from a binary set of two actions is suﬃcient to say which is welfare superior.22
If w = 0.5, so that welfare is considered as an equal weighting between the selves, then the condition
simply becomes p < 0.5, so that γ need not be known, nor which action is preferred by which
self. This is appealing for application: it would imply that in a series of random choices between
two options the agent would be observed to choose the option one granting higher welfare more
frequently.
We may also wish to consider welfare weightings that place greater weight on the utility of the
long-term self.
Lemma 10. Consider a choice set given by A = {a, b}, and suppose an agent is observed to choose b
from A with probability p, and that b is the action preferred by the short-term self. Further, consider
a utility weighting given by wUl(·) + (1− w)Us(·), with w ≥ 0.5. Then,
p < 0.5⇒ wUl(a) + (1− w)Us(a) > wUl(b) + (1− w)Us(b).
Proof: Consider w = 0.5. From Lemma 9, p < 0.5 ⇐⇒ 0.5Ul(a) + 0.5Us(a) > 0.5Ul(b) + 0.5Us(b)
⇒ Ul(a)− Ul(b) > Us(b)− Us(a)⇒ w(Ul(a)− Ul(b)) > (1− w)(Us(b)− Us(a)) for w ≥ 0.5
⇒ wUl(a) + (1− w)Us(a) > wUl(b) + (1− w)Us(b) for w ≥ 0.5.
Lemma 10 says that if a utility weighting welfare function places at least equal weight on the
long-term self's utility, then observing the agent choosing the long-term self's preferred action more
frequently than an alternate action implies that the more frequently chosen action grants higher
welfare. This is of interest because if, for example, a bag of potato chips is resisted more often than
not, then it implies that it is welfare improving to remove the bag of chips as an option. Additionally,
it allows a degree of welfare evaluation to take place without taking a stance on whether an equal
aﬃne transformations of this underlying payoﬀ function, and a weighted utility welfare function meets this criterion.
22In cases where it is not apparent, which action is preferred by which self is easily established by time delay due
to the diminishing impatience phenomenon
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weighting between selves, or a higher weighting on the long-term self, is the correct choice in a
welfare function.23
Finally, consider the welfare eﬀects of the availability of commitment devices.
Lemma 11. Consider action set An, and a welfare function W (a) = wUl(a) + (1− w)Us(a), with
w > 0. Consider decision 1, with tn − t1 = ∆t ≥ 0. Then, ∃∆ such that ∀∆t > ∆, allowing the
agent access to a zero-cost commitment action set at time t1 increases welfare.
Lemma 11 says that as long as you put positive weight on the utility of the long-term self, then
a commitment option given suﬃciently far in advance of the action being committed to is welfare
improving. The implication is that if weighted utilities between selves is regarded as an acceptable
method of welfare evaluation then, regardless of the weights used, commitment devices can create
welfare improvements. In fact, the result will easily extend to any welfare function which is bounded,
continuous, and strictly increasing in Ul. Thus, the model gives strong support to the notion that
commitment devices create welfare improvements for agents.
7 Extensions, Future Work and Conclusion
One alteration to the model of interest is in the timing of the conﬂict game. Currently, selves
compete for control, and then choose their action. An alternative method of modeling would be for
the selves to ﬁrst commit to an action, and then have their eﬀort game, allowing for strategic choice
of actions on the part of the selves. The general results for commitment and diminishing impatience
are conjectured to remain unchanged, but the temptation results alter in that there would no longer
be a backﬁre eﬀect: neither self would strategically choose an action which would backﬁre in the
way described, meaning that the decision process would become monotonic in the sense of Kalai
and Smorodinsky (1975): adding an action which increased the maximal possible utility for a self
would increase the outcome for that self. This is not necessarily an undesirable alteration, as the
backﬁre eﬀect is relatively limited in scope, and does not seem to correspond to any strong empirical
regularities. However, at this time it is not known whether the equilibrium of a conﬂict game in
which selves strategically choose their bliss points is generically unique.
Another alteration to consider is the bargaining procedure used; Nash bargaining was selected
here for tractability, but the general properties of this model are dependent on the conﬂict game, not
the bargaining procedure. Indeed, it is not diﬃcult to show that the qualitative results of diminishing
impatience, preference for commitment, and temptation, result from any bargaining procedure that
satisﬁes two uncontroversial properties. First, invariance to aﬃne transformations of utility. Second,
23Arguments for considering a short-term, or impatient self as more important than the long-term self, in contrast,
do not exist in the literature on multiple selves, nor does the concept seem to carry any introspective weight.
33
the utility granted to each bargainer by the outcome should be monotonic in the utility granted to
that self by the disagreement point. Other bargaining procedures which satisfy these properties,
then, generate the same qualitative results.
Extending from this, an axiomatization of bargaining procedures which generate the desired
behavior would be of keen interest. Obvious axioms of choice are Pareto eﬃciency and Symmetry,
as well as invariance to aﬃne transformations of the shared payoﬀ utility function; this form of
invariance is equivalent to the bargaining problem being invariant to shifts and non-distorting scaling
of the bargaining set. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives cannot be included, as it is the lack of
this property which generates the temptation eﬀects. Nor can the more general form of invariance to
aﬃne transformations that Nash bargaining builds upon be included; it is the lack of invariance when
separate transformations are applied to the selves which generates time inconsistency in the model.
Monotonicity, as Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining, is certainly a plausible axiom. As mentioned, this
removes the backﬁre eﬀect. However, including Monotonicity is insuﬃcient to pin down a unique
solution, and it is not obvious if there is another natural axiom or axioms of choice. Other future
work will certainly include symmetric multiself models in which the selves vary in dimensions other
than time discounting. In particular, selves that vary in a risk aversion parameter is of interest in
attempting to generate regularities related to risk.
To conclude, this work formalizes intuition about conﬂicting internal preferences into a model that
provides a uniﬁed explanation for a number of behavioral regularities. A smooth time inconsistency
arises from the relative diﬀerence in time preference between the selves. Temptation eﬀects, or
violations of independence of irrelevant alternatives, result from the diﬀering incentives of the selves
in conﬂict over control. Use of commitment devices derives from the long-term self's advantage in
foresight over long time horizons. All of these come from a tightly parameterized diﬀerence in time
preference between the selves, which additionally creates novel intuition about the nature of such
behavior.
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Part II
Temporal Reference Points
1 Introduction
Extensive evidence exists that agents are sensitive to the pattern and timing in which information
is revealed to them, even when they cannot make use of that information. Gneezy and Potters
(1997) and Haigh and List (2005) ﬁnd that agents exhibit greater risk aversion the more frequently
that they evaluate the state of ﬁnancial outcomes. In particular, Bellmare et al. (2005) isolates
information feedback, and not investment ﬂexibility, as the variable of greater inﬂuence. Köszegi
and Rabin (2009) develop a model in which agents prefer to have their information clumped together
rather than spread out.
Concurrently, there is a body of work indicating that the way in which time is framed and
presented inﬂuences how individuals evaluate situations put before them. For example, Chandran
and Menon (2004) ﬁnds that agents judge risk to be greater when health risks are presented to
them in daily terms rather than yearly, even though the overall risk level is objectively the same.
Gourville (1998) examines the eﬀect of the temporal framing of costs (e.g. just pennies per day!)
on the the decisions of individuals, and ﬁnds them to be signiﬁcant.
These two groups of research suggest a common thread: there may be something special about
the points in time to which an agent's attention is drawn. I leverage this idea to create a model which
unites the concept of diminishing impatience with preferences for clustered information. Further, the
model provides a novel explanation for some discordant results in studies on diminishing impatience.
I make the assumption that the value of a prospect is not only dependent on the distribution
over ultimate outcomes, but also on a set of subjectively important times in the life of that prospect,
which I term temporal reference points. When evaluating a prospect the agent is assumed to have a
discount function which is applied to each of the durations between these temporal reference points.
This replaces standard time discounting, in order to model the sensitivity the agent may have with
regard to these points in time.
I remain agnostic about how agents form these temporal reference points (though I believe it is
a promising future avenue of research). Instead, I examine two natural cases. The ﬁrst is the case
where an agent forms the temporal reference points solely from the times he expects to receive new
information about the outcome of a prospect. This agent is sensitive to updates of information on
the ultimate value of a prospect, but not sensitive to other possible framing eﬀects (such as emphasis
on a particular point in time in the presentation of a set of prospects). I refer to such an agent as
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information focused. The second is a case where shifting a prospect into the future causes an agent
to treat the new starting point of the prospect as a temporal reference point.
Section 2 develops the notation and fundamentals of the model, which addresses the preferences
of agents over prospects set in continuous time. In particular, agents are characterized by a utility
function, a discounting function, and a framing mapping, the last of which represents the process by
which the agent decides upon the temporal reference points of the prospect. If the framing maps to
{0}, so that the only temporal reference point is now, then the model becomes standard expected
utility, with the discount function reverting to standard time discounting. Thus, the model can be
viewed as a generalization of standard models. Prospects are characterized by distributions over the
set of possible outcomes, of which exactly one will occur in ﬁnite time. Further, each prospect has
a set of possible histories of informational updates given to the agent (signals). The history at any
given time aﬀects both the distribution over future signals, as well as the expected distribution over
outcomes.
Section 3 examines the case where agents are information focused. I develop the notion of
preference for grouped information (PGI), which indicates a preference for informational updates
to be folded into one another, reducing the total number of times at which information is gained.
PGI is similar in spirit to Dillenberger (2010), which develops Preference for One-shot Resolution
of Uncertainty (PORU), but here I place the notion in a time-sensitive setting, whereas PORU is
deﬁned in time neutrality. I show an equivalence between PGI and diminishing impatience in this
environment. Diminishing impatience, an extensively documented property of agents' behavior (e.g.
Thaler 1981) is the idea that an agent becomes less impatient between an immediate and a delayed
alternative as both are delayed further.
A second, more reﬁned, type of information preference is also developed. This is a preference for
informational updates to be closer to each other temporally, which I call a preference for less dispersed
information (PLDI). I show the equivalence between PLDI and strongly diminishing impatience, a
reﬁnement of diminishing impatience which requires an agent to become continually less impatient
as rewards become more distant. As shown by the survey Frederick et al. (2002) there is evidence for
strongly diminishing impatience, though it ceases to diminish after a period (they show that after a
year there is zero evidence of further diminishing impatience). I am unaware of any empirical studies
examining PLDI at the present time, but this work suggests such studies may be of interest. PLDI
is further shown to be a generalization of PGI, with grouped information being a limiting case of less
dispersed information. This limiting relationship is of importance in the continuous time setting, in
which deﬁning a single point in time at which information is received is potentially problematic.
Section 4 relaxes the assumption of information focused agents, which opens up many possibilities
as to how agents may determine temporal reference points. I focus on a single case where the act of
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shifting a prospect into the future causes the agent to treat the new starting point of the prospect as
a temporal reference point. I show that in such a case the agent's indiﬀerence curves over prospects
are also shifted into the future by the same amount, retaining indiﬀerence between equally shifted
prospects.
This particular case of temporal reference points is important because it suggests a novel resolu-
tion to apparently contradictory experimental evidence concerning diminishing impatience. A very
large body of work attests that diminishing impatience becomes less strong as prospects are pushed
further into the future, e.g. Frederick et al. (2002). Numerous studies show that subjects exhibit
preference reversals when a set of options is made more distant, e.g. Keren and Roelofsma (1995).
However, the thorough experimental survey Glimcher et al. (2007) examines the eﬀect of shifting a
set of prospects into the future, and ﬁnds disagreement with this previous work. The authors show
that when the shifted prospects retain their temporal relation to one another, subjects' indiﬀerence
curves remain statistically constant over the prospects. Speciﬁcally, the diminishing impatience
across the set of prospects was just as strong, despite the set being more temporally distant. The
model here oﬀers explanation for this apparent conﬂict by supposing that the experimental design
of the Glimcher study, where all of a very large number of delayed comparisons were made to a $20
payout in 60 days, caused the subjects to focus on 60 days as a subjectively important point in time.
Thus, subjects plausibly form a temporal reference point in that study that would not be formed in
other studies without a similar point to focus on.
Section 5 concerns the discounting function and how it can be interpreted in this model given
the multiple steps of discounting occurring in the evaluation of prospects. I focus on two inter-
pretations in particular. One in which the discounting is divided into geometric time discounting
and an additional survival function, which can be thought of as encompassing implicit risk. In
this interpretation, the agent sees the temporal reference points as problem spots, where something
might go wrong with the explicitly stated outcomes of the prospect. This may be due to distrust of
the explicitly stated prospect, mortality risk, or just general pessimism. The second interpretation
treats the discounting function as time discounting, but has the agent place himself in the role of his
future selves, evaluating his preferences as if he were those selves, before discounting backward.
In essence, the temporal reference points become the times to which the agent projects himself.
Section 6 concludes and proposes further avenues for research, in particular research on the
formation of temporal reference points.
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2 The Model
2.1 Decision Problem and Notation
An agent is faced with a choice between multiple prospects at time 0, with the set of all possible
prospects denoted P. There is a closed and compact set of payouts, A, and every prospect terminates
with a payout in ﬁnite time with probability 1.24 Further, there is a closed and compact set of pairs
O = {(α, tα)}, where α ∈ A and tα indicates the time at which the payout occurs. Elements of O
are referred to as outcomes.
Time is continuous, but each prospect, A ∈ P, has a ﬁnite number of distinct, ordered, positive
points in time,
IA = {tA1 , tA2 , ....tAN},
at which new information, a signal, is received by the agent as to the outcome of the prospect.25
The signal from prospect A received at time tAn is denoted s
A
n .
At any point in time in the life of a prospect, t, the agent will have seen a history of signals
hAt ∈ HAt = {sA1 , sA2 , ...sAi }, where tAi is the largest element of IA strictly less than t, of what has
occurred at each of the elements of IA (what information was revealed) up to, but not including, t.
The distribution over possible sAt is a function of the signals received to that point, h
A
t . The history
of signals and the prospect itself, then, deﬁne a mapping that gives the distribution over the ﬁnal
possible outcomes of the prospect, denoted for a given history hAt by
4A(hAt ) : O −→ [0, 1].
These distributions are assumed to be consistent with the probabilities of signals. So, the dis-
tribution over outcomes just before an informational update is equivalent to the distribution over
signals expected at that update composed with the distributions induced by the receipt of those
signals. Intuitively, this represents the agent rationally and recursively determining the distribution
over outcomes based on the probability of each signal and the distribution over outcomes induced
by those signals.
24Although the elements of A are not limited to monetary payments, nothing will be lost in the intuition of the
model by considering them to be.
25Note that this excludes the possibility that uncertainty is resolved at time 0. While this assumption would be
very limiting in a discrete time setting, here it is not. Given that time 0 is the time at which the agent is evaluating the
prospect, this is just assuming that uncertainty is not being resolved while this evaluation is occurring. Uncertainty
can still be resolved arbitrarily close to time 0, which allows the accounting of cases where, say, an agent is oﬀered a
choice between two gambles, and the dice are rolled moments after their choice.
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At the beginning of the prospect looking forward to any time t generates an expected distribution
over histories, each of which generates a distribution over outcomes. Thus each time t for a prospect
has associated with it a distribution over distributions over outcomes, denoted ΛtA. At time 0, due
to there being no history, this distribution over distributions is degenerate on a single distribution
over outcomes. That is, Λ0A is degenerate on a single distribution, denoted 40A.
Appended to the set IA are the times 0 and t
A
F , where t
A
F > t
A
N is the time of the last outcome(s)
generated by prospect A.26 This deﬁnes the set:
TA = {0, tA1 , tA2 , ....tAN , tAF }.
For ease of notation, tA0 will sometimes be used in place of zero, and t
A
N+1 in place of t
A
F , so that
TA = {tA0 , tA1 , tA2 , ....tAN , tAN+1}. Payouts may be received at any of the elements of TA, and once
a payout is received, the prospect terminates with no further payouts possible.
Each agent further associates with each prospect a set of non-negative ordered points in time,
RA = {0, rA1 , rA2 , rAM},
which will be referred to as the temporal reference points of that prospect. At minimum, this set
includes 0. So, each agent has a mapping from the set of prospects to the set of subsets of the
non-negative real numbers,
R : P −→ P(R+).
This mapping can conceptually be thought of as how the agent frames the subjectively important
points in time when evaluating the prospect. As will be shortly seen, the elements of RA will
determine how the agent applies discounting to their evaluation of the prospect.
The agent further has a utility function over outcomes, u(·) : A −→ R+, as well as a discounting
function, D(·) : R+ −→ [0, 1], which is decreasing, non-negative, and satisﬁes D(0) = 1. The
discount rate should be understood to not only include time discounting, but potentially other
forms of discounting future payouts as well.27 Further interpretation of this discount function is
dealt with in Section 5.
26Note that tAF > t
A
N implies the assumption that there is at least one possible payout/utility received after all
uncertainty is resolved. Like the case of excluding 0 from IA, this is not limiting in a continuous time setting. A payout
can be modeled as being arbitrarily close to knowledge of the payout, such as when an agent receives a monetary
payment mere moments after knowing that he will.
27However, in the special case where R maps all prospects A to {0}, so that the only important time is now, the
model becomes standard expected utility with D(t) representing normal time discounting (and thus encompassing
both geometric and non-geometric time discounting models).
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In evaluating the present discounted utility of prospects the agent discounts based on his temporal
reference points, rather than discounting based on the time between now and the payouts as is
standard in the literature. For each payout he discounts between now (the time at which he is
evaluating) and the ﬁrst such temporal reference point, between each pair of temporal reference
points before the payout, and between the last temporal reference point before the payout and the
time of the payout.
Formally, let rAnˆ(t) be the highest element of RA which is less than t. Then an agent at time 0
evaluates the present discounted value of a prospect A as
VA =
ˆ
(α,t)∈O
u(α) ∗ 40A(α, t) ∗D(rA1 − 0) ∗D(rA2 − rA1 ).... ∗D(rAnˆ(t) − rAnˆ(t)−1) ∗D
(
t− rAnˆ(t)
)
,
and prefers the prospect with the highest such present discounted value.28
Deﬁnition. Consider an agent whose mapping, R satisﬁes R(A) = IA ∪ {0}, ∀A ∈ P. This agent
is said to be information focused.
An information focused agent regards as important all the times at which new information will
be received, in addition to right now. Section 3 will examine this type of agent, whereas Section 4
will relax this assumption on the mapping R.
Noting that for an information focused agent each outcome occurs at an element of TA, we can
write the present discounted value of a prospect A for an information focused agent as:
VA =
ˆ
(α,tAn )∈O
u(α) ∗ 40A(α, tAn ) ∗D(tA1 − 0) ∗D(tA2 − tA1 ).... ∗D(tAn−1 − tAn−2) ∗D
(
tAn − tAn−1
)
.
Finally, in cases where D(t) is continuously diﬀerentiable, I denote h(t) = −D
′(t)
D(t) , the hazard
rate of D(t). The hazard rate gives us what is essentially the instantaneous rate of discounting. For
example, for the geometric D(t) = e−ρt, h(t) = ρ. This will be of aid in intuition for several of the
results.
28This representation makes clear that for D(t) = e−ρt the model collapses to standard geometric time discounting.
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2.2 Example With Visualization
Given a prospect with countable support over signals after each history of signals (which implies
countable outcomes due to ﬁnite history length), we can visualize the prospect as a branching tree.
The visualization will aid intuition even in the non-countable case. Aligning the tree from left to
right, with the root at t = 0, and points further to the right as points farther in time, at each of the
elements of I, when new information is received, the tree splits.
For example consider the following prospect, A. At time t1 the agent will receive a with prob-
ability p. If a is not received then at time t2 the agent learns what payout he will receive at time
t3. There is a q probability of receiving b, and a 1 − q probability of receiving c. The prospect is
visually represented in Figure 1.
a
b
c
p
1-p q
1-q
t=0 t=t1 t=t2 t=t3
Figure 1: Prospect A with TA = {0, t1, t2, t3}
Each split in the tree is an informational update to the agent. At time t1, they either receive a,
which is information in itself, or do not, which is a signal that they will receive either b or c. For
example, if h is the history containing the signal that a was not received at time t1, then 4A(h)
places q weight on an outcome of (b, t3) and 1− q weight on an outcome of (c, t3).
If the agent is information focused for this example, then the value of the prospect would be
VA = u(a)pD(t1)+u(b)(1−p)qD(t3−t2)D(t2−t1)D(t1)+u(c)(1−p)(1−q)D(t3−t2)D(t2−t1)D(t1),
or more succinctly
VA = D(t1) [pa+ (1− p)D(t3 − t2)D(t2 − t1) (qb+ (1− q)c)] .
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3 Diminishing Impatience and Information Timing Preferences
In this section, I examine the case of an information focused agent. I begin by deﬁning the notion of
diminishing impatience in the context of this model. An agent who exhibits diminishing impatience
becomes less impatient for a later outcome relative to an immediate outcome as both payouts become
more distant. More formally,
Deﬁnition. Denote by (a, t) the deterministic prospect that provides payout a at time t. If an
agent's preferences over prospects are such that
(a, 0) ∼ (b, t1)⇒ (a, t2)  (b, t1 + t2) ∀ a, b ∈ A, ∀ t1, t2 > 0,
then the agent exhibits diminishing impatience. If the preference is everywhere strict, they exhibit
strictly diminishing impatience.
If the agent's preferences are further such that
(a, t1) ∼ (b, t2)⇒ (a, t1 + t3)  (b, t2 + t3) ∀ a, b ∈ A, ∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0,
then the agent exhibits strongly diminishing impatience. If the preference is everywhere strict, they
exhibit strictly strongly diminishing impatience.29
Diminishing impatience here says that if an agent is indiﬀerent between an immediate reward
and a later, better reward, he will prefer the later reward if both are equally delayed. Strongly
diminishing impatience is a reﬁnement of this which requires that preference change holds true for
any sooner versus latter reward, not only when one is immediate.
Lemma 1. An information focused agent exhibits (strictly) diminishing impatience if and only if
D(t1 + t2) (>) ≥ D(t1)D(t2) ∀ t1, t2 > 0.
The agent exhibits (strictly) strongly diminishing impatience if and only if
D(t2)D(t1 + t3) (<) ≤ D(t1)D(t2 + t3) ∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0.
Further, if D(t) is continuously diﬀerentiable, then the agent exhibits (strictly) strongly dimin-
ishing impatience if and only if the associated hazard rate, h(t), is (strictly) decreasing.
Proof: All proofs not in the text are given in Appendix B.
29Similar notions are introduced by Chakraborty and Halevy (2015), with strictly diminishing impatience here
corresponding to their deﬁnition of delay independent diminishing impatience (DIDI) and strictly strongly diminishing
impatience here corresponding to their deﬁnition of delay independent strongly diminishing impatience (DISDI). In a
discrete time setting without temporal reference points (or, equivalently, with the only temporal reference point being
0), the notions coincide exactly.
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So, an agent exhibits diminishing impatience if and only if he discounts more heavily when a
length of time is broken up into two intervals before discounting. This occurs in discounting functions
with a steep drop-oﬀ at t = 0. For example, the well known β − δ discounting function,
D(t) ≡
1, if t = 0βe−δt, otherwise.
Intuitively, breaking the length of time in two forces the overall discounting to have the drop-oﬀ
twice.
As for strongly diminishing impatience in Lemma 1, the continuously diﬀerentiable case with
a decreasing hazard rate lends us insight: an agent exhibits strongly diminishing impatience if he
discounts steeply at ﬁrst, with a high hazard rate, in the time immediately following a temporal
reference point, and then less and less steeply as time continues. This matches, for one common
example, the hyperbolic form of discounting.30 The intuition matches that of the diminishing impa-
tience case: if time is split in two, the overall discounting now has two periods of steep discounting
rather than one.
Since we are dealing with deterministic prospects here in the referenced deﬁnition of diminishing
impatience, there are no points at which new information is received. Thus, T = {0, tF }, where tF
is the time the payout is occurring. The restriction to an information focused agent, then, ensures
that there are no intermediate temporal reference points. Thus, discounting is based on the entire
time between the present and the payout, becoming analogous to standard models. This should not
be mistaken to mean that restricting attention to information focused agents in this model is no
diﬀerent than applying β − δ or hyperbolic discounting; the similarity only extends to evaluating
deterministic prospects, when there is no new information to be had.
Similarly, Lemma 1 should not be misunderstood to be saying that the agent is exhibiting
diminishing impatience because the time is broken up into two segments. Rather, the condition
which implies diminishing impatience is the same as the condition while implies more discounting
when time is broken up. It is this equivalence that will help lead to my ﬁrst result, but ﬁrst I must
address the ranking of information levels of prospects, and preferences over them.
30Under generalized hyperbolic discounting, a reward in t time is discounted by (1 + αt)−(γ/α).
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Deﬁnition. Consider two prospects A, B ∈ P such that IA ⊂ IB. Then, prospect A is said to have
more grouped information than prospect B if ‖IB‖ − ‖IA‖ = 1 and ∃ i ≥ 2 s.t.
Λ
tAn
A = Λ
tBn
B ∀ n s.t. 0 ≤ n < i− 1, and
Λ
tAn−1
A = Λ
tBn
B ∀ n s.t. i ≤ n ≤ ‖IB‖,
or if ∃ C ∈ P s.t. A has more grouped information than C, and C has more grouped information
than B. Further, an agent's preferences exhibit preference for grouped information (PGI) if they
satisfy A  B for all such A, B. If the preference is everywhere strict, then denote it SPGI.
This deﬁnition is slightly cumbersome notationally, but not hard to understand intuitively. In
essence, A has more grouped information than B if the two prospects are the same except for an
instance in which A gives the same information in one update that B gives in two updates (more
than one instance of such is accounted for by the transitive part of the deﬁnition). I will illustrate
the deﬁnition with two examples.
a
b
t=0 t=2 t=3
0.5
0.5
a
b
t=0 t=2 t=3
0.5
0.5
a
b
0.9
0.1
0.1
0.9
t=1
Figure 2: Prospect A, left, has more grouped information than prospect B, right.
Prospect A in Figure 2 has IA = {2}, while prospect B has IB = {1, 2}. In the scope of the
deﬁnition, the relevant i is 2. So, to satisfy the deﬁnition, two things have to be true. First, it
must be the case that Λ
tA0
A = Λ
tB0
B . This is just the requirement that they have the same initial
distribution over outcomes, which they clearly do. Second, Λ
tA1
A = Λ
tB2
B . That is, the distribution
over distributions expected at tB2 = 2 under prospect B is the same as that at t
A
1 = 2 under prospect
A. Indeed, this is the case; at those times both prospects have 0.5 weight placed on the degenerate
outcome of (a, 3), and 0.5 weight placed on the degenerate outcome of (b, 3). Intuitively, prospect
B communicates the same information at times 1 and 2 that prospect A communicates at time 2
alone.
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t=0 t=1 t=2 t=4 t=0 t=1 t=2 t=4
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a
b
b
c
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0.4
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.6
0.6
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.5
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.1
0.9
0.6
0.4
t=3t=3
Figure 3: Prospect A, left, has more grouped information than prospect B, right.
In this slightly more complex example, the i that satisﬁes the deﬁnition is, again, 2. It is easy
to conﬁrm that the initial distribution over outcomes is the same. It must also be the case that
Λ
tA1
A = Λ
tB2
B and Λ
tA2
A = Λ
tB3
B . We see that at time t
B
2 = 2, Λ
tB2
B places weight 0.8 ∗ 0.6 + 0.2 ∗ 0.1 = 0.5
on the distribution placing 0.4 weight on outcome a and 0.6 weight on outcome b, and weight
0.8 ∗ 0.4 + 0.2 ∗ 0.9 = 0.5 weight on the distribution placing 0.3 weight on outcome c, and 0.7 weight
on outcome d. Λ
tA1
A is an identical distribution over distributions. Λ
tA2
A and Λ
tB3
B can be similarly
veriﬁed to be the same distribution over degenerate outcomes. Again, in essence, Prospect A does
in one step what prospect B does in two.
The agent who has preferences for grouped information prefers to eliminate points in time at
which information is revealed by grouping information together.
Proposition 1. An information focused agent exhibits (S)PGI if and only if he exhibits (strictly)
diminishing impatience.
Here the ﬁrst result draws an equivalence between a preference for more grouped information and
diminishing impatience. The intuition for the result is not diﬃcult: a prospect with less grouped
information implies that the times which are being discounted over are further broken up. As was
previously established, the condition for diminishing impatience is the same as that which implies
more discounting when lengths of time are subdivided.
The restriction on the nature of the agent's framing function, R, is necessary here; if R were
unrestricted it may be that a prospect A contained more temporal reference points in spite of
having more grouped information. The restriction to information focused agents is not the minimum
restriction needed for the equivalence, but it is the most natural and intuitive such restriction.31
31The minimum necessary restrictions for the equivalence would be ﬁrst that all informational update times are
temporal reference points, second that removing an informational update time removes that point as a temporal
reference point, and third that removing an informational update time does not add new temporal reference points.
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I now turn to a diﬀerent notion of information preferences, and that is preferences over the
relative dispersion of informative points in time.
Deﬁnition. Consider A, B ∈ P such that ‖IA‖ = ‖IB‖. Then A has less dispersed information
than prospect B if ∃ C ∈ P s.t. A has less dispersed information than C which has less dispersed
information than B, or if all of the following is true. First, ‖IAr IB‖ = ‖IB r IA‖ = 1. Second, the
single unique element in IA and IB have the same index in their respective sets, denoted n
′. Third,
Λ
tAn
A = Λ
tBn
B ∀ n, 0 ≤ n ≤ ‖IA‖.
Fourth,
min{tAn′ − tAn′−1, tAn′+1 − tAn′} < min{tBn′ − tBn′−1, tBn′+1 − tBn′}.
Further, an agent is said to have preference for less dispersed information (PLDI) if his prefer-
ences are such that A  B for all such A, B. If the preference is everywhere strict, then denote it
SPLDI.
The deﬁnition essentially says: take a prospect, B, take a point in time at which new information
is revealed in that prospect (but not one where outcomes are received, since from Λ
tA0
A = Λ
tB0
B , A
and B must have the same distribution over outcomes) and shift it so that its nearest neighbor in
the set T is closer than its previous nearest neighbor. Then the resulting new prospect, A, has less
dispersed information. Note that the conditions of the deﬁnition imply that the same information
is revealed at the shifted point in both prospects; all that changes is when it is revealed.
More succinctly, if you push informative elements of TA closer together, the resulting prospect
has less dispersed information. The transitive part of the deﬁnition says that if you do this multiple
times, the end result has less dispersed information than what you started with. A few examples
will make this clear. Consider, TA = {0, 1, 4, 6} and TB = {0, 2, 4, 6}.
Prospect A satisﬁes the fourth criterion for having less dispersed information than prospect B. If
their informational update points give the same information, then A has less dispersed information
than B. The relevant n' for the deﬁnition is 1, since it is element t1 that is diﬀerent. t
A
1 is closer to
its nearest neighbor than tB1 . Speciﬁcally,
min{tA1 − tA0 , tA2 − tA1 } = 1 and min{tB1 − tB0 , tB2 − tB1 } = 2.
Now consider TC = {0, 1, 5, 6}. Assuming the ﬁrst three criteria are satisﬁed for prospects
C and A, Prospect C has less dispersed information than prospect B because it has less dispersed
information than A. Conceptually, tA2 , at 4, has been shifted to t
C
2 , 5.
Proposition 2. An information focused agent exhibits (S)PLDI if and only if he exhibits (strictly)
strongly diminishing impatience.
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The intuition here is a bit less obvious. Less dispersed information, for example, means moving
from discounting over two moderate lengths of time to discounting over one shorter and one longer
length of time. If one pictures the tail of one of the moderate lengths being removed and added to
the other moderate length, this creates one shorter and one longer period. If it is the case that the
discounting becomes less steep as time goes on, then the tail removed is discounted more heavily
then the tail added. This, then, connects back to Lemma 1. In that Lemma, one can see t2 and
t1 + t3 as being the moderate times, whereas t1 and t2 + t3 are the shorter and longer times (because
t1 < t2).
Lemma 2. An information focused agent exhibits (S)PGI if they exhibit (S)PLDI.
Proof: Direct from Propositions 1 and 2, and the fact that (strictly) strongly diminishing impatience
implies (strictly) diminishing impatience.
This relationship concerning diﬀerent types of information preferences is not surprising. A
prospect with more grouped information can be thought of as a limiting case of a prospect with
less dispersed information, in which a shifted informative element of T is shifted close enough to its
nearest neighbor to coincide with it in the limit. This limiting relationship is important conceptually,
as it allows the sidestepping of tricky issues of how to deﬁne a single point in time at which an agent
received information. Further, the combination of both types of preference allows us to ﬁll in some
gaps left by the deﬁnition of PGI.
To see what is meant by this, consider two prospects, A and B, with TA = {0, 3, 6} and
TB = {0, 2, 4, 6}, where prospect A gives the same information at time 3 that prospect B spreads
over times 2 and 4. Intuition may lead toward regarding prospect A as having more grouped
information than prospect B, but they do not satisfy the deﬁnition. However, prospect C, with
TC = {0, 3, 4, 6} does have less dispersed information than B, and A has more grouped information
than C. So, an agent exhibiting PLDI would satisfy A  C  B.
However, this does not necessarily extend to any such situation. Consider instead TA = {0, 1, 2.5, 4}
and TB = {0, 1, 1.1, 3.9, 4} where, similar to the previous example, prospect A gives the same
information at time 2.5 as B spreads over 1.1 and 3.9. In this case, there is no intermediate C with
less dispersed information than B. Intuitively, this is because B's information is already clustered in
tight temporal groups, and an agent exhibiting PLDI might prefer they stay clustered. Thus, knowl-
edge of PLDI is not enough here to determine the agent's preference between the two prospects.
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An agent whose D(t) is represented by a β − δ function, and thus who exhibits SPGI as well
as complete indiﬀerence to dispersion, would prefer prospect A; such an agent cares only about
the number of groupings he receives the information in. However, a β − δ discounting function is
arguably a poor choice for modeling in a continuous time setting, as it sees no distinction between
a minute gap and a day. This is especially true if uncertainty resolution is to take place arbitrarily
soon after the evaluation of prospects. For this reason, in this setting, a hyperbolic discounting
function with very steep initial discounting that rapidly approaches geometric discounting is likely
a superior choice to model agents who exhibit diminishing impatience, but show little evidence of
strongly diminishing impatience.
4 Non-Informative Temporal Reference Points
In this section, the assumption that agents are information focused is relaxed, so the agents may
regard non-informative points in time as important. This is done to accommodate the theoretical
case that an agent may focus on a particular point in time based on how prospects are presented or
framed, such as if an experiment repeatedly involves a particular point in time.
First, some notation. For a given set, S, denote:
S+t ≡ {s+ t| s ∈ S}
Deﬁnition. A prospect X is said to be τ -shifted from prospect Y , if
IX = I
+τ
Y ,
and if ∀ distributions over outcomes, 4X and 4Y satisfying 4X(α, t+τ) = 4Y (α, t), ∀ (α, t) ∈ O,
it is the case that
Λ
tXn
X (4X) = Λt
Y
n
Y (4Y ) ∀ n, 1 ≤ n ≤ ‖IX‖.
Simply put, a prospect X is τ -shifted from Y if X is equivalent to taking everything about
prospect Y (outcome mapping function, timing and distributions over signals) and shifting it forward
in time by τ . Note that, in particular, this means that 40X(α, t + τ) = 40Y (α, t), ∀ (α, t) ∈ O,
whenever X is τ -shifted from Y .
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Proposition 3. An agent's preferences satisfy A ∼ B ⇔ C ∼ D, ∀ A,B,C,D ∈ P s.t. C is τ -
shifted from A, with R(C) = R(A)+τ ∪{0}, and D is τ -shifted from B, with R(D) = R(B)+τ ∪{0}.
Proposition 3 takes two competing prospects and shifts them into the future; the result says
that if the point they are shifted to becomes a temporal reference point in addition to any that
already existed, then an agent's indiﬀerence between the two prospects is maintained. The key here
is that R(C) and R(D) both contain the element τ as their ﬁrst non-zero element. As the agent
still discounts back to that same point for both, before discounting to the present, the indiﬀerence
between the prospects A and B is maintained. In other words, the added discounting of D(τ) is the
same for both shifted prospects. The particular discount function, D(t), used is irrelevant to this
result.
The signiﬁcance of this is as a resolution to the apparent conﬂict of diﬀering experimental evidence
on diminishing impatience. As discussed in the introduction, Glimcher et al. (2007) shows results
of an experiment in which the indiﬀerence curves of agents were maintained when the prospects
were shifted into the future by 60 days. The model here can account for this through the suggestion
that, because every one of a large number of choice pairs in the delayed set of prospects involved a
comparison to $20 in 60 days, agents were induced to regard 60 days as a temporal reference point,
a subjectively important date in time, in their evaluation and comparison of prospects.
Thus, the combination of Proposition 3, with a discount function implying diminishing impatience
(in accordance with Lemma 1), can account for both the results of Glimcher, and the pervasive
evidence showing that diminishing impatience weakens at the very least, as in Frederick et al.
(2002), and arguably disappears, as rewards become more distant. This is done through the simple
argument that the former experiment provided ample reason for agents to focus on a particular
point of time in the future, whereas other experiments on diminishing impatience have not done so.
Further contrast of this evidence is examined in Section 6.
5 Interpretation of Discounting in the Model
In this section, I will discuss possible interpretations of discounting in this model, and what it might
mean, in an intuitive sense, to discount between temporal reference points.
One possible interpretation of the discount function, D(t), is to split it into two components:
geometric time discounting, along with a survival function representing implicit risk, s(t): D(t) ≡
e−ρts(t).
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In this case, the survival function, s(t), can be interpreted as capturing the subjective view of
the probability with which the explicitly stated outcomes of the prospect will endure over time t.
1 − s(t), then, is the subjective probability assigned to not explicitly stated (implicit) outcomes
by the agent. This implicit risk may be a result of pessimism, distrust, or simply non-explicit
death probability. It is straightforward to show that the same requirements on D(t) which imply
diminishing impatience, PGI, PLDI, etc., apply to s(t) directly under this interpretation. Thus, for
example, if s(t) is continuously diﬀerentiable, then a time focused agent exhibits PLDI if and only
if s(t) has a decreasing hazard rate, h(t) = −s
′(t)
s(t) .
A decreasing hazard rate lends itself well to an interpretation where focusing on particular points
in time causes a rise in pessimism at those points which fades until brought back into focus by another
such point. An agent, whether consciously or not, may view a point in time on which he is focused
as an opportunity for something to go wrong with regard to the explicitly stated outcome of the
prospect. While this may seem superﬁcially similar to loss aversion, and the preference for grouped
information that can arise out of it, such as in Köszegi and Rabin (2009), they are functionally quite
distinct. Loss aversion implies greater weight being placed on negative adjustments in expectations
than is placed on positive adjustments; no mechanism for the distinction of positive and negative
adjustments exists in this model. This interpretation can however be extended to encompass the risk
of some single external outcome taking place, provided that this outcome is weakly worse than any
of the explicitly stated ones.32 For example, prospect death risk as examined by Halevy (2008), or
the implicit risk that an experimenter oﬀering you a deferred payment will renege on his agreement
at some point.
A second interpretation is to view the discount function as time discounting, with the addition
that the agent focuses on temporal reference points as if he was his future self at that point. So, for
example, if he regards one year from now as being a temporal reference point, he would ﬁrst discount
payouts occurring after that point in time as if he were himself in a year, and then discount back
to the present from that point. Thus, the signiﬁcance of the temporal reference points would be
as points to which the agent projects himself in evaluating prospects. In this interpretation, D(t)
as hyperbolic time discounting, such as D(t) = (1 + αt)−(γ/α), would satisfy the conditions for
diminishing and strongly diminishing impatience, and thus for PGI and PLDI.
32This could be ﬁt in the model simply by normalizing the utility payout of such an outcome to zero.
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6 Conclusion and Future Research
I conclude having shown that temporal reference points hold promise in giving novel explanation for
a number of experimental results. Even with this promise, the question of how agents form temporal
reference points remains to be explored in detail.
I dealt with, ﬁrst, the case in which temporal reference points are formed by informational
updates. This assumption immediately leads to the question of information thresholds; that is,
how much information is needed to form a temporal reference point. For the information focused
consumer, it was assumed here that any information creates a temporal reference point. However,
in daily evaluation of prospects, informational updates are often, in a sense, ubiquitous. When
considering the returns on prospects derived from stock investment for example, information is
received on a daily basis by the simple fact that the agent knows that the stock market hasn't
crashed today. It is not plausible, however, to suppose that such low-granularity information would
cause the individual to focus on every instance at which he becomes freshly aware that, yes, the
stock market is still intact. Thus, what the threshold for informational granularity is in order to
trigger a temporal reference point is an important question for the viability of this model.
I also dealt with the case where uniform delay of two prospects caused the delay factor to become
a temporal reference point. This particular deviation from information focused agents was chosen
due to the results of Glimcher et al. (2007). Glimcher, as earlier discussed, proposes that the
variable of interest explaining their results is the time of the soonest possible reward, in contrast to
the explanation proposed here. The data from their experiment alone is not enough to disentangle
the two explanations, but such disentanglement should be possible through choice experiments in
which focus is made on a latter point in time (e.g. 60 days), but choice sets include options from
that time, later times and earlier times.
Further, while the formation of a temporal reference point by the subjects in Glimcher is plausible
due to the focus and repetition of a particular point in time, this does not go very far towards
developing a actual theory of how temporal reference points are formed. Issues of attention and
focus, repetition and ubiquity in temporal framing may all be factors in the formation of such.
This is not an issue in applications where information focused consumers is a natural and obvious
assumption to make, but if a theory of temporal reference points is to be extended beyond these
cases, more investigation into the method of the formation of such reference points will be needed.
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Part III
Related Literature
Time Inconsistency
Good resolutions are useless attempts to interfere with scientiﬁc laws. Their origin is
pure vanity. Their result is absolutely nil. (Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray)
Samuelson (1937) gave us the discounted utility function that became ubiquitous in economic liter-
ature. In spite of Samuelson's concerns about the model (It is completely arbitrary to assume that
the individual behaves so as to maximize an integral of the form envisaged in [the DU model]), it
became the standard due to its elegance and tractability. As mounting evidence since that time has
shown, Samuelson was right to disavow the descriptive accuracy of his model. Numerous inconsis-
tencies in behavior have arisen inconsistent with the DU model, among them time inconsistency,
the simple observation that what an agent wants for himself tomorrow is not the same as what he
wants when tomorrow arrives. The empirical evidence for and theoretical work on time inconsis-
tency and the subtopic of diminishing impatience is broad and spans disciplines, seeing particular
interest in psychology and economics. I focus here on a few of the more inﬂuential and relevant
studies. Frederick et al. (2002) provides a far more extensive and thorough review of the economic
literature on time preference, with a special focus on time inconsistency, up to the date of that work.
The literature in this section is relevant to both the multiself bargaining model and the temporal
reference points model.
The classic work Strotz (1956) is the ﬁrst to formally analyze time inconsistency. Strotz sets out a
model in which an agent must choose a plan for lifetime consumption with the added complication of
a non-geometric discount function. He identiﬁes the inherent ﬂuctuations in behavior and preference
reversals that this would lead to and identiﬁes two alternate strategies that a non-myopic agent can
adopt in the face of such challenges. The ﬁrst strategy is pre-commitment: noting that the ability
to lock in or lock out certain future actions would always be desirable to a non-myopic agent, Strotz
explains the observed use of costly commitment devices. The second strategy is consistency: in the
face of a lack of commitment ability an agent would naturally wish to choose the best current plan
given the foreknowledge of the diﬀering preferences of the agent's self in the future and the ability
of that future self to change the plan.
Strotz maintains that exponential discounting is the proper way of discounting, and concludes
with the speculation that exponential discounting is a learned behavior which, with proper education
and upbringing, can override the inherent non-exponential form. In the best case the agent becomes
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a true geometric discounter, having supplanted his natural inborn form of time inconsistency. In the
less eﬀective cases, we may see individuals being weak, and failing to uphold the correct exponential
discounting that they have been taught. This is the cause of the splurges, binges and extravagances
of human behavior.
Ainslie (1975) gives a wide overview of literature on impulsiveness in economics, sociology, psy-
chology, psychiatry, and therapy. He identiﬁes three proposed explanations for impulsive behavior.
First, that the agents do not truly understand the consequences of their actions. Second, that agents
are compelled by a lower principle to act against their own best interest. Third, that agents in-
nately distort their valuation of consequences with imminent consequences having a greater weight.
Through the aid of extensive animal research, Ainslie identiﬁes the third as the most promising in ex-
planatory power. He establishes that a hyperbolic discounting function and its associated smoothly
diminishing impatience is the best and most elegant ﬁt for the behaviors prescribed by the ani-
mal research.33 He further notes that the same discounting function creates an elegant explanation
for many observed human behaviors of impulsivity. Finally, Ainslie makes the important observa-
tion that Strotz was partially incorrect to identify pre-commitment and consistency as alternatives,
noting simply that an agent would ideally employ both: committing against as many undesirable
behaviors as possible, while retaining consistency with those that remained. In Ainslie (1992) he
follows this earlier work with further evidence showing that both animal and human behavior ﬁts
hyperbolic discount functions.
Note here that while the multiself bargaining model I propose generates behavior in line with
hyperbolic discounting, it could be interpreted to ﬁt into Ainslie's second category. That is, with the
impatient self representing a low impulse attempting to pull the individual away from their true
preferences. While tempting, however, I do not see a good argument to be made for why the patient
self is any more true than the impatient one. This leaves the model, by default, to fall into Ainslie's
third category, if any of them.
Thaler (1981) provides an inﬂuential study testing three hypotheses concerning patterns of de-
cision making. First, he ﬁnds that implicit discount rates decrease with length of time, indicating
that the discount rate is higher over proximate time than over distant time. The explanation he
promotes as most promising is that the agent inherently sees a greater diﬀerence between today and
tomorrow than between a year from now and a year and a day. This is the explanation that has
been most prominently adopted in the economic literature to explain preference reversal. Second,
he ﬁnds that implicit discount rates decrease with the size of the rewards under consideration. He
identiﬁes as a plausible explanation a cost of self control that does not increase with the size of the
reward. Third, he identiﬁes that discount rates are smaller for losses than for gains. The explanation
33Speciﬁcally, under generalized hyperbolic discounting, a reward in t time is discounted by (1 + αt)−(γ/α).
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put forth for this is one of loss aversion: an agent does not equate the opportunity costs of forgone
gain with out of pocket costs, over-weighing the latter compared to the former.
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) argue that insuﬃcient attention has been applied to violations of
the canonical discounted utility (DU) of Samuelson (1937). They enumerate four identiﬁed anomalies
in behavior not consistent with the DU model, and develop a model that accounts for them. Three
of these anomalies match with the three results of Thaler above. The fourth, documented by
Loewenstein (1988), ﬁnds that the amount required to compensate for delaying a reward by a given
interval was two to four times greater than the amount subjects were willing to sacriﬁce to speed up
consumption by the same interval. This is evidence of a framing eﬀect because both choices were
just diﬀerent representations of the same underlying options. They encompass these anomalies in
their model by including these framing eﬀects, a value function which is steeper for losses than for
gains and, most relevant to the present work, a hyperbolic time discounting function.
Keren and Roelofsma (1995) examine the connection between the certainty eﬀect (the obser-
vation that certain outcomes are over-weighed relative to near-certain outcomes) and diminishing
impatience. In their experiment, they develop six subject groups. In one group, subjects were of-
fered a choice between $100 now and $110 in four weeks; 82% chose the $100. In another group,
subjects were oﬀered a choice between $100 in 26 weeks and $110 in 30 weeks; 37% chose the $100.
This demonstrates the classic diminishing impatience and is in line with previous work. However,
consider another two groups in their study. In one, subjects were oﬀered a choice between a 50%
chance of $100 now, and a 50% chance of $110 in four weeks; 39% chose the ﬁrst option. In the
other, subjects were oﬀered a choice between a 50% chance of $100 in 26 weeks, and a 50% chance
of $110 in 30 weeks; 33% chose the ﬁrst option. Similar results were shown for a 90% chance set.
In other words, when payments are made less certain the present bias and diminishing impatience
quickly fades. Their results are suggestive that at least part of the reason that subjects overweight
the present is that the present is absolutely certain; that is, diminishing impatience is at least in
part caused by the certainty eﬀect. When the present is made very uncertain, present bias fades.
Halevy (2008), building on the results of Keren and Roelofsma, develops a discrete time model
with a rank-dependent expected utility maximizer with constant stopping (death) probability. He
develops his model to show the equivalence of diminishing impatience and the common ratio eﬀect
in such a setting. A correction by Saito (2011) argues that the equivalence is between diminishing
impatience and the certainty eﬀect, and between strongly diminishing impatience and the common
ratio eﬀect.
Chakraborty and Halevy (2015) further corrects both Halevy (2008) and Saito (2011). The au-
thors show a problem in both works stemming from a too-weak deﬁnition of diminishing impatience.
In the ﬁrst two papers diminishing impatience and strongly diminishing impatience are deﬁned based
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on a delay of only one period in two competing rewards. In the 2015 paper, Chakraborty and Halevy
show that these time preference notions must be deﬁned for all possible (discrete) delays in order for
the desired equivalence to hold. With their strengthened notions of delay independent diminishing
impatience (DIDI) and delay independent strongly diminishing impatience (DISDI), they show the
equivalence in their setting between DIDI and the certainty eﬀect (CE) and between DISDI and the
common ratio eﬀect (CRE). Notably, this is an equivalence between a time preference based in a
discrete time setting, and risk preferences over probabilities in the unit interval. Both are united by
the property of increasing elasticity of the probability distortion function inherent in rank-dependent
utility. This diﬀerence in domains for time and risk preferences, one discrete and one continuous,
is what led the original weaker deﬁnition to fail to create equivalence. With the original deﬁnition,
the risk preference (CE, CRE) implied the corresponding time preference, but the converse did not
hold, as Chakraborty and Halevy illustrate with an example. Intuitively, the strengthening of the
time preference deﬁnitions the authors employ changes their notion of diminishing impatience to one
that has a natural connection to a continuous time setting. To see this intuition, note that if the
deﬁnition holds true for any delay, then it can approximate a notion of diminishing impatience in
a continuous time setting (such as the deﬁnition employed by the temporal reference points model)
by employing arbitrarily small period lengths. There is no such connection possible to continuous
time with the original deﬁnition based on a delay of a single period length, which in a sense causes
the original deﬁnition to be unable to bridge the gap between the discrete time preferences and
continuous risk preferences.
Turning back to non-rank-dependent settings, Laibson (1997) popularized the use of the β − δ
model of discounting in discrete time models. In such a discount function, consumption τ periods
in the future is discounted using discount factor βδτ when τ > 0 (and by factor 1 for τ = 0). When
0 < β < 1, the author argues, this discount function retains the important qualitative properties
of hyperbolic discounting while remaining relatively tractable. He terms this discounting quasi-
hyperbolic. Laibson's work led to widespread use of the β − δ form of discounting in applications.
In Laibson (1998), he applies this model to known stylized facts about consumption choices, showing
that it predicts many well-documented regularities. He further expounds on the welfare implication
of the hyperbolic model, speciﬁcally how under-saving can lead to welfare losses in the Pareto sense:
to all present and future selves. In Laibson et al. (1998), the authors calibrate a model to β − δ
discounting based on data on saving for retirement. They show that patterns of asset accumulation
are consistent with quasi-hyperbolic discounting, using observed regularities to distinguish between
quasi-hyperbolic and exponential savers.
Frederick et al. (2002), as mentioned, provides a very thorough survey of the literature on
non-exponential time discounting. One result from their work bears particular mention here. By
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analyzing the numerous studies measuring discount rates, they ﬁnd that after a horizon of around
a year there is no evidence at all of a further decline in discount rates. This is strong evidence
that discounting is asymptotically exponential; that is, discount functions become increasingly close
to exponential as time spans increase. This evidence ﬁts in with the multiself bargaining model,
provided that the long-term and short-term selves have reasonably distinct discount rates. In the
language of the temporal reference points model, this would be consonant with a discount function
exhibiting preference for grouped information, and also preference for less dispersed information
within a limited time horizon. Such an agent would only care about the proximity of information
to other information when the updates were relatively close.
Harris and Laibson (2013) provide an alternate approach to avoiding the discontinuity of predic-
tions that come from the standard beta-delta model by introducing an element of uncertainty. In
their model, there remains a discontinuous distinction between now and later, as in standard β − δ,
but the agent, in evaluating the discounted value of rewards, is uncertain about when now will end,
and later will begin. The interpretation of this is challenging, as it implies the agent is internally
uncertain about how they themselves are discounting future rewards. However, it is shown that this
model of uncertainty generates preferences equivalent to a deterministic discounting function which
is qualitatively similar to true hyperbolic discounting. Thus, their work presents an alternate form
of a continuous time discounting function (as opposed to the hyperbolic discounting function).
Of special signiﬁcance to the temporal reference points model is the work of Glimcher et al.
(2007), whose well-documented results stand in direct opposition to several of the others discussed
here. A study performed on individuals in MRIs given choices over pairs of prospects leads the au-
thors to disagree with the fact that diminishing impatience swiftly disappears as contrasted prospects
become more distant, and also disagree with the fact that preference reversals occur when options
are pushed into the future. In the study one set of options, the immediate set, gave choices between
$20 immediately and delayed amounts greater than $20. An indiﬀerence curve was ﬁt to individuals
based on the choices made, and the implicit discounting indicated by this curve was found to be
well ﬁt by a hyperbolic function. This ﬁrst results conﬁrms previous work. However, another set of
options in their study, the delayed set, gave choices between $20 in two months, and an amount
greater than $20 at a delay of more than two months. It is important to note that every choice in
the delayed set had $20 in two months as one of the two options. Two important results of theirs
stand out.
First, and most importantly, they ﬁnd that the hyperbolic discount function stochastically ﬁtting
the indiﬀerence curve generated by choices over the immediate set is the same as the hyperbolic
discount function for the indiﬀerence curve of the delayed set. In the words of the authors, subjects
were just as hyperbolic when making choices at delays of two months as they were when making
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choices of no delay. Second, they ﬁnd that neural activity for the delayed set was scaled down by
approximately as much as the 60 day option was for the immediate set. For instance, the 120 days
option in the delayed option set was scaled by that same factor twice. Neither of these results are
in line with previous results concerning time discounting. The authors propose that the additional
variable of interest is the time of the soonest possible reward, supposing that the time of this reward
becomes a default starting point for discounting. In other words, they argue that individuals are
not present biased as much as they are as soon as possible biased. This explanation is not fully
suﬃcient to rectify evidence, such as that of Keren and Roelofsma (1995) mentioned above, that
agents do exhibit behavior consonant with diminishing impatience. The evidence presented there,
and in many other surveys, cannot be explained by a bias for the soonest possible reward. Indeed,
no such bias appears at all when the rewards become distant enough. The results of Glimcher et
al. as well as the literature preceding it can be rectiﬁed in the temporal reference points model, as
I discussed in that work. The fact that every comparison was made to 60 days is what makes it
plausible that an agent would focus in on 60 days as an important point in time, whereas such a
focus would be absent from other studies done on diminishing impatience.
Mullainathan and Banerjee (2010) take a diﬀerent approach to time inconsistency by proposing
a class of temptation goods. These goods are assumed to generate utility for the current self, but
not for earlier selves that anticipate their consumption. The source of inconsistency is immediately
apparent: an agent never wishes his future selves to consume temptation goods, yet always wishes
to consume them immediately himself. By assuming the fraction of marginal earnings spent on
temptation good is decreasing with overall consumption, the authors predict behavior consistent with
regularities concerning the behavior of the poor relative to the rich, such as borrowing repeatedly
at extremely high interest rates.
Going one step further in their notion of time inconsistency, Jamison and Wegener (2010) propose
that people regard their future selves as truly separate persons. They draw upon neuroscientiﬁc and
functional imaging studies that seem to indicate that mental systems associated with mentalizing
other agents are the same as those associated with imagining oneself in the future. Thus, they argue
that modeling intertemporal choice as a strategic game between present and futures selves is more
than just a convenient modeling device, but has direct descriptive value.
Other evidence of diminishing impatience includes Angeletos et al. (2001), who simulate both
hyperbolic and exponential households, ﬁnding that the former ﬁt consumption data much better.
Kirby and Herrenstein (1995) provide another study documenting preference reversal. Myerson
and Green (1995) show further evidence of hyperbolic discounting in particular via a experimental
study. Fang and Silverman (2009) estimate a structural model of labor supply and welfare program
participation. They use their estimation to reject exponential discounting in favor of hyperbolic,
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and then use counterfactuals to quantify a measure of the utility loss stemming from a lack of
commitment power.
As mentioned ﬁrst by Strotz (1956), and followed up on by many papers mentioned, an immediate
corollary of diminishing impatience is a desire for commitment power, unless the agent is completely
naive about future preference reversals. The evidence for this preference for commitment is also sub-
stantial. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) show that students voluntarily choose binding intermediate
deadlines for paper submissions in a college class. However, they do not set them optimally, and
external deadlines are still superior. Thaler and Benartzi (2004) report on a proposed, and tested,
savings plan which allows workers to voluntarily commit to automatically saving a fraction of future
raise increases for retirement. Their evidence shows that the majority of subjects subscribe and stay
in the program. Kaur et al. (2009) report on an experiment on workers in an Indian data entry ﬁrm.
Workers had a wage per unit of work of w and could voluntarily choose to have that wage drop to
w/2 unless they achieved a certain minimum target which they could also choose. Despite the fact
that they stood to lose quite a lot, a signiﬁcant number of subjects committed to non-trivial targets.
Temptation & Multiple Selves
The term temptation has been used to refer to two types of behavioral phenomenon observed
in the literature. The ﬁrst is related to the tendency of agents to be tempted to make decisions
biased toward payoﬀs in the present or near future; this use is tied directly into time inconsistency.
The second is the observation of violations of independence of irrelevant alternatives when multiple
immediate choices are available, where agents may be tempted by an appealing option which
inﬂuences their choice without actually choosing the appealing option. More precisely, violations of
Sen's (1971) condition α, which states that if x ∈ B ⊂ A, and x ∈ C(A), then x ∈ C(B), where
C(A) is the set of elements chosen from set A.
Temptation in either form will lead to agents having a preference for commitment: the ability
to constrain the eﬀect of these tempting options either by removing options in advance, or by
exercising costly self-control. Due to a large number of models addressing both forms of temptation
simultaneously, and simple conﬂation of the word temptation to mean either of these eﬀects,
this section will necessarily have some spill-over to the previous section. I particularly focus on
literature examining these concepts through the lens of models containing multiple sets of conﬂicting
preferences.
First, there is copious research, largely in psychology, showing that self-regulation seems to be a
limited resource. Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) examine patterns of self-regulatory failure in
the literature. They conclude that the evidence supports a limited resource model of self-regulation,
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and that people often voluntarily lose control. Muraven et al. (1998) follows this by examining
the limited resource model of self-control in more detail. Through a series of studies they are able to
show that a limited resource model ﬁts the data better than other models of self-control. Baumeister
et al. (2007) provides a further short survey of evidence for the limited resource model to that date.
Vohs and Faber (2007) take these insights to economics by examining the hypotheses of the
limited resource model as related to impulse buying. They ﬁnd that participants who had par-
ticipated in a willpower depleting activity felt stronger urges to buy and spent more money when
confronted with unanticipated buying opportunities. Similarly, Ozdenoren et al. (2012) apply a
limited willpower model to the domain of endowment consumption over time. Their model gener-
ates a number of qualitative predictions, showing that time preference may be domain speciﬁc, that
previous actions aﬀect preference for future ones (due to potential expenditures of willpower in the
recent past), and that intertemporal smoothing will not, in general, appear.
A limited self-control resource implies violations of independence of irrelevant alternatives; the
act of resisting one alternative will aﬀect an agent's ability to resist another. While willpower as
a limited resource is not a part of the multiself bargaining model, the same behavior is generated
by both. In the multiself bargaining case, the introduction of more tempting options, that is more
options desirable to the short-term self, increases the bargaining power of that self, and thus forces
the long-term self to 'give ground'. This can thus be interpreted as a limited capacity to resist
multiple tempting options.
Gul and Pesendorfer introduced the axiomatic treatment of temptation and self control. In
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), they develop a very important axiomatic representation result for
temptation preferences with self-control in a two period setting. In the ﬁrst period, the agent
chooses a set of lotteries. In the second period, the agent chooses one lottery from the set chosen in
the ﬁrst period. An agent has both an a priori ranking over singleton sets of lotteries, a commitment
ranking, represented by u(·), and an instantaneous urge or temptation toward singleton sets of
lotteries, a temptation ranking, represented by v(·). An agent must compromise between what he
would have chosen without temptation, represented by arg max
x
u(x), and the psychological cost of
not choosing the most tempting option in each set, which would be arg max
x
v(x). The cost of this
self-control is represented by the temptation utility diﬀerence between the choice made and the most
tempting choice, so that the further from the temptation, the greater the cost. Thus, an individual
chooses x to maximize u(x)− (max
y
v(y)− v(x)), so that preferences over sets of options in the ﬁrst
period can be represented by:
U(A) = max
x∈A
u(x)− (max
y∈A
v(y)− v(x)).
Gul and Pesendorfer then deﬁne preferences in the second period over {(A, x) : x ∈ A} where
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A is the set of lotteries chosen in period 1, and x ∈ A is the lottery chosen in period 2. In
other words, the preference is over both the menu and the choice from the menu. This extended
preference, denoted by ∗, allows them to formalize the notion of temptation, saying y tempts x
if ({x}, x) ∗ ({x, y}, x). In other words, the agent would rather choose x in the absence of
the temptation of y, then choose x in the presence of the temptation of y. This preference allows
them to develop a notion of dynamically consistent preferences while accounting for self-control and
temptation eﬀects. More speciﬁcally, since the preferences are deﬁned over the menu and the choice,
and not the choice itself, the representation allows the accounting of apparent temptation eﬀects
while maintaining a notion of independence.
In Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), they extend their two period analysis to an inﬁnite horizon to
provide an alternative to non-exponential time discounting. This gives rise to a representation with a
recursive deﬁnition of preferences, in which in each period the consumer need pay a self-control cost
based on the diﬃculty of not consuming their entire wealth. Or, more precisely, based on the diﬀer-
ence between the temptation utility granted by consuming everything, and the temptation utility of
consuming the choice made. They interpret this as an individual whose temptation utility interferes
with his long-run self-interest. Notably, they ﬁnd that removing non-binding constraints changes
equilibrium allocations, and that steady state consumption is independent of initial endowments and
increasing in self-control (or decreasing in self-control costs).
As for economic literature on multiple selves, Thaler and Shefrin (1981) deal with the issue of
self-control and intertemporal choice by modeling the individual as an organization in discrete time.
This organization consists of a farsighted planner and a series of myopic doers who have no care
beyond the current period. Their work stresses the similarities of this conﬂict within an individual
to the principle-agent conﬂict of actual ﬁrms and is, to the best of my awareness, the ﬁrst formal
economic model to view an individual as having two sets of preferences at a single point in time
that are in conﬂict. They argue that such a model is unavoidable to explain self-control, because
self-control implies conﬂict within the self.
To expand a bit on the details of their model, a series of single-period lived doers derive utility
from consumption, and have direct control over the consumption in that period. The single planner
derives utility from the consumption of all doers, rather than getting consumption directly. Each
doer would consume the maximum amount possible if allowed, but the planner is able to restrict
their choices through discretion and rules. Discretion takes the form of a parameter choice which
is costly in utility terms but limits the maximum consumption that can be chosen. This is the
essence of costly self control. Rules refers to the use of either pre-commitment, or the imposition
of a rule of thumb that the doer has to follow, such as a self-imposed ban on borrowing (perhaps
with exceptions to be made for houses and automobiles). They apply their model ﬁrst to data
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from pension plans, which showed that pension savings and non-pension savings were not perfect
substitutes. More speciﬁcally, the introduction of forced savings was not oﬀset by an equal decrease
in voluntary savings. This is explained by the involuntary savings being essentially willpower-free,
allowing the planner to focus self-control on voluntary savings.
It is shown in Benabou and Pycia (2002) that Gul and Pesendorfer's (2001) representation can
also be interpreted through the dual-self view of Thaler and Shefrin, in which there is an endogenous
probability of losing control to your more myopic urge. Their re-interpretation bears an interesting
conceptual connection to the multiself bargaining model. Speciﬁcally, Benabou and Pycia postulate
two selves who lobby the brain for control, each expending a resource cost, and receiving probability
of control proportional to the expenditure of the eﬀort. This bears a close resemblance to the
conﬂict that I use to determine the disagreement point. There are important distinctions, most
saliently of which is that the multiself bargaining here allows bargaining between the selves to a
mutually preferred point, rather than stopping at strict randomization between their most favored
points. This allows the accommodation of randomization in the case of discrete decisions, as well
as deterministic decisions for actions such as savings-consumption choice. In contrast, Benabou and
Pycia's interpretation implies randomization in all cases where the selves prefer diﬀerent outcomes.
Further, I distinguish selves by a single parameter rather than distinct evaluations. This more
restrictive view is limiting, but allows the generation of novel insights.
Chatterjee and Krishna (2006, 2009), develop a model of conﬂicting preferences closely related
to the representation result of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). In the ﬁrst period an individual has to
choose a set of feasible choices from which he will select one in the second period. With a probability
dependent on the set chosen, the individual in essence loses control to an alter ego in the second
period, who makes a choice based on their own preferences, represented by v(·). model, in which
an alter-ego has a probability of appearing and overriding the decision of the far-sighted decision
maker. The preferences over sets of lotteries, then, is given by:
U(A) = (1− pA)max
x∈A
u(x) + pA max
y∈Bv(A)
u(y),
where pA is the probability of losing control when faced with set A, and Bv(A) is the set of v
maximizers in A. The authors show that this dual-self representation is a relaxation of the axioms
of Gul and Pesendorfer. That is, Gul and Pesendorfer's representation implies that a decision maker
behaves as if he has an alternate ego in the second period when he is making choices in the ﬁrst
period. The authors argue that this reinterpretation allows unambiguous welfare statements in the
face of dynamic inconsistency.
Building on Thaler and Shefrin (1981), work of Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 2011, 2012) bears
the closest resemblance in the literature to the multiself bargaining model. In Fudenberg and Levine
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(2006), they develop a discrete time model consisting of a single long-lived patient self, and a series
of one period lived short-term selves, in which the short-term self has full control over the action
in each period, and the long-term self exerts costly eﬀort to constrain the actions available to the
short-term self, where the cost is increasing in the utility denied to the short-term self. Their model
is more general than that of Thaler and Shefrin, applying to a wide range of situations, as opposed
to simply consumption-savings. Further, they specify the self-control aspect more precisely, allowing
the model to be more tractable and make more precise predictions.
Expanding on the details of their model, each period is played in two stages. First, the long-
run self chooses a self-control action that inﬂuences the utility function of the myopic self. The
choice of this self-control action reduces utility for both selves, and changes the preferences of the
short-term self. Second, the short-term self chooses the optimal action (for himself). They use
their model, ﬁrst, to explain diminishing impatience. Further, by arguing that self-control costs are
convex rather than linear, they explain violations of independence of irrelevant alternatives as well as
experimental evidence showing decreased self-control in the face of increased cognitive load. Rabin's
paradox of risk aversion in the large and small is explained by a case in which cash-on-hand is used
as a commitment device, leading the agent to consume all small but unexpected winnings. When
winning large amounts, self-control allows the agent to save some of it. Intertemporal smoothing
makes agents less risk averse in this latter case, so that they are less risk averse to large gambles
than to small ones. Further, they argue that the axioms of Gul & Pesendorfer (2001, 2004) need be
relaxed in order to account for the experimental evidence on the eﬀects of cognitive load.
In Fudenberg and Levine (2011), they extend their model, with the assumption a convex cost
of self control, in order to account for a wider range of puzzling experimental phenomena. One
important qualitative prediction derived in their work is that preference reversal is less likely when
the probability of rewards is smaller. This is in line with the data of Keren and Roelsofsma (1995)
expounded on earlier. Second, they are able to show how convex costs of self-control can explain
the Allais paradox as well as the common ratio eﬀect. The essential force behind both of these
qualitative additions is that in cases where payoﬀs are less likely (such as when two options are
mixed with a chance of getting nothing), less self-control is needed. The convex costs of self-control,
then, allow the long-term self to exert more inﬂuence over situations where decisions are more likely
to be payoﬀ irrelevant. Similarly, they predict that the Allais paradox should disappear as payoﬀs
become more distant (as the long-term self is able to exert more control). Further, by estimating a
version of the model, they are able to demonstrate that a wide range of phenomena can be explained
by a stable set of parameters.
In Fudenberg and Levine (2012), they further extend the model, relaxing the assumption of
completely myopic short-term selves in order to remove discontinuities in such eﬀects as time dis-
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counting and cognitive load. As the short-term selves now care somewhat about the future, the
authors modify self-control costs to depend on the present value denied to the short-term self, rather
than the period utility. This speciﬁcation requires, as the authors point out, the assumption that the
short-term selves, in spite of caring about the future, are still strategically naive, unable to conceive
of future self-control. Finally, in order for temptation and limited self-control to have inﬂuence in
more than just the present period, they make the crucial addition of a cognitive resource variable
that tracks self-control over time.
The Multiself Bargaining model developed in this work departs from this strand of work by
Fudenberg and Levine conceptually primarily by treating selves symmetrically. The key innovation
is that many behaviors of interest can be generated solely by a diﬀerence in geometric time preference
between two selves, without the introduction of self-control cost or cognitive resources as modeling
elements.
Ainslie (1986) speculates on the nature of intra-personal conﬂict, and its value to psychology
and economics, in particular touching on the idea of inner bargaining. His form of bargaining is
not symmetric, and focuses on selves that act at diﬀerent times. However the work is signiﬁcant for
being the ﬁrst, to my awareness, to mention the concept of two inner selves deliberately coming to
a mutually beneﬁcial agreement rather than conﬂict.
Green and Hojman (2009) in a working paper develop an important set of results for welfare anal-
ysis related to multiple selves and to cases of IIA violations in general. Starting with the statement
that revealed preference theory cannot be used as a basis for welfare analysis because rationality
cannot be reasonably assumed, they explain choices are arising from compromise between conﬂict-
ing preference relations.34 They develop a method to determine a set of explanatory preferences
that can give rise to the observed data, and ﬁnd that, in general, their method does not yield a
unique set of explanatory preferences. Thus, they compute bounds on welfare based on the set of
all possible sets of explanatory preferences. The authors do not assume multiple sets of preferences,
but rather show how such sets are generated from a set of choice data. They also develop a cardinal
welfare theory based on the weighting the diﬀerent possible sets of explanatory preferences place on
each preference within the explanatory set.
Finally, Ambrus and Rozen (2013) show in a working paper that a limitation on the number of
selves is necessary for any multiple self model to have predictive value. They establish a measure of
the number of independence of irrelevant alternatives violations that a choice rule generates. They
then show that there is a linear relationship between the number of selves aggregated into a given
choice rules and the number of such IIA violations. They conclude, then, having shown that without
34The authors by rationality mean that there exists a preference relation deﬁned over singleton sets which accounts
for the choice data; they do not allow for the Gul & Pesendorfer view of rationality, which broadens the deﬁnition of
the preference to encompass IIA violations.
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an a priori limitation on the number of selves, any number of IIA violations can be rationalized.
Neurological studies on the descriptive accuracy of multiple concurrent selves are mixed. McClure
et al. (2004) shows MRI evidence consistent with the notion that decisions made with diﬀerent time
horizons engage very diﬀerent areas of the brain, and argues that this is evidence for multiple
structures within the brain. In contrast, the aforementioned Glimcher et al. (2007) uses separate
MRI evidence to contradict this assertion, claiming that there is no evidence that multiple selves in
conﬂict is any more than a convenient modeling assumption. I am at present unaware of a resolution
to this conﬂict among neurological evidence.
Information Preferences & Temporal Framing
In this section, I give an overview of the literature on the preferences of agents over the timing of
information, as well as studies on the eﬀects of temporal framing. The literature in this section is
relevant primarily to the temporal reference points model.
I begin with an overview of both disappointment aversion and loss aversion with narrow framing,
neither of which forms part of the temporal reference points model, but which are both popular
sources of alternate hypotheses as to why information timing matters to agents. Both involve agents
being more sensitive to bad outcomes than to good ones. The central intuition of the literature
employing these to explain information preference is that additional information exposure provides
more opportunities for both good and bad news, but the negative eﬀect of the chance of bad news
outweighs the positive eﬀect of the change of good news.
First, Gul (1991) sets forth the theory of disappointment aversion, in which agents evaluate a
lottery based on an endogenous reference point. Outcomes worse than the endogenous reference
point are weighted at 1 + β, while those better than the endogenous reference point are weighted
at 1. He proposes that this model is the most restrictive one which both includes expected utility
theory as a special case and also accounts for the Allais paradox. The reference point is the unique
value, x, such that if the expected value of the lottery is calculated with the additional weight put
on values less than x, that expected value will be equal to x. Disappointment aversion fares well
empirically for many aspects of choice behavior. For example, Camerer and Ho (1994) use a survey
of violations of independence and betweenness to show that disappointment aversion ﬁts the data
far better than expected utility.
Loss aversion, introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their seminal paper on prospect
theory, is the tendency of agents to be more sensitive to losses than to gains. Narrow framing
suggests that individuals examine each outcome or decision in isolation. In combination, these two
have been used to explain a number of economic regularities, being jointly referred to as myopic
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loss aversion.
Turning now to evidence evidence of the eﬀects of information feedback on agents, Gneezy and
Potters (1997) allowed subjects to sequentially bet $2 on a repeated known lottery. In one case,
subjects learned the outcome and made a new decision each period. In another case, subjects made a
decision for the next three periods, and learned only the aggregate outcome. Subjects were found to
bet much less in the ﬁrst case than in the second. The authors note that this increased risk aversion
in the presence of greater feedback is in line with myopic loss aversion. Haigh and List (2005) did a
similar study to Gneezy and Potters with undergraduates and professional traders. They not only
replicated the result of Gneezy and Potters, but interestingly found that the informational feedback
eﬀect was greater for the traders than the undergraduates.
Bellemare et al. (2005) were able to separate the eﬀect of information feedback from that of
investment ﬂexibility. Building from the Gneezy and Potters experiment, they added a third case
where subjects could only change their decision every third period, but still received informational
updates every period. They signiﬁcantly found that even when investment ﬂexibility was ﬁxed,
informational feedback alone explained most of the diﬀerence in risk aversion. Thus, they argue,
myopic loss aversion is driven by information feedback.
Köszegi and Rabin (2009) develop a dynamic consumption model in which utility is based on
current consumption and changes in beliefs about consumption (both present and future). In their
model, agents are assumed to be loss averse with respect to changes in these beliefs; that is, negative
news is worse than positive news is good. The informational updates received in their model are the
changes in expected future consumption. One result is that agents prefer to get information clumped
together. This is due to the loss aversion: information more spread out gives more opportunities
for ﬂuctuations in the expectations of consumption, and thus more opportunities to experience loss.
This preference is in line with the PGI developed in the temporal reference points model, though
the source is diﬀerent. (As their model is in discrete time, there is no equivalence to PLDI). Their
model further shows a preference for receiving the same information earlier. The agent prefers to
get bad news about a future event sooner so that the loss is felt to be more distant.
Palacios-Huerta (1999), building on Gul's disappointment aversion, is the ﬁrst in the economic
literature to raise the idea that a disappointment averse individual would prefer all uncertainty
to be resolved at once, rather than sequentially. This is shown by working out an example. The
fundamental insight is that a weakening of the independence axiom will induce a preference for
the way in which uncertainty is resolved. The author supports the use of disappointment aversion
over prospect theory (i.e. myopic loss aversion) based explanations on the basis of the fact that
disappointment aversion is only one parameter richer than expected utility, and retains as much as
possible of expected utility theory while also being consistent with the Allais paradox and other
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behavioral anomalies.
Dillenberger (2010) deals with the nature of what he calls Preferences for One-Shot Resolution
of Uncertainty (PORU), a formalization of the idea raised by Palacios-Huerta. An agent exhibiting
PORU would prefer that any two stage lottery be resolved in a single stage. Dillenberger further
introduces Negative Certainty Independence (NCI), which says that an agent who prefers a non-
degenerate lottery to a certain outcome will not reverse preferences when both options are mixed
with a common third option. Essentially, NCI is a formalization of the certainty eﬀect, as it says
that the certainty of the certain outcome must (weakly) give it some additional appeal over the
lottery.35 Dillenberger then establishes that these properties, PORU and NCI, are equivalent. He
further quantiﬁes PORU by deﬁning the gradual resolution premium, which is the amount the
agent would pay to replace a two stage lottery with its single stage equivalent. That is, to avoid the
gradual resolution of uncertainty.
It is important to note that, while there are certainly similarities between PORU and a prefer-
ence for grouped information (PGI) in the temporal reference points model, they are not the same
property because they occupy diﬀerent settings. Dillenberger (2010) uses time neutrality (the idea
that an agent does not care about timing), as one of the conditions for the equivalence he develops
in order to isolate the eﬀects of gradual resolution of uncertainty apart from the timing. Thus, PGI
cannot be seen as a direct application of PORU. The closest connection to PORU would be via an
information focused agent with discount function described by a continuous time analog of β − δ
discounting, so that
D(t) ≡
1, if t = 0βe−δt, otherwise.
In the temporal reference points model, such an agent would only have preferences with regard to
the number of stages in which information is revealed in this model, without caring at all about the
relative timing of those informational updates.
Artstein-Avidan and Dillenberger (2010) show directly that disappointment aversion implies
PORU, and then, as an application, extend disappointment aversion to lotteries with an arbitrary
number of stages, noting that a disappointment averse agent prefers to replace each two-stage sub-
lottery with its single-stage counterpart. This mirrors closely the property of PGI in the temporal
reference points model.
Turning to the eﬀects of direct temporal framing, Chandran and Menon (2004) examine the
eﬀects on temporal framing on the decisions of individuals. Through survey data, they examine
35The certainty eﬀect is an empirically supported observation that agents over-weigh certain outcomes in compar-
ison to outcomes with even the slightest bit of uncertainty.
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the diﬀerences in framing health risks by per day risk versus per year risk. They ﬁnd that risks
presented in per day terms appear more proximal and concrete to subjects, leading to increased self-
risk perceptions. They suggest, through an adoption of the Construal Level Theory of Liberman and
Trope (1998, 2000) that this is due to the idea of a day triggering the notion of a proximal event,
and a year a distant one. In the language of the temporal reference points model, an alternate
hypothesis is that framing health risks in terms of daily events creates additional temporal reference
points, which decreases the value of the health-based lottery, making the subjects appear more risk
averse.
Gourville (1998) looks at the pennies-per-day phenomenon where a consumer cost is presented
as a drawn out, minimal daily (or weekly, or monthly) cost in contrast to a single larger payment. He
ﬁnds that the alternate types of cost framing trigger diﬀerent associations, and lead to signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent consumer behavior. In contrast to the work of Chandran and Menon, Gourville argues that
the associations of the two types of payments are not temporal. Rather, the minimal daily cost is
shown to be compared with other small ongoing costs by the agent (cup of coﬀee per day!), while
the single larger payment is associated with other large expenses. Thus it is not clear here that the
eﬀect is due to the temporal framing or other types of framing. In other words, it may be due to
framing based on the size of the payment, rather than the timing of it.
Bargaining
In the realm of bargaining, a small existing strand of literature explores methods of generating
endogenous disagreement points in bargaining problems, which is relevant to the multiself bargaining
model.
Vartiainen (2007) studies a bargaining problem without a disagreement outcome. He develops
a solution that determines the outcome and the disagreement point simultaneously. Further, he
shows that there is a unique solution of this kind which satisﬁes Pareto-optimality, independence of
irrelevant alternatives, symmetry and scale invariance, and that this solution maximizes the Nash
product with respect to the solution and the reference point. Essentially the way this is deﬁned is
to ﬁnd two points in the set of outcomes, x and y , such that x is the Nash bargaining solution when
y is the disagreement point, and that when the entire set is inverted arithmetically, the inverted y
becomes the Nash bargaining solution with the inverted x as the disagreement point. This solution
concept requires strict convexity of the utility set in order to generate a unique solution.
Bozbay et al. (2012) develop a similar extension for Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining, where
both a disagreement point and a compromise point are determined simultaneously. The compromise
point is the classic Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome for the disagreement point. The disagreement point is
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determined by following the line joining the compromise point and the anti-utopia point (consisting
of the worst possible utility for each player), and then ﬁnding the worst point on this line within
the set of outcomes. Once again, this solution concept requires strict convexity of the utility set in
order to generate a unique solution.
Unfortunately, neither of these methods of endogenous disagreement points can be applied to the
multiself bargaining model. This is primarily because both require strict convexity of the bargaining
set, which would exclude from consideration discrete action sets (which create utility vector sets
which are not strictly convex). Secondarily, the methods of disagreement point generation, while
mathematically elegant, do not seem to be any more conceptually ﬁtting for the application than
the one used.
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Part IV
Appendices
Appendix A: Proofs for Multiself Bargaining Model
I begin the proofs by formalizing a few results, not included in the main body of the paper, that
derive from the nature of the Nash bargaining solution.
Lemma A.1 formalizes the notion that, taking the line drawn between the disagreement point
and the Nash bargaining outcome, if the disagreement point is moved to the right side of that line,
the outcome will also move to the right, and visa versa. In Figure A.1, the shaded area represents
where a moved disagreement point would move the outcome to the right. This result will be used
in several of the latter proofs.
Us
Ul b
l
b
s
a
d
Figure A.1: Line dividing eﬀect of moving disagreement point.
Lemma A.1. Consider a bargaining set, U with disagreement point (d1s, d1l ), and denote the Nash
bargaining outcome by (U1s , U
1
l ). Consider the same bargaining set with a diﬀerent disagreement
point (d2s, d
2
l ), and denote Nash bargaining outcome by (U
2
s , U
2
l ). Denote 4ds = d2s − d1s, 4dl =
d2l − d1l , and assume that neither disagreement point is on the Pareto frontier of U . Then,
d2s ≥ U1s =⇒ U2s > U1s ; d2l ≥ U1l =⇒ U2l > U1l .
If d2s < U
1
s , d
2
l < U
1
l , then
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4ds(U1l − d1l )−4dl(U1s − d1s) < 0⇒ U2l ≥ U1l ;
4ds(U1l − d1l )−4dl(U1s − d1s) > 0⇒ U2s ≥ U1s ;
4ds(U1l − d1l )−4dl(U1s − d1s) = 0⇒ U2s = U1s ,
with the right inequalities strict if the Pareto frontier of U is smooth at (U1s , U1l ).
Proof: The ﬁrst line follows directly from fact that if the disagreement point is not on the Pareto
frontier, then the Nash bargaining outcome will necessarily be a Pareto improvement on it. Meaning,
U2s > d
2
s.
Now, consider the second case, where the original outcome remains a Pareto improvement on
the new disagreement point. Note that the Pareto frontier of U is a continuous, not necessarily
diﬀerentiable, curve with endpoints at the bliss points of the two selves. Take any continuous
bijective mapping f that maps [0, 1] onto this curve. Without loss of generality, assume that it
maps 0 to the bliss point of the long-term self, and 1 to the bliss point of the short-term self.
f can then be divided into two mappings, one for each of the two coordinates of the points on
the Pareto frontier, fs : [0, 1] → [X l, Xs] and fl : [0, 1] → [Y l, Y s]. For x ∈ [0, 1] denote by
(Us(x), Ul(x)) ≡ (fs(x), fl(x)) the point on the Pareto frontier which x is mapped to. Note that
Us(x) is strictly increasing in x, while Ul(x) is strictly decreasing in x. Then, we can rewrite the
outcome of the Nash bargaining procedure to be the solution to:
max
x∈[0,1]
(
Us(x)− d1s
) (
Ul(x)− d1l
)
.
Denote x1 the argument of the solution to this maximization (Nash bargaining gives us a unique
solution). Then, the Nash bargaining outcome can be written as
(
Ul(x
1), Us(x
1)
)
. Where Us(x)
and Ul(x) are diﬀerentiable, which is wherever the Pareto frontier is smooth, the ﬁrst derivative of
the objective is:
∂Us(x)
∂x
(Ul(x)− d1l ) +
∂Ul(x)
∂x
(Us(x)− d1s),
so that the ﬁrst order condition is:
Ul(x)− d1l
Us(x)− d1s
= − ∂Ul(x)/∂x
∂Us(x)/∂x
.
If the Pareto frontier is smooth at the Nash bargaining outcome, we then have
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Ul(x
1)− d1l
Us(x1)− d1s
= − ∂Ul(x
1)/∂x
∂Us(x1)/∂x
.
Now consider the new disagreement point (d2s, d
2
l ). Denote
x2 = arg max
x∈[0,1]
(
Us(x)− d2s
) (
Ul(x)− d2l
)
.
Assume that the Pareto frontier is smooth at
(
Ul(x
1), Us(x
1)
)
, then,
4ds(U1l − d1l )−4dl(U1s − d1s) < 0⇔4dsUl(x1) +4dld1s < 4dlUs(x1) + d1l4ds
⇔4dsUl(x1) + (d1l +4dl)d1s < 4dlUs(x1) + d1l (d1s +4ds)
⇔ (d2s − d1s)Ul(x1) + d2l d1s < (d2l − d1l )Us(x1) + d1l d2s
⇔ Us(x1)Ul(x1)− d1sUl(x1)− d2lUs(x1) + d2l d1s < Us(x1)Ul(x1)− d2sUl(x1)− d1lUs(x1) + d1l d2s
⇔ (Ul(x1)− d2l ) (Us(x1)− d1s) < (Ul(x1)− d1l ) (Us(x1)− d2s)
⇔ Ul(x
1)− d2l
Us(x1)− d2s
<
Ul(x
1)− d1l
Us(x1)− d1s
⇔ Ul(x
1)− d2l
Us(x1)− d2s
< − ∂Ul(x
1)/∂x
∂Us(x1)/∂x
⇔ ∂Us(x
1)
∂x
(Ul(x
1)− d2l ) +
∂Ul(x
1)
∂x
(Us(x
1)− d2s) < 0.
This last line shows that the Nash product, with the new disagreement point, is now decreasing
in x at x1. This, implies x2 < x1, since the Nash product is single-peaked along the Pareto frontier.
Thus,
⇒ x2 < x1 ⇒ Us(x2) < Us(x1), Ul(x2) > Ul(x1).
The rest of the cases for a smooth Pareto frontier follow similarly.
Now, we need to consider the case where the Pareto frontier is not smooth at U1 =
(
Ul(x
1), Us(x
1)
)
,
and proceed by contradiction. Suppose that 4ds(U1l − d1l ) < 4dl(U1s − d1s) but that U2l < U1l (the
other case will follow identically). This immediately implies U2s > U
1
s (U
2 is to the lower right of
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U1). Denote the line connecting d1 to U1 as
←−→
d1U1, with slope m1. Similarly
←−→
d2U2, with slope m2 for
the line between d2 and U2, and
←−→
d1d2, with slope md, for the line between the disagreement points.
We begin by showing that d2 is above
←−→
d1U1. Consider three cases. Case 1, 4ds > 0. Then,
4ds(U1l − d1l ) < 4dl(U1s − d1s)⇒ m1 =
(U1l − d1l )
(U1s − d1s)
<
4dl
4ds = m
d.
Thus, md > m1. As d2s > d
1
s, d
2 lies above
←−→
d1U1. Case 2, 4ds < 0,
4ds(U1l − d1l ) < 4dl(U1s − d1s)⇒
(U1l − d1l )
(U1s − d1s)
>
4dl
4ds .
Two subcases. If 4dl > 0 , then md < 0, (d2 is to the left and above), and so d2 is deﬁnitely
above
←−→
d1U1. If 4dl < 0, then m1 > md > 0, and as d2s < d1s, d2 lies above
←−→
d1U1. Case 3, 4ds < 0.
4ds(U1l − d1l ) < 4dl(U1s − d1s)⇒4dl > 0, so that d2 is directly above d1.
Thus, d2 lies above
←−→
d1U1. Now, U2 is below
←−→
d1U1, as it lies to the right along the Pareto frontier
of U from U1. So, as d2 lies above ←−→d1U1 and U2 lies below it, ←−→d1U1 and ←−→d2U2 necessarily cross, so
that m2 < m1.
Now, consider a some set of utility vectors, V, that has a Pareto frontier consisting of the line
connecting U1 and U2. Note that all points on the line between U1 and U2 are necessarily elements
of U , as U is convex. Then, consider the bargaining problem given by < V, d1 >, and denote its
solution vector as V 1. V 1s ≤ U1s . This is because the Nash product is single-peaked along the Pareto
frontier. Thus, if V 1s > U
1
s , then any point to the right of U
1 along the Pareto frontier of V induces
a greater Nash bargaining product than that of U1. But, this would imply that U1 was not the
Nash product maximizing choice from < U , d1 >, since there are points to the right of U that are
elements of U . Therefore, V 1s ≤ U1s . This means that that the slope between d1 and V 1, denote m1v,
is higher than m1. m1v ≥ m1.
Similarly, for the bargaining problem < V, d2 >, with solution V 2, V 2s ≥ U2s ⇒ m2v ≤ m2.
m2v ≤ m2 < m1 ≤ m1v ⇒ m2v < m1v
However, since the slope of the Pareto frontier of V is smooth, from earlier in the proof we know
that the line connecting a disagreement point to the outcome vector should be the negative of the
slope of the frontier. This implies that m1v = m
2
v, which gives us the contradiction. 
Lemma A.2 uses the fact that if we have two diﬀerent utility vector sets whose Pareto frontiers
coincide in an open interval around the Nash bargaining outcome, then small variations in the
disagreement point will have the same eﬀect on the outcome chosen from both sets. This allow us
to apply Lemma 1 for diﬀerent sets when the Pareto frontier around the outcome is the same for
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both sets.
Lemma A.2. Consider a utility vector set set U1, with disagreement point (d1s, d1l ), and denote the
Nash bargaining outcome by (U1s , U
1
l ). Consider another utility vector set U2 with disagreement point
(d2s, d
2
l ), and denote the Nash bargaining outcome by (U
2
s , U
2
l ). Denote4ds = d2s−d1s, 4dl = d2l−d1l ,
and assume that neither disagreement point is on the Pareto frontier of their respective utility vectors
sets. Further, assume that there is an open connected subset of the Pareto frontier of U1 containing
(U1s , U
1
l ), and that this subset is also a subset of the Pareto frontier of U2. and that (U1s , U1l ) is on
the Pareto frontier of U1. Then,
d2s ≥ U1s =⇒ U2s > U1s ; d2l ≥ U1l =⇒ U2l > U1l .
Otherwise, if d2s < U
1
s , d
2
l < U
1
l , then, ∃4¯ > 0 such that if 4dl < 4¯ and 4ds < 4¯,
4ds(U1l − d1l )−4dl(U1s − d1s) < 0⇒ U2l ≥ U1l ;
4ds(U1l − d1l )−4dl(U1s − d1s) > 0⇒ U2s ≥ U1s ;
4ds(U1l − d1l )−4dl(U1s − d1s) = 0⇒ U2s = U1s ,
with the right inequalities strict if the Pareto frontier of U1 is smooth at (U1s , U1l ).
Proof: The ﬁrst line follows directly from fact that if the disagreement point is not on the Pareto
frontier, then the Nash bargaining outcome will be a Pareto improvement on it. Meaning, U2s > d
2
s.
Now consider the second line. First, the Nash bargaining outcome chosen from U2 with disagree-
ment point (d1s, d
1
l ) is (U
1
s , U
1
l ). This follows from the fact that the Pareto frontier of U2 is the
same as that of U1, and from the fact that the Nash bargaining product is continuous and has a
unique local maximum. Thus, if the Nash product from U2 could be increased by moving away from
(U1s , U
1
l ) in one direction, then so could the Nash product from U1.
Second, consider the Nash bargaining outcome chosen from U1 with disagreement point (d2s, d2l ).
As the Nash bargaining outcome varies continuously with the disagreement point, for a suﬃciently
small change in the disagreement point, this outcome will lie within the open connected subset of the
Pareto frontier containing (U1s , U
1
l ). Then, by the same reasoning as for the original disagreement
73
point, this new outcome will also be the result of the Nash bargaining solution applied to U2 with
disagreement point (d2s, d
2
l ). Thus, for a suﬃciently small variation in the disagreement point, the
eﬀect on the outcome chosen from U1 is the same as the eﬀect on the outcome chosen from U2. The
result then follows directly from Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.3. Suppose that the Pareto frontier of Un consists only of mixtures of the two bliss
points. Then, the lottery selected via bargaining has the same mixing weights between actions as the
equilibrium of the conﬂict game.
Proof of Lemma A.3: First, if using the disagreement point with the eﬀort costs added back in,
the result follows directly from the fact that the disagreement point is on the Pareto frontier.
Consider the other case (without the eﬀort costs added in). The bliss points are given by (Xsn, Y
s
n )
and (X ln, Y
l
n), so that a mixing between them can be expressed as
(
wXsn + (1− w)X ln, wY sn + (1− w)Y ln
)
,
where w is the weight placed on the bliss point of the short-term self. From Lemma 1, the disagree-
ment point is given by:
(
X ln +
Sγ+1n (S
γ
n + (1− γ)Lγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
, Y st +
Lγ+1n (L
γ
n + (1− γ)Sγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
)
.
To ﬁnd the Nash bargaining solution, then, we choose w to maximize the product of gains over
the disagreement point utilities. This product is given by:
(
wXsn + (1− w)X ln −X ln −
Sγ+1n (S
γ
n + (1− γ)Lγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
)(
wY sn + (1− w)Y ln − Y st −
Lγ+1n (L
γ
n + (1− γ)Sγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
)
=
(
wSn − S
γ+1
n (S
γ
n + (1− γ)Lγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
)(
(1− w)Ln − L
γ+1
n (L
γ
n + (1− γ)Sγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
)
.
The ﬁrst order condition is
Sn
(
(1− w)Ln − L
γ+1
n (L
γ
n + (1− γ)Sγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
)
− Ln
(
wSn − S
γ+1
n (S
γ
n + (1− γ)Lγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
)
= 0
⇒ SnLn(Sγn + Lγn)2 − SnLγ+1n (Lγn + (1− γ)Sγn) + LnSγ+1n (Sγn + (1− γ)Lγn) = 2wSnLn(Sγn + Lγn)2
⇒ SnLn(Sγn + Lγn)2 − SnL2γ+1n + LnS2γ+1n = 2wSnLn(Sγn + Lγn)2
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⇒ S2γn + 2SγnLγn + L2γn − L2γn + S2γn = 2w(Sγn + Lγn)2
⇒ Sγn(Sγn + Lγn) = w(Sγn + Lγn)2 ⇒ w =
Sγn
Sγn + L
γ
n
.
This is exactly the same weight placed on the short-term self gaining control, and thus on the
bliss action of the short-term self, by the equilibrium of the conﬂict game.
Proof of Lemma 1: First, es = el = 0 is not an equilibrium; a marginal increase in eﬀort by either
self leads to a guarantee of control, and thus a strictly positive increase in utility. Similarly,ei > 0,
e−i = 0 is not an equilibrium; self i would strictly prefer to lower their eﬀort, as doing so does not
reduce their probability of control, but does reduce their cost. Now, consider an interior equilibrium,
es > 0, el > 0. The short-term self chooses es to maximize expected utility, given by
Us(es, el) =
eγs
eγs + e
γ
l
Xsn +
eγl
eγs + e
γ
l
X ln − es.
The ﬁrst and second derivatives of this objective are
∂
∂es
Us(es, el) = γe
γ−1
s e
γ
l (e
γ
s + e
γ
l )
−2Sn − 1;
∂2
∂2es
Us(es, el) = γe
γ−2
s e
γ
l (e
γ
s + e
γ
l )
−3 [(γ − 1)(eγs + eγl )− 2γeγs ]Sn,
similarly for the long-term self. Note that the second derivative is negative if 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, satisfying
the second order condition. We can write the ﬁrst order condition of the selves as
γeγ−1s e
γ
l Sn = (e
γ
s + e
γ
l )
2; γeγ−1l e
γ
sLn = (e
γ
s + e
γ
l )
2.
Deﬁning Rn =
Ln
Sn
, and equating the two left hand sides we have
γeγ−1s e
γ
l Sn = γe
γ−1
l e
γ
sLn ⇒ el = es
Ln
Sn
= esRn.
Substituting into the short-term self's ﬁrst order condition,
γeγ−1s e
γ
sR
γ
nSn = (e
γ
s + e
γ
sR
γ
n)
2 ⇒ γe−1s RγnSn = (1 +Rγn)2
⇒ es = γR
γ
nSn
(1 +Rγn)2
=
γLγnS
γ+1
n
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
.
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We get el similarly, and the probability p of the short-term self winning the contest.
el =
γLγ+1n S
γ
n
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
; p =
eγs
eγs + e
γ
l
=
Sγn
Sγn + L
γ
n
=
1
1 +Rγt
.
This gives us a unique interior local maximum for 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1; we must now verify that neither
self prefers to deviate to ei = 0. Given the above es and el, the expected utility for the short-term
self is
Sγn
Sγn + L
γ
n
Xsn +
Lγn
Sγn + L
γ
n
X ln −
γLγnS
γ+1
n
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
=
Sγn
Sγn + L
γ
n
Xsn −
Sγn
Sγn + L
γ
n
X ln +
Sγn + L
γ
n
Sγn + L
γ
n
X ln −
γLγnS
γ+1
n
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
=
Sγn
Sγn + L
γ
n
(Xsn −X ln) +X ln −
γLγnS
γ+1
n
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
=
Sγ+1n
Sγn + L
γ
n
+X ln −
γLγnS
γ+1
n
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
= X ln +
Sγ+1n (S
γ
n + (1− γ)Lγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
.
If the short-term self exerts zero eﬀort, their expected utility is X ln. So, we need
Sγ+1n (S
γ
n + L
γ
n)− γLγnSγ+1n
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
> 0⇒ Sγ+1n (Sγn + Lγn) > γLγnSγ+1n
⇒ (Sγn + Lγn) > γLγn ⇒ Sγn > (γ − 1)Lγn.
Which is true for γ ≤ 1. Similarly for the long-term self. So, neither player wishes to deviate to
ei = 0; note that this implies that neither bliss point is a Pareto improvement over the disagreement
point. Thus, we have a unique Nash equilibrium given by:
e∗s,n =
γLγnS
γ+1
n
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
, e∗l,n =
γLγ+1n S
γ
n
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
, p∗n =
Sγn
Sγn + L
γ
n
=
1
1 +Rγn
,
which creates an expected utility vector of:
(
X ln +
Sγ+1n (S
γ
n + (1− γ)Lγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
, Y sn +
Lγ+1n (L
γ
n + (1− γ)Sγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
)
.
Proof of Lemma 2: Pareto eﬃciency follows directly from the fact that we are applying the Nash
bargaining solution, and so will only choose a point on the Pareto frontier of U .
Consider replacing the shared payoﬀ utility function u(·) with v(·) = λu(·) + µ. Denote Uun and
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Uvn the respective sets of utility vectors that result from using the two utility functions, and similarly
for u and v superscripts on other terms. Every vector (Us, Ul) ∈ Uun consists of weighted sums of u(·),
and so becomes (λUs +µ, λUl +µ) ∈ Uvn.36 As the bliss points are transformed similarly, Svn = λSun
and Lvn = λL
u
n. Putting these into the formula for d
v
n (with or without the eﬀort costs added in),
we ﬁnd that dvn = λd
u
n + µ. Thus, each point in Uun , as well as the disagreement point, have been
subject to the same aﬃne transformation. It follows from the properties of Nash bargaining that the
outcome is subject to the same aﬃne transformation, and so the resulting lottery (corresponding to
that utility outcome) is unchanged.
If Un is such that (x, y) ∈ Un if and only if (y, x) ∈ Un, then the coordinates of the two bliss
points are necessarily mirrors of each other. Xsn = Y
l
n, X
s
n = Y
l
n, so that Sn = Ln. This immediately
implies that the disagreement point is such that dn,s = dn,l. Given that the disagreement point is
symmetric, the result follows from the Symmetry property of Nash bargaining.
Proof of Lemma 3: The time t1 utility vectors given from choosing ML or MH are, respectively
(
u(ML)e
−ρs∆1 , u(ML)e−ρl∆1
)
;
(
u(MH)e
−ρs(∆1+∆2), u(MH)e−ρl(∆1+∆2)
)
.
If u(MH)e
−ρl∆2 < u(ML), then both selves prefer the sooner payoﬀ, and pL = 1. If u(MH)e−ρs∆2 >
u(ML), then both selves prefer the latter payoﬀ, and pL = 0. In either case, the result follows directly.
Consider now the case where:
u(MH)e
−ρl∆2 > u(ML) > u(MH)e−ρs∆2 ,
so that the long-term self strictly prefers the latter payoﬀ, and the short-term self strictly prefers
the sooner payoﬀ. Then,
S1 = u(ML)e
−ρs∆1 − u(MH)e−ρs(∆1+∆2) = e−ρs∆1
(
u(ML)− u(MH)e−ρs∆2
)
L1 = u(MH)e
−ρl(∆1+∆2) − u(ML)e−ρl∆1 = e−ρl∆1
(
u(MH)e
−ρl∆2 − u(ML)
)
p1 =
Sγ
Sγ + Lγ
=
e−ρs∆1γ
(
u(ML)− u(MH)e−ρs∆2
)γ
e−ρs∆1γ (u(ML)− u(MH)e−ρs∆2)γ + e−ρl∆1γ (u(MH)e−ρl∆2 − u(ML))γ
36The weighted sums are discounted sums of expectations of utilities induced by lotteries over actions.
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=(
u(ML)− u(MH)e−ρs∆2
)γ
(u(ML)− u(MH)e−ρs∆2)γ + e(ρ2−ρl)∆1γ (u(MH)e−ρl∆2 − u(ML))γ ⇒
∂
∂∆1
p1 < 0.
Thus, the probability the short-term self wins the conﬂict game is decreasing in ∆1. From Lemma
A.3, the decision of the agent will have the same weightings on the actions as the conﬂict game.
Thus, the probability that the bliss point of the short-term self (the smaller, sooner payout) is chosen
is decreasing in ∆1. 
Proof of Proposition 1 (Diminishing Impatience): Without loss of generality, we can consider
the shared payoﬀ utility to be zero. Note that this implies that the discounted utilities of the actions
only diﬀer through their impact on future action sets, and therefore future payoﬀ utilities.
Consider the eﬀects of an ε increase in ∆1. Denote with superscript ε relevant terms after this
increase. So, ∆ε1 = ∆1 + ε, Uε1 is the set of utility vectors after the increase, Sε1 and Lε1 are the
respective diﬀerences between bliss points utilities for the two selves after the increase. The time
between the decision at time t1 and all payoﬀ utilities increases by ε, so that both selves discount
the value of all lotteries at time t1 by an additional e
−ερi as a result of the change. The proof will
proceed by considering three bargaining problems given by:
< U1, d1 >;< Uε1 , da1 >;< Uε1 , dε1 >,
where
da1 = (e
−ερsd1,s, e−ερld1,l).
We will show ﬁrst that the ﬁrst two bargaining problems result in the same chosen lottery, and
second that the third bargaining problem improves the outcome for the long-term self relative to
the second bargaining problem. This will then immediately imply that the ε problem gives higher
utility to the long-term self.
Consider < Uε1 , da1 >. The ﬁrst coordinate (short-term self utility) of all utility vectors in
Uε1 , as well as the disagreement point, are multiplied by e−ερs relative to < U1, d1 >. Similarly
with the long-term self utility and e−ερl . This means that < Uε1 , da1 > is an aﬃne transformation
of < U1, d1 > and, by the invariance to aﬃne transformations property of the Nash bargaining
solution, both bargaining problems must result in the same action.
Now consider < Uε1 , dε1 >. Note that:
Sε1 = e
−ερsXs1 − e−ερsX l1 = e−ερsS1; Lε1 = e−ερlLs1 − e−ερlLl1 = e−ερlL1.
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We must consider the disagreement point both with and without the eﬀort cost added in. Recall
that without the cost added in:
d1 =
(
X l1 +
Sγ+11
Sγ1 + L
γ
1
, Y s1 +
Lγ+11
Sγ1 + L
γ
1
)
,
which implies:
dε1 =
(
e−ερsX ln +
(e−ερsS1)γ+1
(e−ερsSn)γ + (e−ερlLn)γ
, e−ερlY sn +
(e−ερlL1)γ+1
(e−ερsSn)γ + (e−ερlLn)γ
)
=
(
e−ερs
[
X ln +
S1
γ+1
Snγ + e(ρ2−ρ1)γεLnγ
]
, e−ερl
[
Y sn +
L1
γ+1
e(ρ1−ρ2)γεSnγ + Lnγ
])
.
Now, consider < Uε1 , da1 > again. The disagreement point from this bargaining problem is:
da1 =
(
e−ερs
[
X ln +
S1
γ+1
Snγ + Lnγ
]
, e−ερl
[
Y sn +
L1
γ+1
Snγ + Lnγ
])
.
Now comparing < Uε1 , dε1 > to < Uε1 , da1 >, note that the two share the same set of utility
vectors, but diﬀer in their disagreement point. Speciﬁcally, since ρ2 > ρ1, d
ε
1,s < d
a
1,s, and d
ε
1,l > d
a
1,l.
Applying Lemma A.1, with da1 as the ﬁrst disagreement point, and d
ε
1 as the second, we see that
4ds < 0 and 4dl > 0. Denoting in parenthesis the case where the Pareto frontier is smooth, the
utility the long-term self receives under < Uε1 , dε1 > is (strictly) greater than that received under
< Uε1 , da1 >, meaning that it results in a lottery (strictly) more favorable for the long-term self. As
< Uε1 , da1 > and < U1, d1 > result in the same action, < Uε1 , dε1 > likewise results in an action
(strictly) preferred by the long-term self as compared to < U1, d1 >. This gives the ﬁrst part of the
result.
We now show that this also holds for the disagreement point without the eﬀort added in, which
is given by:
d1 =
(
X ln +
Sγ+1n (S
γ
n + (1− γ)Lγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
, Y st +
Lγ+1n (L
γ
n + (1− γ)Sγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
)
.
The disagreement points for the ε case and the aﬃne transformation case are given by:
dε1 =
(
e−ερsX ln +
(e−ερsSn)γ+1 ((e−ερsSn)γ + (1− γ)(e−ερlLn)γ)
((e−ερsSn)γ + (e−ερlLn)γ)2
,
e−ερlY st +
(e−ερlLn)γ+1 ((e−ερlLn)γ + (1− γ)(e−ερsSn)γ)
((e−ερsSn)γ + (e−ερlLn)γ)2
)
=
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(
e−ερs
[
X ln +
Sn
γ+1
(
Sγn + (1− γ)e(ρ2−ρ1)γεLγn
)
(Sγn + e(ρ2−ρ1)γεLγn)2
]
, e−ερl
[
Y st +
Lγ+1n
(
Lγn + (1− γ)e(ρ1−ρ2)γεSγn
)
(e(ρ1−ρ2)γεSγn + Lγn)2
])
;
da1 =
(
e−ερs
[
X ln +
Sn
γ+1 (Sγn + (1− γ)Lγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
]
, e−ερl
[
Y st +
Lγ+1n (L
γ
n + (1− γ)Sγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
])
.
If dε1,s < d
a
1,s, and similarly, d
ε
1,l > d
a
1,l, then the application of Lemma 1 goes through as before.
dε1,s < d
a
1,s ⇔
(
Sγn + (1− γ)e(ρ2−ρ1)γεLγn
)
(Sγn + e(ρ2−ρ1)γεLγn)2
<
(Sγn + (1− γ)Lγn)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)2
⇔
(
Sγn + (1− γ)e(ρ2−ρ1)γεLγn
)
(Sγn + L
γ
n)
2 < (Sγn + (1− γ)Lγn) (Sγn + e(ρ2−ρ1)γεLγn)2
⇔
(
Sγn + (1− γ)e(ρ2−ρ1)γεLγn
) (
S2γn + 2S
γ
nL
γ
n + L
2γ
n
)
<
(Sγn + (1− γ)Lγn)
(
S2γn + 2e
(ρ2−ρ1)γεSγnL
γ
n + e
(ρ2−ρ1)γεL2γn
)
⇔ 2S2γn Lγn + SγnL2γn + (1− γ)e(ρ2−ρ1)γεLγnS2γn <
2e(ρ2−ρ1)γεS2γn L
γ
n + e
(ρ2−ρ1)γεSγnL
2γ
n + (1− γ)LγnS2γn
⇔ (1− γ)(e(ρ2−ρ1)γε − 1)LγnS2γn < 2(e(ρ2−ρ1)γε − 1)S2γn Lγn + (e(ρ2−ρ1)γε − 1)SγnL2γn
e(ρ2−ρ1)γε − 1 is positive, so,
⇔ (1− γ)LγnS2γn < 2S2γn Lγn + SγnL2γn ⇔ 0 < (1 + γ)Sγn + Lγn,
with the last true since γ ≥ 0. Similarly for dε1,l > da1,l. Thus, the ﬁrst part of Proposition 1
holds whether we use the disagreement point with or without the eﬀort costs added in.
Now consider the second part of Proposition 1. The utility granted to the long-term self is
bounded below by the utility granted to them by the disagreement point. Thus, the diﬀerence
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between the long-term self's bliss point utility and the utility granted to them by the action chosen
by the agent is bounded above by the diﬀerence between their bliss point utility and the utility of
the disagreement point. In other words,
Y l,ε1 − Ul(D(Aε1))
e−ρl(41+ε)
≤ Y
l,ε
1 − dε1,l
e−ρl(41+ε)
.
So, let us consider the limit of the right hand side.
lim
ε→∞
Y l,ε1 − dε1,l
e−ρl(41+ε)
= lim
ε→∞e
ρl(41+ε)
(
e−ερlY l1 − e−ερl
[
Y s1 +
L1
γ+1
e(ρ1−ρ2)γεSnγ + Lnγ
])
=
lim
ε→∞e
ρl41
(
Y l1 − Y s1 −
L1
γ+1
e(ρ1−ρ2)γεSnγ + Lnγ
)
= lim
ε→∞e
ρl41
(
L1 − L1
γ+1
e(ρ1−ρ2)γεSnγ + Lnγ
)
= lim
ε→∞e
ρl41L1
(
1− L1
γ
e(ρ1−ρ2)γεSnγ + Lnγ
)
= 0,
the last following from the fact that ρ1 − ρ2 < 0. The result also follows with the disagreement
point without eﬀort costs added in.
lim
ε→∞e
ρl(41+ε)
(
e−ερlY l1 − e−ερl
[
Y s1 +
Lγ+11
(
Lγ1 + (1− γ)e(ρ1−ρ2)γεSγ1
)
(e(ρ1−ρ2)γεSγ1 + L
γ
1)
2
])
= lim
ε→∞e
ρl41
(
Y l1 − Y s1 −
Lγ+11
(
Lγ1 + (1− γ)e(ρ1−ρ2)γεSγ1
)
(e(ρ1−ρ2)γεSγ1 + L
γ
1)
2
)
= lim
ε→∞e
ρl41L1
(
1− L
γ
1
(
Lγ1 + (1− γ)e(ρ1−ρ2)γεSγ1
)
(e(ρ1−ρ2)γεSγ1 + L
γ
1)
2
)
= 0.
So, for either disagreement point,
lim
ε→∞
Y l,ε1 − Ul(D(Aε1))
e−ρl(41+ε)
≤ lim
ε→∞
Y l,ε1 − dε1,l
e−ρl(41+ε)
= 0.
Proof of Lemma 4: Consider a given commitment action a1 ∈ Ar1 which constrains An to an. The
discounted utility a self receives from a1 is given by:
Ui(a1) = u(a1) +K + e
−ρi∆tUi(an),
where K is the total of discounted payoﬀ utilities resulting from all decisions strictly between 1
and n, of which there may be none. Following from the deﬁnition of required commitment set, and
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the fact that commitment actions a1 cannot aﬀect the action sets in periods other than n, u(a1) and
K are the same ∀ a1, so without loss of generality we can normalize u(a1) +K to zero.37 Similarly,
a commitment lottery α1 ∈ Ar1 induces a realized lottery over actions at decision n, αn. As the
utilities of lotteries are equal to the lottery over utilities, we have:
Ui(α1) = e
−ρi∆tUi(αn)⇒ eρi∆tUl(α1) = Ul(αn).
Now, note that αncn 6= bln. That is, the agent will not choose a degenerate lottery on the bliss
action of the long-term self at decision n; this follows from the fact that the bliss points are not
Pareto improvements over the disagreement point (shown in the proof of Lemma 1), and thus cannot
be the Nash bargaining solution. So,
Ul(α
nc
n ) < Ul(b
l
n)⇒ 0 < Ul(bln)− Ul(αncn ).
Consider now the case where ∆t = 0. Because Ur1 is not discounted relative to Uncn , Uncn = Ur1 ,
and the lottery over actions induced by the commitment lottery choice will be the same as the lottery
chosen without commitment, so that αncn = α
r
n. Now consider increasing ∆t. By Proposition 1,
lim
∆t→∞
Y l1 − Ul(D(Ar1))
e−ρl∆t
= 0⇒ lim
∆t→∞
eρl∆tUl(b
l
1)− eρl∆tUl(αr1) = 0
⇒ lim
∆t→∞
Ul(b
l
n) = Ul(α
r
n).
So, for ∆t = 0, Ul(α
r
n) = Ul(α
nc
n ) < Ul(b
l
n), while in the limit of ∆t, Ul(α
nc
n ) < Ul(α
r
n) = Ul(b
l
n).
Thus, there ∃ some ∆ for which Ul(αncn ) < Ul(αrn). By the ﬁrst part of Proposition 1, Ul(αrn) is
monotonically increasing in ∆t, so Ul(α
nc
n ) < Ul(α
r
n) ∀ ∆t ≥ ∆. The diﬀerence in the utilities for
the long-term self trivially implies that αncn 6= αrn.
If the Pareto frontier of Uncn is smooth at (Us(αncn ), Ul(αncn )) then again consider the limiting
case with ∆t = 0, so that α
nc
n = α
r
n, implying
(Us(α
nc
n ), Ul(α
nc
n )) = (Us(α
r
n), Ul(α
r
n)) .
Since the utility vectors in Ur1 are the discounted utility vectors of Uncn , the Pareto frontier of Ur1
is smooth at a vector if the Pareto frontier of Uncn is smooth at the corresponding vector. As Uncn
is smooth at (Us(α
r
n), Ul(α
r
n)), Ur1 is smooth at (Us(αr1), Ul(αr1)). Finally, we can apply the ﬁrst
part of Proposition 1 to see that a marginal increase in ∆t causes a strict increase in Ul(α
r
n), which
37This amounts to a non-distorting shifting of the entire bargaining problem, which has no impact on the lotteries
chosen.
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indicates for ∆t > 0 the utilities, and thus the actions, will diﬀer.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Preference for Commitment): First, denote αcnc1 ∈ Ao1 the lottery
over commitment actions at decision 1 that induces the same lottery over decision n actions as
αncn . That is, α
cnc
1 is committing to doing what you would have done if you hadn't committed;
cnc indicates committing to the non-committing action lottery. It diﬀers from not committing in
that it carries with it some commitment cost, c, and so is Pareto dominated by the no commitment
action, anc1 in Ao1. Now note that Uo1 consists of Ur1 with the addition of (Us(anc1 ), Ul(anc1 )) =
(Us(α
cnc
1 ) + c, Ul(α
cnc
1 ) + c), as well as mixings between that vector and the Pareto frontier of Urm;
see the right graph of Figure 7 for a visualization.
Start with the case where Uncn contains Pareto improvements on all strict mixings between αncn
and αrn, both of which lie on the Pareto frontier. Since Ur1 consists of discounted utility vectors from
Uncn , the utility vectors induced by αcnc1 and αr1, (Us(acnc1 ), Ul(acnc1 )) and (Us(ar1), Ul(ar1)), lie on
the Pareto frontier of Ur1 , and the line segment between their induced utility vectors lies inside of
Ur1 . However, (Us(acnc1 ), Ul(acnc1 )) is not on the Pareto frontier of Uo1 , since it is dominated by the
no commitment action in anc1 ∈ Ao1.
We will proceed in two steps. Step 1 is to show that for suﬃciently small cost of commitment,
αr1 is on the Pareto frontier of Uo1 . Step 2 is to show that for suﬃciently small cost of commitment,
if αr1 is on the Pareto frontier of Uo1 , it will be the lottery chosen.
Step 1. Consider the lottery over decision 1 actions deﬁned by 0.5acnc1 + 0.5α
r
1. As Ur1 contains
Pareto improvements on all strict mixings between acnc1 and α
r
1, there is some point α
P
1 with induced
utility vector
(
Us(a
P
1 ), Ul(a
P
1 )
)
on the Pareto frontier of Ur1 which Pareto dominates this 50/50
mixture. Speciﬁcally,
Us(a
P
1 ) > 0.5Us(a
cnc
1 ) + 0.5Us(α
r
1)⇒ Us(aP1 )− 0.5Us(acnc1 )− 0.5Us(αr1) ≡ εs > 0;
Ul(a
P
1 ) > 0.5Ul(a
cnc
1 ) + 0.5Ul(α
r
1)⇒ Ul(aP1 )− 0.5Ul(acnc1 )− 0.5Ul(αr1) ≡ εl > 0.
Now consider the lottery over decision 1 actions deﬁned by 0.5anc1 + 0.5α
r
1. This lottery is Pareto
dominated by aP1 if
Us(a
P
1 )− 0.5Us(anc1 )− 0.5Us(αr1) > 0⇔ Us(aP1 )− 0.5 [Us(αcnc1 ) + c]− 0.5Us(αr1) > 0
⇔ Us(aP1 )− 0.5Us(αcnc1 )− 0.5c− 0.5Us(αr1) > 0⇔ εs − 0.5c > 0⇔ 2εs > c.
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So, for suﬃciently small c, 0.5anc1 + 0.5α
r
1 is Pareto dominated by a
P
1 .
Now, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that 0.5anc1 + 0.5α
r
1 is Pareto dominated by a
P
1 , and
αr1 is not on the Pareto frontier of Uo1 .
Note that Ul(α
cnc
1 ) < Ul(α
r
1) ⇒ Ul(αr1) − Ul(αcnc1 ) ≡ δl > 0, by Lemma 4. As Ul(αcnc1 ) + c =
Ul(a
nc
1 ), it follows that for c < δl, Ul(a
nc
1 ) < Ul(α
r
1), meaning that α
r
1 is not Pareto dominated by
anc1 . Then, it must be the case that α
r
1 is dominated by a mixing between a
nc
1 and some other lottery
αD1 ∈ Ar1 that induces a utility vector on the Pareto frontier of Ur1 . So,
wUs(α
D
1 ) + (1− w)Us(anc1 ) > Us(αr1); wUl(αD1 ) + (1− w)Ul(anc1 ) > Ul(αrl ).
Then, it follows that since the mixture between anc1 and α
D
1 dominates α
r
1, it must be that
Ul(α
r
1) < Ul(α
D
1 ). Similarly, as α
P
1 is a mixture of α
r
1 and a
nc
1 , Ul(a
nc
1 ) < Ul(α
P
1 ) < Ul(α
r
1).
Altogether,
Ul(a
nc
1 ) < Ul(α
P
1 ) < Ul(α
r
1) < Ul(α
D
1 ).
For ease of notation, I will refer to the utility vectors induced by these four as Unc, UP , Ur and
UD. I will use m(Unc, UP ) to refer to the magnitude of the slope between Unc and UP .
As UP was established as a Pareto improvement on a mixing between Unc and Ur, it must be
the case that UP lies above the mixing line segment connecting Unc and Ur. This implies
m(UP , Unc) > m(Ur, Unc) > m(Ur, UP ).
Next, UP , Ur and UD are all vectors on the Pareto frontier of Ur1 . Since Ur1 is convex,
Ul(α
P
1 ) < Ul(α
r
1) < Ul(α
D
1 )⇒ m(Ur, UP ) ≥ m(Ur, UD).
Together,
⇒ m(Ur, Unc) > m(Ur, UD)⇒ m(Ur, Unc) > m(Unc, UD) > m(Ur, UD).
But, if the last is true, then Ur lies above the mixing line between UD and Unc, which contradicts
the assertion that Ur is Pareto dominated by a mixture of the two. Thus, we conclude that for
c < min{εs, εl, δl},
αr1 lay on the Pareto frontier of Uo1 . Figure A.2 gives a visualization of the relevant slopes.
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Figure A.2: Illustration of slopes.
Illustrated by the thick curve is Ur1 . Uo1 consists of this plus the addition of Unc, along with
mixings with it. Finally, as Ur1 is convex, if the line segment connecting Ur to U cnc is strictly inside
the Pareto frontier (excepting the endpoints), as it is by supposition, then there exists an open
subset of the Pareto frontier of Ur1 around Ur such that the line segment connecting any vector in
this subset to U cnc is also strictly inside the Pareto frontier. The argument that was used to show
that αr1 is on the Pareto frontier of Uo1 , then, applies to the points in this open subset as well, which
establishes that there is an open subset of the Pareto frontier of Ur1 containing αr1 which is a subset
of the Pareto frontier of Uo1 .
Step 2. We now want to show that if αr1 lay on the Pareto frontier of Uo1 , then for suﬃciently
small c, αr1 = D(Ao1). We begin by showing that for small c the bliss points of Ur1 are the same as
for Uo1 .
Ul(α
cnc
1 ) < Ul(b
r
l )⇒ Ul(brl )− Ul(αcnc1 ) = ζl > 0⇒ Ul(brl )− Ul(αnc1 ) = ζl − c;
Us(α
cnc
1 ) < Us(b
r
s)⇒ Us(brs)− Us(αcnc1 ) = ζs > 0⇒ Us(brl )− Us(αnc1 ) = ζs − c.
So, for c < min{ζs, ζl}, the bliss points of Ur1 grant higher utility than anc1 , which means that Uo1
has the same bliss points as Ur1 . As the disagreement point is solely dependent on the bliss point, this
means that the decision from Ar1 will utilize the same disagreement point as the decision from Ao1.
Finally, the application of Lemma A.2, with 4ds = 4dl = 0, (Us(αr1), Ul(αr1)) = (Us(αo1), Ul(αo1))⇒
αr1 = α
o
1.
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Thus, for c < min{εs, εl, δl, ζl, ζs}, αr1 = αo1. This concludes the case for when Uncn contains
Pareto improvements on all strict mixings between αncn and α
r
n.
Now we consider the case where Uncn does not contain Pareto improvements on strict mixings
between αncn and α
r
n. In this case, the utility vectors induced by the two lotteries must lie on a line
segment which is a subset of the Pareto frontier of Uncn . Similarly, then, αcnc1 and αr1 must lie on a
line segment on the Pareto frontier of Ur1 . As for the ﬁrst part of the proof, this is because Ur1 is
a distortion of Uncn . Consider the endpoints of this line segment, and the corresponding lotteries.
Denote these lotteries g and h. We can then write:
αr1 = θ
rg + (1− θr)h; αcnc1 = θncg + (1− θnc)h,
for some values of θr and θnc. Denote gl = Ul(g), gs = Us(g), hl = Ul(h), hs = Us(h). As α
r
1 is
the result of the Nash bargaining solution for Ur1 , and thus maximizes the Nash product, we know
that
(θrgl + (1− θr)hl − drl )(θrgs + (1− θr)hs − drs)
−(θncgl + (1− θnc)hl − drl )(θncgs + (1− θnc)hs − drs) = εN > 0.
Now we look at the no commitment lottery in Ao1,
(Us(a
nc
1 ), Ul(a
nc
1 )) = (Us(α
cnc
1 ) + c, Ul(α
cnc
1 ) + c)
= (θncgs + (1− θnc)hs + c, θncgl + (1− θnc)hl + c) .
Consider the lottery given by
α˜r1 =
θr − θnc
1− θnc g +
1− θr
1− θnc a
nc
1
Intuitively, α˜r1 maintains the same relative position as α
r
1, but is shifted up to the Pareto frontier
that has been expanded by the addition of anc1 to the choice set. Now,
(Us(α˜
r
1), Ul(α˜
r
1)) =
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(
θr − θnc
1− θnc gs +
1− θr
1− θnc [θ
ncgs + (1− θnc)hs + c] , θ
r − θnc
1− θnc gl +
1− θr
1− θnc [θ
ncgl + (1− θnc)hl + c]
)
=
(
θrgs + (1− θr)hs + 1− θ
r
1− θnc c, θ
rgl + (1− θr)hl + 1− θ
r
1− θnc c
)
.
As previously established, if c < min{ζs, ζl} then the disagreement points of Uo1 and Ur1 are the
same. Now we look at the diﬀerence in the Nash products that result from selecting α˜r1 or selecting
anc1 from Uo1 .
(
θrgs + (1− θr)hs + 1− θ
r
1− θnc c− ds
)(
θrgl + (1− θr)hl + 1− θ
r
1− θnc c− dl
)
−
(θncgs + (1− θnc)hs + c− ds) (θncgl + (1− θnc)hl + c− dl) =
1− θr
1− θnc c
(
θr(gl + gs) + (1− θr)(hl + hs) + 2 1− θ
r
1− θnc c− (dl + ds)
)
−
c (θnc(gl + gs) + (1− θnc)(hl + hs) + 2c− (dl + ds)) + εN .
For suﬃciently low c, this diﬀerence is positive, as all terms except εN approach zero. This
means that for suﬃciently low c, α˜r1 results in a higher Nash product than a
nc
1 , so that a degenerate
lottery on anc1 cannot be the choice of the agent.
Proof of Lemma 5: Two cases. If c > 0, then because the discounted utility received from
actions committed to vanishes as ∆t → ∞, and the no commitment action anc1 has strictly higher
payoﬀ utility than all other actions in Ao1, for suﬃciently high t the utility vector induced by the no
commitment action Pareto dominates all other utility vectors, and the result follows.
If c = 0, then U(anc1 ) = U(α
cnc
1 ). For ∆t = 0, Uo1 and Uncn are all the same utility vector
set. Thus, as we know the agent chooses αncn at decision n, he must choose some mixture of the
equivalent vectors from Uo1 , which are anc1 and αcnc1 . By Proposition 1, increasing the time between
commitment and payoﬀ (∆t) cannot decrease the future payoﬀ to the long-term self, meaning that
αon (the lottery of decision n actions induced by α
o
1) must weakly improve for the long-term self
(move up on the Pareto frontier of Uncn ). But this means that αo1 must also move up the Pareto
frontier of Uo1 from a
nc
1 , and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3 (Minimal Commitment Equivalence): First, note that Am1 may be
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represented as [a, b], with am1 ∈ [a, b] being the minimal action committed to, so that choosing
am1 ∈ Am1 causes the action set at decision n to be limited to [am1 , b]. By supposition, Un([am1 , b])
will have a Pareto frontier of pure actions, and so the decision made by the agent in decision n is
a pure action in [am1 , b]. By Lemma 6, then, the commitment to a minimal a
m
1 is equivalent to the
commitment to some an ∈ [am1 , b].
Now, as Ui(an) is continuous by supposition, Un varies continuously with the size of the interval
of actions available at decision n. Likewise, as the disagreement point varies continuously with the
bliss points, which vary continuously with Un, the disagreement point varies continuously with the
size of the interval of actions available. Then, as the Nash bargaining solution is continuous with
respect to the disagreement point values, and points on the Pareto frontier, the decision made by
the agent at decision n varies continuously with the size of the interval of actions available.
Consider am1 = b. This limits the action set at decision n to [b, b] = {b}. Now consider decreasing
am1 continuously, so that the action set at decision n, [a
m
1 , b] is increasing. By the previous continuity
argument, this continuous decrease of am1 results in decision actions n that vary continuously, starting
from b; they cannot go above b since that is the deﬁned maximum action. Varying am1 from b to a,
the set of decision n actions that result vary from b to some minimum of a′. Every an ∈ [a′, b] is
induced by some am1 ∈ [a, b], and am1 induces no actions outside of [a′, b]. Thus, Ar1 and Am1 create
the same set of decision n actions, and therefore the same decision 1 discounted utilities. As they
have the same commitment cost c by supposition, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 4 (Pure Temptation): I will drop the n subscript here for ease of notation.
First, note that the disagreement point, with or without eﬀort cost added in, can be expressed as a
function of the four bliss point utility values Xs, Y s, X l, Y l. We can then consider the change in
the disagreement point utilities with respect to a change in the bliss point utility values. Start with
the disagreement point with eﬀort costs added in.
d = (ds, dl) =
(
X l +
Sγ+1
Sγ + Lγ
, Y s +
Lγ+1
Sγ + Lγ
)
.
S = Xs −X l and L = Y l − Y s, so that
∂ds
∂Xs
=
(γ + 1)Sγ
Sγ + Lγ
− S
γ+1γSγ−1
(Sγ + Lγ)2
=
S2γ + (γ + 1)SγLγ
(Sγ + Lγ)2
> 0;
∂dl
∂Xs
= − L
γ+1Sγ−1
(Sγ + Lγ)2
< 0;
⇒ ∂ds
∂Xs
(U1l − d1l )−
∂dl
∂Xs
(U1s − d1s) > 0⇒
∂Us(D(A))
∂Xs
≥ 0,
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with the last from application of Lemma A.2, with the inequality strict if the Pareto frontier is
smooth. Since by supposition there are no Pareto improvements on the original choice, we also have
∂Ul(D(A))
∂Xs
≤ 0,
also with the inequality strict if the Pareto frontier is smooth.
Now consider the disagreement point with eﬀort costs added in,
d = (ds, dl) =
(
X l +
S2γ+1 + (1− γ)Sγ+1Lγ
(Sγ + Lγ)2
, Y s +
L2γ+1 + (1− γ)Lγ+1Sγ
(Sγ + Lγ)2
)
.
∂ds
∂Xs
=
(2γ + 1)S2γ + (1− γ)(1 + γ)SγLγ
(Sγ + Lγ)2
− 2γSγ−1S
2γ+1 + (1− γ)Sγ+1Lγ
(Sγ + Lγ)3
=
S3γ + (γ2 + 2)S2γLγ + (1− γ2)SγL2γ
(Sγ + Lγ)3
> 0;
∂dl
∂Xs
=
γ(1− γ)Sγ−1Lγ+1
(Sγ + Lγ)2
− 2γSγ−1L
2γ+1 + (1− γ)Lγ+1Sγ
(Sγ + Lγ)3
=
γ(γ − 1)S2γ−1Lγ+1 − γ(γ + 1)Sγ−1L2γ+1
(Sγ + Lγ)3
< 0;
So, the same reasoning applies.
Proof of Lemma 7: An increase in Xs has two potential eﬀects to consider. One is the alteration
of the disagreement point, and one is the alteration of the Pareto frontier. The ﬁrst increases
Us(D(A)), as seen in the proof of Proposition 4. For the second, an increase in Xs can expand
the Pareto frontier, but not contract it. The utilities granted by the Nash bargaining solution both
strictly increase if Pareto improvements upon a bargaining outcome are added. Thus, both eﬀects
increase Us(D(A)).
Proof of Proposition 5: We drop the n subscripts for ease of notation. As in the proof of
Proposition 4, we look at the eﬀect on the disagreement point of altering the bliss values. Note that
∂L
∂Y s = −1, and consider ﬁrst the disagreement point with eﬀort costs added in.
∂dl
∂Y s
= 1 +
−(γ + 1)Lγ
Sγ + Lγ
+
γLγ−1Lγ+1
(Sγ + Lγ)2
=
(Sγ + Lγ)2 − (γ + 1)Lγ(Sγ + Lγ) + γLγ−1Lγ+1
(Sγ + Lγ)2
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=
(1− γ)SγLγ + S2γ
(Sγ + Lγ)2
> 0;
∂ds
∂Y s
=
γSγ+1Lγ−1
(Sγ + Lγ)2
> 0.
As the disagreement point improves for both selves, the application of Lemma A.2 is less straight-
forward than for the proof of Proposition 4.
4ds(Ul(α)− dl)−4dl(Us(α)− ds) < 0⇔
γSγ+1Lγ−1
(Sγ + Lγ)2
(Ul(α)− dl)− (1− γ)S
γLγ + S2γ
(Sγ + Lγ)2
(Us(α)− ds) < 0
⇔ (γSLγ−1)(Ul(α)− dl) < ((1− γ)Lγ + Sγ)(Us(α)− ds)⇔ Ul(α)− dl
Us(α)− ds <
(1− γ)Lγ + Sγ
γSLγ−1
.
So,
Ul(α)− dl
Us(α)− ds <
(1− γ)Lγ + Sγ
γSLγ−1
⇒4ds(Ul(α)− dl)−4dl(Us(α)− ds) < 0⇒
∂Us(D(A))
∂Y s
≤ 0, ∂Ul(D(A))
∂Y s
≥ 0.
Proposition 5' (Indirect Temptation with original disagreement point): Consider a deci-
sion maker choosing αn from An, corresponding Un, and consider the eﬀects of altering the utility
granted to the long-term self by the short-term self bliss point: Y sn . As long as an open connected sub-
set of the Pareto frontier of Un containing the Nash bargaining outcome (Us(αn), Ul(αn)) remains
a subset of the Pareto frontier of Un, then
L
S
∗ (S
γ
n + L
γ
n)
2 + γ2Lγn(S
γ
n − Lγn)
γLγn(S
γ
n + L
γ
n) + γ2L
γ
n(S
γ
n − Lγn) <
Ul(αn)− dl
Us(αn)− ds ⇒
∂Us(D(An))
∂Y sn
≥ 0, ∂Ul(D(An))
∂Y sn
≤ 0,
with the reverse strict inequality implying the reverse weak inequalities.
Proof: The proof is the same as that for Proposition 5, other than the derivatives of the disagreement
point values.
∂dl
∂Y s
= 1− (2γ + 1)L
2γ + (1− γ)(1 + γ)SγLγ
(Sγ + Lγ)2
+ 2γLγ−1
L2γ+1 + (1− γ)Lγ+1Sγ
(Sγ + Lγ)3
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=
(Sγ + Lγ)3 − (Sγ + Lγ) ((2γ + 1)L2γ + (1− γ)(1 + γ)SγLγ)+ 2γL3γ + 2γ(1− γ)L2γSγ
(Sγ + Lγ)3
=
S2γLγ
(
2 + γ2
)
+ S3γ + SγL2γ
(
1− γ2)
(Sγ + Lγ)3
.
∂ds
∂Y s
= −γ(1− γ)S
γ+1Lγ−1
(Sγ + Lγ)2
+ 2γLγ−1
S2γ+1 + (1− γ)Sγ+1Lγ
(Sγ + Lγ)3
=
−(Sγ + Lγ)γ(1− γ)Sγ+1Lγ−1 + 2γLγ−1S2γ+1 + 2γ(1− γ)Sγ+1L2γ−1
(Sγ + Lγ)3
=
(γ − γ2)Sγ+1L2γ−1 + (γ + γ2)S2γ+1Lγ−1
(Sγ + Lγ)3
.
So that,
∂dl/∂Y
s
∂ds/∂Y s
=
S2γLγ
(
2 + γ2
)
+ S3γ + SγL2γ
(
1− γ2)
(γ − γ2)Sγ+1L2γ−1 + (γ + γ2)S2γ+1Lγ−1
=
L
S
∗ S
γLγ
(
2 + γ2
)
+ S2γ + L2γ
(
1− γ2)
(γ − γ2)L2γ + (γ + γ2)SγLγ
=
L
S
∗ (S
γ + Lγ)2 + γ2Lγ(Sγ − Lγ)
γLγ(Sγ + Lγ) + γ2Lγ(Sγ − Lγ)
The rest of the proof follows as for Proposition 5.
Proof of Lemma 9: Deﬁne R = LS . Then,
wUl(a) + (1− w)Us(a) > wUl(b) + (1− w)Us(b)⇔ w(Ul(a)− Ul(b)) > (1− w)(Us(b)− Us(a))
⇔ wL > (1− w)S ⇔ R > 1− w
w
⇔ p = 1
Rγ + 1
<
1(
1−w
w
)γ
+ 1
,
the last connection from Lemma 1 and A.3.
Proof of Lemma 11: By lemma 4, the ultimate action will shift in favor of the long-term self
for suﬃciently large ∆t. This shifted action, in turn, will increase the discounted utility for the
long-term self and decrease it for the short-term self. For suﬃciently large ∆t, the ratio between
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this increase and decrease can be made arbitrarily large, as the short-term self discounts at a faster
rate. Thus, for any weighting of the long-term self's utility, we can choose ∆t high enough that the
weighted sum will increase.
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Appendix B: Proofs for Temporal Reference Points Model
Proof of Lemma 1: First, diminishing impatience. As the agent is information focused, and there
are no new informational updates in a deterministic prospect, there are no temporal reference points
that break up the length of time which the agent discounts over. Thus,
(a, 0) ∼ (b, t1)⇔ u(a) = u(b)D(t1), and
(a, t2)  (b, t1 + t2)⇔ u(a)D(t2) ≤ u(b)D(t1 + t2).
So, (a, 0) ∼ (b, t1)⇒ (a, t2)  (b, t1 + t2) ∀ a, b ∈ O, u(a), u(b) > 0, ∀ t1, t2 > 0 ⇔
u(a) = u(b)D(t1)⇒ u(a)D(t2) ≤ u(b)D(t1 + t2) ∀ a, b ∈ O, u(a), u(b) > 0, ∀ t1, t2 > 0 ⇔
u(a)/u(b) = D(t1)⇒ u(a)/u(b) ≤ D(t1 + t2)/D(t2) ∀ a, b ∈ O, u(a), u(b) > 0, ∀ t1, t2 > 0 ⇔
D(t1) ≤ D(t1 + t2)/D(t2) ∀ t1, t2 > 0 ⇔ D(t1)D(t2) ≤ D(t1 + t2) ∀ t1, t2 > 0.
For strongly diminishing impatience, similarly,
(a, t1) ∼ (b, t2)⇔ u(a)D(t1) = u(b)D(t2), and
(a, t1 + t3)  (b, t2 + t3)⇔ u(a)D(t1 + t3) ≤ u(b)D(t2 + t3).
So, (a, t1) ∼ (b, t2)⇒ (a, t1 + t3)  (b, t2 + t3) ∀ a, b ∈ O, u(a), u(b) > 0,
∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0, ⇔
u(a)D(t1) = u(b)D(t2)⇒ u(a)D(t1 + t3) ≤ u(b)D(t2 + t3) ∀ a, b ∈ O, u(a), u(b) > 0,
∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0, ⇔
u(a)/u(b) = D(t2)/D(t1)⇒ u(a)/u(b) ≤ D(t2 + t3)/D(t1 + t3) ∀ a, b ∈ O, u(a), u(b) > 0,
∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0, ⇔
D(t2)/D(t1) ≤ D(t2 + t3)/D(t1 + t3) ∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0, ⇔
D(t2)D(t1 + t3) ≤ D(t1)D(t2 + t3) ∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0,
with the strict cases following by simply making the inequalities strict at each step. As far as
the relation to the hazard rate when the discounting function is continuously diﬀerentiable, it will
suﬃce to show, that when the hazard rate is decreasing,
D(t2)D(t1 + t3) ≤ D(t1)D(t2 + t3) ∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0 ⇔ h′(t) ≤ 0 ∀ t ≥ 0.
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h′(t) ≤ 0 ∀ t ≥ 0⇔ −D
′(t+ α)
D(t+ α)
≤ −D
′(t)
D(t)
∀ t ≥ 0, α > 0
⇔
ˆ t+γ
t
D′(τ + α)
D(τ + α)
dτ >
ˆ
D′(τ)
D(τ)
dτ ∀ t ≥ 0, α, γ > 0
⇔ [ln(D(τ + α))]t+γt ≥ [ln(D(τ))]t+γt ∀ t ≥ 0, α, γ > 0
⇔ ln(D(t+ α+ γ))− ln(D(t+ α)) ≥ ln(D(t+ γ))− ln(D(t)) ∀ t ≥ 0, α, γ > 0
⇔ ln
(
D(t+ α+ γ)
D(t+ α)
)
≥ ln
(
D(t+ γ)
D(t)
)
∀ t ≥ 0, α, γ > 0
⇔ D(t+ α+ γ)
D(t+ α)
≥ D(t+ γ)
D(t)
∀ t ≥ 0, α, γ > 0
⇔ D(t)D(t+ α+ γ) ≥ D(t+ γ)D(t+ α) ∀ t ≥ 0, α, γ > 0
Denote t1 = t, t2 = t+ γ and t3 = α,
⇔ D(t1)D(t2 + t3) ≥ D(t2)D(t1 + t3) ∀ t2 > t1 ≥ 0, t3 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider two prospects A and B, such that A has more grouped infor-
mation than B, with ‖IB‖−‖IA‖ = 1. Recall that by deﬁnition the prospects have the same time 0
distribution over outcomes, and let the unique point in time that B gives an informational update
at but A does not be denoted by tb.
Let's ﬁrst see that ‖IB‖ > 1. If not, IA = {}, which implies that prospect A has no informational
updates, which means it is a deterministic prospect; any non-deterministic prospect necessarily gives
information at some point in the resolution, whether it is before the payout is received, or at the
time the payout is received. Since A and B have the same time 0 distribution over outcomes, this
means that prospect B must also be deterministic. But this contradicts that prospect B has an
informational update, and so by contradiction ‖IB‖ > 1.
Recall that we can write the value of a prospect A as
VA =
ˆ
(α,tn)∈O
u(α) ∗ 40A(α, t) ∗D(tA1 − 0) ∗D(tA2 − tA1 ).... ∗D(tAn−1 − tAn−2) ∗D
(
tn − tAn−1
)
.
Denote by tb−1 and tb+1 as the elements of TA and TB before and after tb respectively. Because
0 < tb < t
B
F , these elements both exist. Further, both TA and TB share these two elements, while only
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TB contains tb. Note that in this case no outcomes can occur at time tb, because both prospects have
the same distribution over outcomes, and thus all times at which outcomes occur must be included
in both TA and TB . Now consider two types of outcomes.
The ﬁrst group are those occurring at or before time tb−1; this group may be empty. If not, then
all such outcomes are discounted by the same sequence of discounting multipliers in both prospects,
as both TA and TB have the same series of elements at and before tb−1. Thus, such outcomes give
the same present value in the calculation of the value of the prospects, and can be ignored in a
comparison of which prospect has the higher value.
The second group are those occurring at or after tb+1. This group is non-empty, because at
minimum some outcomes occur at tAF = t
B
F . The discounting given to these elements for prospect A
will include:
.... ∗D(tb+1 − tb−1) ∗ ....,
while for prospect B it will include:
.... ∗D(tb − tb−1) ∗D(tb+1 − tb) ∗ ....,
where all discount factors before and after those shown are the same for both prospects, since TA
and TB are the same except for tb. Thus, these elements are discounted more heavily for prospect
B, and thus B has a lower value than A, if and only if
D(tb − tb−1) ∗D(tb+1 − tb) ≤ D(tb+1 − tb−1).
And B has a strictly lower value if and only if the inequality is strict.
Now, if A ()  B for any two prospects such that A has more grouped information than B and
‖IB‖−‖IA‖ = 1, then the present value of prospect A is (strictly) higher than for prospect B. Since
this is true for any such A and B, for any positive value of τ1 and τ2 we can ﬁnd a pair of prospects
such that τ1 = tb − tb−1 and τ2 = tb+1 − tb, so it must be the case that
D(τ1 + τ2) (>) ≥ D(τ1)D(τ2) ∀ τ1, τ2 > 0.
In the other direction, if D(τ1 + τ2) (>) ≥ D(τ1)D(τ2) ∀ τ1, τ2 > 0, then for any such pair of
prospects, we have B with some elements discounted more heavily, so that A ()  B.
Now turning attention to the transitive part of the deﬁnition of more grouped information. Note
that for any two prospects, A and Z for which A has more grouped information than Z, it must be
the case that there is a ﬁnite sequence of pairs of prospects, whose magnitudes of their informational
update times diﬀer by only 1, each with more grouped information than the last. So, A is more
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grouped than B, which is more grouped than C, which is more grouped than D..., which is more
grouped than Z, with ‖TB‖ − ‖TA‖ = ‖TC‖ − ‖TB‖ = ‖TD‖ − ‖TC‖ = .... = 1.
Then, if D(τ1 + τ2) (>) ≥ D(τ1)D(τ2) ∀ τ1, τ2 > 0, by the reasoning above, each prospect in
the sequence will have a (strictly) lower value than the one before it, so that prospect A will have a
(strictly) higher value than prospect Z.
If A has a (strictly) higher present value than prospect Z whenever A has more grouped infor-
mation than Z, then just consider the cases where ‖TZ‖ − ‖TA‖ = 1. Then by the reasoning above,
D(τ1 + τ2) (>) ≥ D(τ1)D(τ2) ∀ τ1, τ2 > 0.
Lemma 1, with the observation that D(τ1 + τ2) (>) ≥ D(τ1)D(τ2) ∀ τ1, τ2 > 0 if and only if the
agent exhibits (strictly) diminishing impatience completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2: Due to Lemma 1, it will suﬃce to show that an information focused
agent exhibits (S)PLDI if and only if D(τ2)D(τ1 +τ3) (<) ≤ D(τ1)D(τ2 +τ3) ∀ τ2 > τ1 ≥ 0, τ3 > 0.
Consider A, B ∈ P with ‖IA r IB‖ = ‖IB r IA‖ = 1 that satisfy the four direct conditions
for less dispersed information. Denote by n′ the shared index of the unique elements TA r TB and
TB r TA. Note the times not shared by the two prospects (tAn′ and tBn′) cannot support outcomes,
because if they did, 40A 6= 40B , in violation of the third condition of less dispersed information.
For any time index but n', I will drop superscript to refer to, for example, tn′−1 = tAn′−1 = t
B
n′−1,
since that time is shared by both TA and TB . Now, look at two groups of outcomes.
First, outcomes occurring at or before tn′−1; this group may be empty. If not, then all such
outcomes are discounted by the same sequence of discounting multipliers in both prospects, as both
TA and TB have the same series of elements at and before tn′−1. Thus, such outcomes give the same
present value in the calculation of the value of the prospects, and can be ignored in a comparison of
which prospect has the higher value.
Second, outcomes occurring at or after tn′+1. This set is non-empty, because tn′+1 ≤ tAF . These
outcomes will be discounted diﬀerently by the two prospects.
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In prospect A, they will be discounted by
... ∗D(tAn′ − tn′−1) ∗D(tn′+1 − tAn′) ∗ ....,
in prospect B, by
... ∗D(tBn′ − tn′−1) ∗D(tn′+1 − tBn′) ∗ ....
These outcomes will be discounted more heavily by prospect B if any only if
D(tBn′ − tn′−1) ∗D(tn′+1 − tBn′) ≤ D(tAn′ − tn′−1) ∗D(tn′+1 − tAn′).
From the deﬁnition of less dispersed information,
min{tAn′ − tn′−1, tn′+1 − tAn′} < min{tBn′ − tn′−1, tn′+1 − tBn′}
Let τ1 = min{tAn′ − tn′−1, tn′+1 − tAn′}, τ2 = min{tBn′ − tn′−1, tn′+1 − tBn′}, and τ3 = tn′+1 −
tn′−1 − τ1 − τ2. Then,
D(tBn′ − tn′−1) ∗D(tn′+1 − tBn′) ≤ D(tAn′ − tn′−1) ∗D(tn′+1 − tAn′) ⇔
D(τ2) ∗D(τ1 + τ3) ≤ D(τ1) ∗D(τ2 + τ3).
By construction, τ2 > τ1, and τ3 > 0. To see why the latter is true, note that each of τ1 and
τ2, being minimums of a split between tn′+1 and tn′−1, can be at most half of that distance, and τ1
must be less than τ2, so strictly less than half. Thus, their sum, τ1 + τ2 < tn′+1 − tn′−1, making τ3
strictly positive. Thus, B's outcomes, and thus its present value, will be discounted more heavily
for all such A and B if and only if
D(τ2)D(τ1 + τ3) ≤ D(τ1)D(τ2 + τ3) ∀ τ2 > τ1 ≥ 0, τ3 > 0,
with VB < VA if and only if the inequality is strict.
Turning attention to all possible cases where A has less dispersed information than Z, note that
for any two such prospects, it must be the case that there is a countable sequence of pairs of prospects
starting with A and ending with Z, each pair only disjoint by a single element of I, and each with
less dispersed information than the last. So, A has less dispersed information than B, which has
less dispersed information than C, which has less dispersed information than D..., which has less
dispersed information than Z.
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Then, if D(τ2)D(τ1 + τ3) (<) ≤ D(τ1)D(τ2 + τ3) ∀ τ2 > τ1 ≥ 0, τ3 > 0, by the reasoning above,
each prospect in the sequence will have a (strictly) lower value than one before it, so that prospect
A will have a (strictly) higher present value than prospect Z.
If A has a (strictly) higher present value than prospect Z whenever A has less dispersed infor-
mation than Z, then only consider the cases where A and Z are disjoint by one element, and by the
reasoning above, D(τ2)D(τ1 + τ3) (<) ≤ D(τ1)D(τ2 + τ3) ∀ τ2 > τ1 ≥ 0, τ3 > 0.
Finally, since having a higher present value is the condition for preference, it is concluded that
for an information focused consumer, A  Z whenever A has less dispersed information than Z if
and only if D(τ2)D(τ1 + τ3) (<) ≤ D(τ1)D(τ2 + τ3) ∀ τ2 > τ1 ≥ 0, τ3 > 0.
Lemma 1, with the observation thatD(τ2)D(τ1+τ3) (<) ≤ D(τ1)D(τ2+τ3) ∀ τ2 > τ1 ≥ 0, τ3 > 0
if and only if the agent exhibits (strictly) strongly diminishing impatience completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3: Directly,
A ∼ B ⇔ VA = VB ⇔
ˆ
(α,t)∈O
u(α) ∗ 40A(α, t) ∗D(rA1 − 0) ∗D(rA2 − rA1 ).... ∗D(rAnˆ(t) − rAnˆ(t)−1) ∗D
(
t− rAnˆ(t)
)
=
ˆ
(α,t)∈O
u(α) ∗ 40B(α, t) ∗D(rB1 − 0) ∗D(rB2 − rB1 ).... ∗D(rBnˆ(t) − rBnˆ(t)−1) ∗D
(
t− rBnˆ(t)
)
⇔
D(τ−0)
ˆ
(α,t)∈O
u(α)∗40A(α, t)∗D((rA1 +τ)−τ)∗...D((rAnˆ(t)+τ)−(rAnˆ(t)−1+τ))∗D
(
(t+ τ)− (rAnˆ(t) + τ)
)
=
D(τ−0)
ˆ
(α,t)∈O
u(α)∗40B(α, t)∗D((rB1 +τ)−τ)∗...D((rBnˆ(t)+τ)−(rBnˆ(t)−1+τ))∗D
(
(t+ τ)− (rBnˆ(t) + τ)
)
⇔
D(rC1 − 0)
ˆ
(α,t)∈O
u(α) ∗40A(α, t) ∗D(rC2 − rC1 ) ∗ ...D(rCnˆ(t+τ)− rCnˆ(t+τ)−1) ∗D
(
(t+ τ)− rCnˆ(t+τ)
)
=
D(rD1 −0)
ˆ
(α,t)∈O
u(α)∗40B(α, t)∗D(rD2 −rD1 )∗ ...D(rDnˆ(t+τ)−rDnˆ(t+τ)−1)∗D
(
(t+ τ)− rDnˆ(t+τ)
)
⇔,
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this step from the fact that R(C) = R(A)+τ ∪ {0} and R(D) = R(B)+τ ∪ {0},
ˆ
(α,t+τ)∈O
u(α)∗40C(α, t+τ)∗D(rC1 −0)∗D(rC2 −rC1 )∗...D(rCnˆ(t+τ)−rCnˆ(t+τ)−1)∗D
(
(t+ τ)− rCnˆ(t+τ)
)
=
ˆ
(α,t+τ)∈O
u(α)∗40B(α, t+τ)∗D(rD1 −0)∗D(rD2 −rD1 )∗...D(rDnˆ(t+τ)−rDnˆ(t+τ)−1)∗D
(
(t+ τ)− rDnˆ(t+τ)
)
⇔,
this from the fact that 40X(α, t+ τ) = 40Y (α, t), whenever X is τ -shifted from Y ,
VC = VD ⇔ C ∼ D.
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